


JPRS-UPA-89-034
22 MAY 1989



FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-034

CONTENTS

22 MAY 1989

PARTY, STATE AFFAIRS

Party Work to Restructure Nationality Relations Discussed [R.G. Abdulatipov; VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS No 2, Feb 89]	1
Reasons for Estonian CP Members Quitting Discussed [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 8 Apr 89]	9
ESSR Supsov Commission on Language Meets To Discuss Problems [Y. Kross; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 8 Apr 89]	10
Estonian Suspov Presidium Discusses Economic Accountability [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 2 April 89]	11
City, Rayon Chairmen Meet To Discuss Economic Accountability [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 2 April 89]	11
Kazakh CP CC Criticizes Education Minister Shayakhmetov [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 2 Mar 89]	12
11 Mar Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum	13
Second Secretary Mendybayev's Report [M. S. Mendybayev; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 Mar 89]	13
Resolution on Health, Environment [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 Mar 89]	28
First Secretary Kolbin's Speech [G. V. Kolbin; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 14 Mar 89]	33
Resolution on Political Reforms [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 14 Mar 89]	36

HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY

Roy Medvedev On Brezhnev's 'Weak' Leadership [R. Medvedev; RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR No 6, Nov-Dec 88]	41
Fabrication of Evidence in Tukhachevskiy Affair Alleged [F. Sergeyev; NEDEL'YA No 7, 13-19 Feb 89]	53

RELIGION

Ancient Islamic Spring Holiday Revived in Tajikistan	60
Official Approval [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 14 Mar 89]	60
Historical Significance [A. Kurbanmamadov; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 18 Mar 89]	60
Report on Activities [S. Ozun, V. Ivashchenko; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 21 Mar 89]	61

SOCIAL ISSUES

Impact of Rule-of-Law State Examined [V. M. Savitskiy; MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 24 Mar 89]	64
Riga Demonstrations Prompt Meeting of Law Enforcement Officials [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 11 Mar 89]	67
MVD Spokesman Responds to Readers [B. Mikhaylov; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 13, 1-7 Apr 89]	68
Glasnost Era Work of Visa Administration Examined [A. Lukyanov, A. Lyutyy; PRAVDA, 25 Mar 89]	69
Growing Gang Problem in Schools Outlined [Kommunar Tabayev; LENINSHIL ZHAS, 18 Jan 89]	71
Family Planning, Infant Mortality in Uzbekistan [D.N. Kabulova; SELSKAYA PRAVDA, 2 Feb 89]	76
Serious Health Problems in East Kazakhstan Oblast [V. Kislyakova; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 8 Mar 89]	79
Activities of Ecological, Social Group Defended [V. Stupak; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 21 Feb 89]	80

REGIONAL ISSUES

Student Defends Use of Belorussian Flag, Coat of Arms [Yu. Usmanova; SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 3 Feb 89]	83
Meeting in Chernigov Commemorates Stalin Purge Victims [E. Kiyashko; RABOCHAYA GAZETA, 2 Feb 89]	83

Tajik Premier on Restoring Earthquake-Damaged Areas [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 11 Mar 89]	83
Anticipated Kirghiz SSR Economic, Social Development in 1989 [KOMMUNIST KIRGIZSTANA, Feb 89]	85
Replacement of Director Leads to Strike at Collective Farm [T. Kvyatkovskaya; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 5 Apr 89]	89
Strike Issues Resolved in Favor of Bus Drivers [V. Lebedev; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 9 Apr 89]	91
Alternate Proposals for KaSSR State Language [S.Z. Zimanol; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 Mar 89]	92
Environmental Protection Plan Draws Critical Comments [I. Savinskaya; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 25 Mar 89]	94
Morgun on Goskompiroda Balance Between Ecology, Industry [F.T. Morgun; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 26 Mar 89]	94

Party Work to Restructure Nationality Relations Discussed

18300476 Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 2 Feb 89 pp 33-46

[Article by R.G.Abdulatipov, doctor of philosophy: "Perestroika and Nationality Relations"]

[Text] The decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference are an important milestone in the revolutionary renewal and spiritual and moral cleansing of Soviet society. Our society has entered a qualitatively new stage of social and ethnic integration. The integration and friendship of the USSR peoples is a major factor in achieving the goals set before the country. Discord among the peoples of a multi-ethnic state, on the other hand, wastes our efforts and common creative energies.

Nevertheless, we have recently witnessed instances of such discord. Economic losses due to events in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it amount to millions of rubles. And these are only quantifiable losses, not to mention other aspects of the problem. It is extremely sad that in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia even perestroika's supporters are split along nationality lines. This reduces our common potential for perestroika. Yet, those losses have not begun today; they began when we became complacent about our accomplishments.

"Achievements in the development of the Union are truly historic, despite the current problems; it is a unique entity,"¹ said M.S.Gorbachev at the 26 November, 1988, meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The foundations of the unity of our country's peoples laid down by Lenin proved sufficiently enduring. Yet, at a certain point we have been overcome by complacency. We were unable to notice in time that the principles of socialism and internationalism were being distorted and perverted. Repression against entire ethnic groups during Stalin's personality cult, indifference to issues that ensure harmonious development of republics during the period of stagnation and the long-standing gap between word and deed have sown distrust for the ideology and policy of internationalism. Combined with the arbitrary economic management methods, excessive centralization and dominance of bureaucratic leadership methods, it undermined so much the harmony in many areas of nationality relations that we now need to make colossal efforts to restore dialectic unity between the ethnic and the interethnic and efficient interaction between the federal state and its constituent republics, as well as among the republics themselves. Harmonious development and interaction of nationalities, union republics and autonomous entities stemming from common interests of class, society, every nationality and every individual should clearly be the main goal of nationality policy.

Now, when preparations are underway for the CPSU Central Committee's plenum that will address the issue of improving interethnic relations in the USSR, we

should review our accomplishments and what we want to achieve in understanding and resolving main problems in the nationality relations. We must not do so on a global scale, as is our wont, but specifically, uncovering the true nature of ethnic and interethnic processes. Contrary to our past practices, internationalism and friendship of the peoples should not be made into an icon, even though it may be easier that way as one no longer has to serve them and work to achieve them; it is enough to remember them on major holidays.

Appealing to our distaste for slogans, some extremists want to reject such values as internationalism and friendship of the peoples entirely and actively advocate nationalist ideas. Others advocate such ideas hiding them under phrases about internationalism. Let us not close our eyes to the fact that some people, having lost faith in true internationalist values, succumb to various nationalist lures.

We are yet to study seriously the causes of this phenomenon. Yet, I think that one of them is the negative impact of dogmatic thinking in the theory and analysis of various social processes. Since it is quite complex and not always safe for realistic assessment, the topic of nationality relations became particularly susceptible to dogma. Fear and reluctance to be innovative in assessing the current condition and future development of ethnic and interethnic issues weigh heavy on all of us. Even today, many of those who study the problem find it hard to trespass the boundary of traditional views. Proof of this is in the books on the subject published in the past 3 years and in presentations at conferences, workshops and roundtable discussions.

It is time to breathe new life into those terms that are sacred to us. We have overtaxed such words as internationalism, friendship of the peoples, the Soviet people, patriotism, Motherland and nationality, so that their excessive use sometimes produces an opposite reaction and even rejection of them as something alien or forced upon us from above. How many assurances and pledges of allegiance to internationalism and friendship of the peoples were heard in the parts of the country where nationality relations turned out to be most neglected, and just at the time when they were being distorted most!

One should always approach things great and sacred with a sense of trepidation. Is it the fault of internationalism and friendship of the peoples that those terms have been often used by egoists and careerists to achieve their ends? Of course not. Therefore, we must work together to free them of all those grandiloquent and alien additions and restore to them their original sanctity and purity. Then they will truly serve perestroika; it is already clear that perestroika serves them.

The proverb says that the world is sustained by friendship. Most Soviets understand and agree with this true statement. We all saw how many true friends gave a helpful hand to Armenia in her time of trial.

Historically, Soviet man should develop as quintessential a trait of caring not only for himself and his own nationality but for the entire Soviet socialist fatherland, and of placing common interests above his own personal ones, internationalist interests above ethnic ones and federal interests above local ones. This sociopolitical and moral trait should help overcome selfishness at all levels, from individual to nationality, and assert such ideals as civic-mindedness, internationalism and friendship of the peoples. This is the normative model. Yet, a model is one thing and reality is quite another.

Our experience resolving the nationality issue has much that is useful, valuable and edifying. There is no need to indulge in one-sided criticism. We should assess what has been preserved and what has been lost. And the most important thing is to determine whether or not while trying to learn about our past we continue to neglect our responsibility for the future. By ignoring historical continuity, it is impossible to make a qualitative leap forward.

Turning to our historical experience, we see that in the early years of Soviet power an active and determined search was conducted for ways to ensure harmonious development for all nationalities and ethnic group and to use the growing socialist potential of every nationality to achieve revolutionary change in society. How many diverse forms and methods of resolving crucial issues of economic, social and spiritual development of different regions there were in those years! The approaches to issues of nation and state building were very creative and flexible. Today, we often recall the ethnic rayons and village councils that existed at the time. The 26 November, 1988, meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium also mentioned this issue.

However, the search for best ways to accomplish nation and state building should not turn into another campaign. To avoid this danger we should set strict guidelines for solving such problems. Thus, if we want to create new ethnic administrative entities, we should make sure that they are created for nationalities and ethnic groups who live on a contiguous territory, account for a given share of the region's population and do not have their own administrative entities elsewhere in the country.

Generally speaking, the task of setting up new ethnic or territorial entities is not the main purpose nationality policy. It is most important to create equal and favorable conditions for the development of all nationalities and ethnic and national groups. From the start, Lenin's nationality policy was distinguished by its attention and solicitous regard for the needs of all nationalities and creative application of the norms and principles of internationalism when dealing with extremely complex problems of interethnic relations.

Later, the creative approach was replaced by cliches and uniformity. Regard for ethnic differences grew increasingly formalistic. During the period of personality cult any attempt to oppose the growing dictate of bureaucratic centralism was presented as evidence of nationalism. Similar labels were attached to those who looked for positives in the history of their people or found merit in national folklore, etc. Many in nascent ethnic intelligentsias fell victim to repressions. Is this not why poor education is one of the main impediments to our development and ethnic relations? Is this not why works on ethnic relations are so rarely based on the sacred intellectual foundation of the revolutionary theory of interaction between ethnic diversity and interethnic unity? High cultural level is a prerequisite for the high cultural level of interethnic relations. Only now have we begun to understand this connection.

It would be easy to place all the blame for the distortions of the Leninist principles of nationality policy on certain individual party and state leaders of the past. Yet, a much more important question remains unanswered: why did we tolerate those distortions? Why did the repressions of Stalin's cult, the excesses of voluntarism and the orgy of stagnation fail to insult our dignity and intellect? Why were whole nationalities at a certain point destroyed and we could not even mention those nationalities in our reference books?

There are those who say that repressions against certain nationalities were justified. Traitors and turncoats may be found in any nationality. But there is and there can be no treasonable or fascist nations.

The decisions of the 20th party congress righted many historical wrongs, restored the good name to many wrongly repressed individuals and rehabilitated entire nationalities. This doubtless had a positive impact on interethnic relations. However, many crucial issues for many nationalities and ethnic groups remained unsolved and were not even raised. Later, stagnation in the life of society manifested itself in neglect of important problems in the development of regions and in stronger administrative dictate. This exacerbated nationality relations, in particular in the socioeconomic and cultural and linguistic areas.

I doubt that a determined campaign against some nationalities was being waged, as some people claim in certain republics. Yet, the inflexible bureaucratic approach and short-sighted policies of top economic leaders and their unwillingness to look to the future hurt the Baltic republics, peasants in Russia's Non-Chernozem region, Kara-Kalpak ASSR residents now facing an ecological disaster and many other nationalities.

Today, by dint of a joint effort, we seem to be recovering the truth, but we now have encountered exaggerated claims of national differences and manifestations of national prejudice. As a reaction to mechanically

imposed centralization—which used to reach comic proportions, as when the Chairman of the EsSSR Council of Ministers had to ask permission of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium to bake cakes according to local pastry chiefs' recipes²—centrifugal trends have arisen both in politics and economics.

While seeking solutions to accumulated problems, some comrades in Estonia have fallen into another extreme, which has taken the form of placing republican laws above Union laws. Now, when what we need are joint efforts from all republics to attain perestroyka's goals, turning our Union into an amorphous confederation would not serve the true interests of any nationality or ethnic group.

Are we not capable of achieving a balance between ethnic and interethnic, after all? We are, too, better than anyone else. These are not just pretty words but historical reality which shows our lasting values and accomplishments, achieved by the peoples of our country in close cooperation and with mutual assistance. We must carefully preserve them and pass them on to young generations. Criticism of the past should not consume us. While rejecting something, we must also think of building anew.

Today, given the events in the NKAO, Armenia and Azerbaijan, many are apprehensive and even fearful of placing Armenians and Azerbaijanis next to one another. Yet, they will inevitably live next to each other for many centuries to come. History has many examples of their fraternal friendship. Is not the memory of the 26 Baku commissars, who included Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Russians and members of other nationalities, sacred to all of us? How sad it is that some people lack responsibility, patience and ability to see ahead or even notice what is happening around them!

Who is responsible for what has just occurred before our eyes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis? Naturally, we must not look only at the direct causes of the conflict and the socioeconomic, cultural and linguistic problems that have been simmering for many years. Such problems will ultimately be resolved. However, we must at last answer a different question: who gains from this conflict? As is well-known, law enforcement authorities had found evidence of major larcenies both in Armenia and Azerbaijan, whereupon came another wave of protests, strikes and rallies. Once central newspapers began to publish articles infringing on the interests of depraved and corrupt groups, thousands of patriots were brought out into the streets. One must be blind to fail to see this connection. Such blindness plays into someone's hands. It has become increasingly obvious that certain corrupt officials in both republics need the state of constant nationalist psychosis to feel safe. It is a crime to be guided by the principle "the worse the better" in this situation, and those who are demagogues and rabble rousers. They do not think of the common good of all nationalities.

The history of Armenians and Azerbaijanis, as of any other nation, is part of the civilization. Both nationalities have given the mankind many men whose names will remain in its memory for many centuries. Why did conflicts and strife occur, even though Ovanes Tumanyan, Mirza Fatali Akhundov, Nizami and Sayat Nova warned against them in their time?

In both republics, serious distortions insulting to the national dignity of any true patriot have occurred. Today, the problem of cleansing seems more important than all those arguments about tribal possessions and boundaries.

Today, we must study and fully appreciate the spiritual, highly moral, humanistic and consistently democratic approach to many interethnic problems contained in the resolutions passed by the 19th party conference. First of all, the conference set the goal of freeing interethnic relations, which also means nationality policy, "of the artificial layers and distortions"³ which occurred during the period of personality cult, voluntarism and stagnation. To achieve this, we must assess and satisfy the needs of all nationalities and ethnic groups and to bring them into harmonious agreement with the interests and needs of the country. It should be noted that satisfying the needs of nationalities is now a true priority, as opposed to the slogans and declarations of the past, when in reality nationality issues were pushed to the background. At the same time, the conference stated, logically enough, that the process of satisfying the needs of nationalities must be in line with the common interests of all nationalities and ethnic groups of the country.

This approach to the problem is familiar, some readers may say. Perhaps, but in and of itself the approach achieves little if it is not backed by an organizational structure and lacks economic and ideological support. When we follow this entire line of reasoning, we will see that a dialectical approach, not the usual metaphysical interpretation, characterizes the resolution on nationality relations. The resolution's statement that "the socialist ideal is not deadening uniformity but full-blooded and dynamic unity within ethnic diversity"⁴ is central for today's nationality policy. The significance of this statement can be seen in comparing it to the long-dominant positions which viewed uniformity as a sign of unity and addressed key issues in the economic and social development of republics and regions in a mechanical and standardized manner, without taking into account local lifestyles. The sad fate of many industries which Nordic ethnic groups have pursued for centuries is an example of this, as is the fact that Central Asian republics, a region of labor surplus, must mobilize—to use a bureaucratic term—labor in other regions for enterprises that have been built there. In Uzbekistan alone, over 500,000 persons of working age are not engaged in socially useful labor⁵. By pursuing that path we have destroyed many opportunities and manifestations of national character.

The study and use of the potential of the ethnic and the interethnic is the essence of nationality policy under perestroika. A special role in this task will be played by the resolution of the 19th party conference "to bring into play institutions in the political system whose task it is to help identify and coordinate the interests of different nationalities."⁶ This represents the organizational aspect that nationality policy has lacked for so long. The party wrongly arrogated all the functions of managing interethnic relations and in the end reduced them all to ideological or propaganda issues. Even today, many party officials both in Moscow and locally believe that managing interethnic relations is purely a question of ideology and education, that everything can be explained away and that national prejudice or rootlessness can thus be eradicated. The area of interethnic relations management is still pervaded by amateur ideas. This must change. To teach nationalities how they should conduct their affairs is a difficult or nearly impossible task. And it is unnecessary. What we need are conditions for them to function and interact naturally.

Recent party documents have repeatedly stressed that in our multinational state no decision should be made without taking the nationality factor into consideration. This approach should be the basis of nationality policy in general as well as in concrete situations in republics, cities, rayons or labor collectives. The time has come for harmoniously combining economic and cultural policy with the policy of consistent internationalism.

The enhanced role of soviets of the people's deputies at all levels, from the Supreme Soviet to local soviets, should serve this goal. Some soviets feel that it is enough to set up commissions on interethnic relations. They do not spend nearly enough time studying various aspects of interethnic relations, do not ask social scientists and experts to take part in this work and reduce the work itself to conflict resolution. As to implementing scientifically developed policies, satisfying legitimate demands of workers of different nationalities and coordinating those interests, those tasks remain beyond their scope of activity. And even the commissions have not been set up systematically. We should also speed up setting up a special state entity on nationalities and issues of nationality relations.

Delays in resolving festering issues in nationality policy will negatively impact the reform process and the establishment of law-based society. The negative attitude to drafts of political reform laws seen in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the course of recent popular debates about those documents was in many ways caused by the fact that we had not explained the situation to the people in time. We were not able to show that achieving harmony of relations between the Union and its constituent republics and increasing local autonomy are the goal of the next stage of political reform. As was noted by the participants of the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the structure of reform and the legal codes of the Union and union republics must fully reflect

the rights and responsibilities of union republics and autonomous entities and define more precisely the powers of the Union and union republics. In improving nationality relations, much will depend on how effectively the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet carry out its new responsibilities.

In theory, socialism should create conditions to overcome national parochialism and national nihilism and to achieve the dialectical unity of the ethnic and the interethnic. Yet, the path toward interethnic unity in our country has been very difficult. Many problems remain unsolved, and some have been solved only partially.

The task of managing nationality relations and internationalist education should not be limited to the ideological sphere, as it was in the past. We must shift to full sociological assessment of all aspects of the development of nationalities and nationality relations and provide the economic and organizational basis for improving them further. The essence of the leninist approach to the development of the system of nationality relations is in its close ties to the process of building socialism and its ability to have a significant impact on that process. The stage of maturity of socialism impacts the development of nationality relations, while nationality relations can influence the process of building socialism to an almost equal degree. Nationality issues, which at times act to slow the progress of the social system under capitalism, are supposed to become a factor encouraging social and spiritual development of a socialist society. This is the dialectics of the tie between internationalist education and fidelity to socialism identified by Lenin.⁷

If socialism and internationalism do not promote one another, the potential of these two fundamental forces in our society is weakened. The practice of the 1970s has shown clearly that distortion of socialist principles and norms lead to revival of national prejudice. Events in Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and actions by members of Pamyat's extremists groups in Novosibirsk, Leningrad and Moscow are not inventions by the ideological enemy but reality of our nationality relations, calling upon us to shape up ideologically, politically and spiritually. Fidelity to socialism, trust in socialist principles and renewal of socialism are main guarantees of internationalism. Our policy today aims to achieve more socialism. In relation to the subject of this article, I want to emphasize that it also means more internationalism and more respect and tolerance for each other, willingness to compromise and cooperate. Complacency in these issues is unacceptable, especially at a time when nationalist excesses have reappeared.

Increased economic difficulties have also impacted the state of nationality relations. Also, the worsened environmental situation in the country and in some regions has for the first time become a destabilizing element in nationality relations. In this case, desire to find scapegoats elsewhere and put the blame on other nationalities

and ethnic groups has become more pronounced. A tendency has emerged to try to solve the problem at the expense of others, under the guise of national consolidation which unfortunately divides nationalities. In reality, such attempts make resolving the crisis more difficult. Even at the 19th party conference speeches were made by some delegates opposing building nuclear power stations and chemical plants in their regions and advocating pushing dirty industries out of their republics. But where? Economic as well as many other issues can no longer be solved in the confines of a single nationality.

Let us take the issue of regional accountability. This idea was in the decisions of the 19th party conference.⁸ Yet, attempts to use the potential offered by economic accountability at a regional or republican level, ignoring cooperation among republics and development of the entire country seem to be economically and politically bankrupt. Regional accountability is not in its essence an encouragement to isolationism among nationalities but a way to attain a higher level of independent inter-republican ties which take into account today's integration processes. Unequal development of infrastructure in different republics and breaches of the principle of social justice in relations within republics and among them disturb national conscience, push it into a partial alliance with religious, patriarchal and tribal forces, encourage separatist tendencies, etc. It would be more logical to seek how to achieve a final solution to these complex problems for the entire union than how to hide from those problems in one's own nationality or republic.

Today we have seen a growing interest in national heritage. This is a complex and controversial process. The class concept on internationalism assumes that it is harmoniously tied to the ethnic as well as to general human values, especially since human values are now becoming a priority. Without these consideration, internationalism becomes a lifeless political dogma capable of impacting social processes only by force or oppression. Yet, the ethnic has no future if it does not aspire to the interethnic and to general human values. The level of maturity of the ethnic in many ways depends on how much it aspires to them. While analyzing the ethnic, we often cast it into patriarchal systems, when tribal and caste characteristics become decisive determinants of people. It is false to enclose in this archaic framework the live process of development of the ethnic which has modern historical and social content.

The interconnection of the ethnic and the interethnic is most often mediated through social issues. It is difficult to trace it in the development of countries and nations. This why people often fall into extremes, either overemphasizing the ethnic or underestimating and ignoring it. The years of personality cult, voluntarism and stagnation have caused us to belittle the significance and the historical future of the ethnic in favor of one-sidedly interpreted class principles, slogans and exhortations. Some role was also played by ideas found in a number of

research papers claiming that confluence and even extinction of nationalities were under way in the country, even though it is hard to find any nationality bent on becoming extinct.

All this had a harmful impact on the people's morale. Albeit partially, the cultural historical process of natural development of the ethnic individuality of man toward the interethnic and the general human level was artificially interrupted. The greatest ideals and values of development of culture, traditions and especially economic activities of nationalities often became empty abstractions. The ethnic often stayed at the lower level of its development without being able to join in with the socialist substance, and thus it became absorbed into the unofficial system of values and orientation of the people. On the practical level of human interaction people most avidly discuss and savor the very aspects of nationality relations which have been left beyond the horizon of official assessment. To an extent, an independent system of stereotypes in interethnic relations has arisen, with various rumors and gossips assuming an important role.

Transition from national stereotypes to nationalist prejudice and at times even to nationalist mass psychosis may be triggered by chance factors or coincidences reflected in mass consciousness. This is exactly what happened in Sumgait. We do not always take this into account in our ideological work. A nationalist mass psychosis during which all ideological and moral norms disappear is yet to be studied.

Practice has shown that we must urgently redirect our ideological work to the micro level of nationality relations, the psychology of feelings and morality. Internationalist education needs to be grounded in related normative ideals and values by means of concrete social, class, national and individual interests of the people.

The micro level of nationality relations is that which is closest to the ethnic and to the individuality of the human being and his activities. This is why it is important that ideological ignorance, national prejudice, admiration for the archaic, empty self-adulation, praise for one's own nation which betrays spiritual shallowness and accusations which insult other nationalities' dignity are first of all condemned by collectives and in personal contact. It is clear that in this area we will need more cultured nationality relations, as well as mutual understanding and trust.

Perestroika has opened a new stage in the development of nationalities and nationality relations. The theoretical foundation for this stage was provided by the 19th party conference which stated that nationality relations are a dynamic system and not a static phenomenon. That system reacts keenly to all processes in the society. Keeping in mind Lenin's statement that "life moves forward by means of contradictions, and live contradictions are much richer, more diverse and meaningful than

the human mind at first assumes" ⁹, we must realize that those live contradictions are controversial and complex as they manifest themselves in the area of interethnic relations.

On the one hand, in today's conditions the rise of national consciousness has galvanized national energies in support of perestroika. At the same time, we have seen open attempts to infringe on the interests, rights and freedoms of other nationalities. For instance, movements in support of perestroika in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, while being generally positive developments in the life of their societies, have begun in some of their documents to demand special privileges for members of their nationalities. For instance, they speak of instituting republican citizenship based on length of residency and fluency in the language of the nationality whose name the republic bears and of declaring that tongue the state language, requiring all residents of the republic regardless of nationality to study it. The 19th party conference proposed a more democratic solution to problems in nationality relations.

Lately, we have often discussed accelerated growth of national consciousness. Yet, we do not seem to notice that at the same time the growth of internationalist consciousness has slowed. If national consciousness develops outside the internationalist course it will inevitably fall into the extreme of nationalist consciousness. In this case the ethnic and interethnic philosophy of consciousness should move in the same ideological direction. In that case, the rapid growth of national consciousness will not infringe on the dignity, individuality and interests of other nationalities and ethnic groups.

Gaining insight into the dialectics of objectively existing phenomena in the area of interethnic relations, processes and contradictions is an important step. But it is not enough to understand the processes, we must also skillfully guide them toward internationalism and start implementing measures without waiting for another anniversary or disaster. This is why we need to carry out a serious analysis of social conflicts in this area and study spiritual and moral processes in nationality relations, especially at the micro level.

As to conflicts, they are not always caused by nationality factors. Their causes may be socioeconomic, cultural or psychological. Conflicts may stem from relations within labor collectives or personal contacts. Yet, they often shift to the nationality sphere. These connections should be carefully studied and based on these studies recommendations should be made to help prevent conflicts in nationality relations.

The 19th party conference asked social scientists to develop the ideological and theoretical foundation for nationality policy. ¹⁰ What is required of them is to provide highly professional assistance to party committees at all levels. Yet, many studies still squeeze processes

in nationality relations into general concepts and obsolete formulas and give trite advice designed to fit all ages and nations. The gap between theory and practice is felt at all levels of interethnic relations. Research institutions at all union and autonomous republics do not lend any significant assistance to party and soviet organizations. Speaking at the 19th party conference, First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party's Central Committee A.Kh.Vezirov noted that we often dwell at greater length on Asia, Africa and Latin America than on vital issues of interethnic relations in our own country, region or republic. ¹¹

For instance, several issues about the Caucasus were mishandled by specialists. Instead of helping resolve the NKAO crisis many studies in both republics only exacerbated the situation. The desire to prove the legitimacy of one's claims at all costs, emotions and ambitions prevailed over science and truth. Science and moral responsibility in issues of nationality relations should be closely tied.

Local party and ideological entities still lack solid structures to conduct sociological analyses of processes and phenomena. Researchers working in ethnic relations lack training in sociology. The low level of sociological training of staffs often leads to useless, if not harmful, questionnaire storms that hit various parts of the country.

Statistical data used by researchers in their studies also leaves a lot to be desired. For instance, the data from the 1959 national census was published in 16 volumes while that from the 1979 census in only one. Unreasonable secrecy that until recently kept much data hidden made it more difficult to get an objective picture of the true state of affairs.

As to the 1989 census and the tabulation of various aspects of the nationality issue, it is not noted by its novelty. Many suggestions and proposals made by specialists were not adopted when the census was prepared. The principle of self-determination of nationality is understood at the State Committee on Statistics in a way that borders on immediate fusion of nationalities. And what about the following example: according to the Statistics Committee, the knowledge of more than two languages of USSR nationalities is not statistically significant and should not be recorded?

Interethnic relations and nationality policy have not been viewed in their human dimensions. What is important today is the way ethnic factors impact on the spiritual and moral condition of man, his sociopolitical status, mood and level of comfort at the labor collective and the republic. Yet, without high-quality studies on the human aspects in interethnic relations it is hard to conduct internationalist education successfully.

We call many republics laboratories of nationality relations and friendship of the peoples. There is much truth in this. But we should conduct professional research at those labs. The scope for studying interethnic relations and testing ideas of internationalist education is truly unique in the republics. The mosaic of interaction of the ethnic and the interethnic is colorful and diverse there. The question is, however, have any theoretical studies or descriptions of their practical application appeared, even in recent years, capable of influencing real processes of nationality relations in a republic or a region, reflecting fully and truthfully real needs, or, which is especially important, arousing interest among educators and professional ideologists? Unfortunately, there is little here worth mentioning.

For instance, at the Kazakhstan party organization a radical shift toward dealing with real problems of nationality relations has occurred and a creative approach to their solution is taking root. Yet, researchers at academic institutions still argue over definitions and publish tomes based on formulas from the 1970s. We used to complain that local party committees did not care about our research, but now, when the situation has changed, we can not keep up with party committees' demand. Yet, research studies can now achieve a qualitatively new level of understanding reality.

We need to accelerate the creation of the all-union research center to study interethnic relations and intensify the training of research staffs for republican research organizations, which was recommended by the 19th party conference.¹² Meanwhile, at the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences a special department studying nationality relations should be set up to prepare and teach special courses to party, soviet, union and komsomol workers, as well as to media professionals at special supplementary training programs.

As to problems of staff training, I would like to mention several other issues in staff policy. Much has been said about uneven standards in staff policy as far as the nationality factor is concerned. Yet, the gap between word and deed so typical of the period of stagnation was apparent here as well. During the 1970s, patriarchal and nepotist trends reemerged in some areas. The root of the negative events in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other regions go down into the morass of the system of mutual support, clan ties, etc. Due to these distortions we fall into a different extreme when selecting and placing staffs, often refusing to promote a talented or capable person only because his relative or countryman holds a similar position elsewhere. Do we not, by falling into this extreme, impose the dubious values of patriarchal consciousness on people who can not otherwise be accused of national prejudice?

The implementation of the principles of socialist self-management would help assign social and political priorities correctly, of course. But the role of party organizations in solving these problems should be an active

one. If they stand aside, the process of selecting leaders will become an interethnic contest—as has already happened in some places. If we embark onto this path we would never realize the advantages of socialist democracy and self-management. Other cases have occurred when, for fear of overemphasizing ethnic factors, certain positions at some multi-ethnic republics and cities have been assigned to different ethnic groups. And in Armenia and Azerbaijan cases have been known of people being illegally dismissed based on their nationality, requiring the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to issue a special decree.¹³

Unfortunately, the idea of manager exchange programs among republics has not been implemented. It could become a good test of leaders' professional qualifications and business skills. It is impossible not to note that cases of ethnic tension at many regions were due to violations of the leninist principles of selecting and placing staffs. Internationalism is one of the main principles of the party's cadre policy. Only by taking its full significance into consideration will the cadres be able to rally workers of all nationalities and ethnic groups around perestroika's ideals. Are not the cadres and the intelligentsia to some extent responsible for the fact that nationality relations have become much more tense in some regions of the country? Even today, some cadres cling to their old views on interethnic relations and, for instance, stand in the way of normalizing the social and moral situation in Kazakhstan which the new leadership of the republic is striving to achieve. Since we want to reshape nationality policy we must reshape cadre policy as well.

Let us return once more to the issue of internationalist education. We think that shortcomings in this important area are often due to the fact that many collectives lack complete internationalist education systems that are well-organized and directed toward achieving a single goal. Those who are responsible for organizing ideological and political education try to do everything at once. As a result, nothing is being done well. Internationalist education work is conducted based on plans often covering entire 5-year periods. During my trips to Kazakhstan, Estonia and Khabarovsk Kray I saw such plans at party organizations. One salient fact is that there is no major difference between plans developed after the 24th and after the 27th party congresses and they differ only in some statements. Different methods and areas of communist education seem disjointed and do not reinforce one another. The educational impact of a given event from the ideological, atheist, esthetic, internationalist and patriotic standpoint is not known to those who draft those plans. This is the reason why there are great volumes of such plans and why it is a wasted effort.

Another significant fault of our plans for ideological and political education is that those who draft them have not been taught to set goals in their work, do not understand the object of ideological education and can not identify

the main element that sets the entire system of educational work into motion. In a multi-ethnic work collective, internationalist and patriotic education may be such an element. It may help solve a great number of problems in ideological, political, moral, labor, atheistic, ecological, esthetic and other types of education.

Today, many of those who work in ideology still do not understand the meaning of ideological work that takes the nationality factor into account. At best, they assume this to mean education and propaganda, but never modeling of internationalist aspects of the milieu, impact of objective ethnic and interethnic processes and organizational and political foundations of internationalist psychology, nor value orientation and fostering of culture of interethnic relations. How can we talk about influencing objectively existing processes if we can not even communicate our true achievements in a way that affects the consciousness and feelings of the people?

The ethnic pluralism of the country could be one of the factors ensuring pluralism of opinions on nationality relations. Yet, the limits of its expression should be set by what offends the dignity, pride and self-consciousness of other nationalities. Examples have already been seen when under the guise of discussing democratization and combatting the consequences of stalinism, veritable persecution campaigns have been unleashed against those who dare express opinions that are disagreeable to those who deem themselves nationality leaders.

Under the conditions of growing ethnic consciousness and its strong impact on ethnic processes, ideological work should become much more flexible and competent. Just as ethnic consciousness should reach interethnic consciousness, interethnic consciousness should become ethnic consciousness. So far, we have seen only one side of this equation.

In internationalist education it is important to fully take into account the ideological, theoretical, political, socio-economic, spiritual, moral and atheist potential of proletarian socialist internationalism and the experience and achievements of the CPSU's nationality policy. Internationalism is a wholesome expression of marxist-leninist philosophy in the area of nationality relations. In this respect, the potential of internationalism in ideological education is enormous.

Internationalist education programs that are currently being developed in many republics should rely in their structure on requirements of general approach of taking into account and realizing the potential of internationalist education. Those programs themselves must be dynamic and flexible. Undoubtedly, they will require creative reorganization and continued methodological support in accordance to the dynamics of development of interethnic processes. Unfortunately, for many years we have been conducting ideological education based on one-sided approaches and methods, in effect using a single old program. Every program should contain many

variations, so that it could be adapted depending to the state of those who are being taught, or ethnic and interethnic processes underway in the society. Lack of flexibility and quick response in our ideological efforts is one of the reasons why our educational work falls behind life's objective processes.

The process of developing nationality relations requires constant spiritual and moral support. One-sided emphasis on politics or economics, whereby the development of nationalities, ethnic groups and republics is viewed as a means, and not as a goal of socioeconomic progress, has done considerable damage to culture and morale and greatly helped dehumanize interethnic communications. This is why the recommendations of the 19th party conference so crucially important for redirecting nationality policy; they stress the need to ensure that economic and social progress in every ethnic region is accompanied by spiritual progress based on special cultural features of its nationalities and ethnic groups. Socialist culture, developing as a multi-ethnic culture should always remain a potent factor in the ideological and moral union of nationalities.¹⁴ Without this spiritual direction in nationality policy as a whole, internationalist education alone will simply be ineffective, of course. Every nationality can and must learn from other nationalities—this is the internationalist principle of the spiritual cooperation of nationalities.

If we achieve the full potential of ethnic, general soviet and general human culture we would regain the spirituality which we have earned socially and historically. Much now depends on our common willingness to get involved, effort, responsibility, tolerance and mutual respect, as well as mutual trust and trust for the policy of perestroika for which we have suffered so much and which can restore to us true national dignity and high internationalist responsibility.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, November 28, 1988.
2. See: R.Otsason, and R.Sokolov, "Republic on Economic Accountability?" LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, November 16, 1988.
3. "Documents of the 19th All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", June 28-July 1, 1988. Moscow, 1988, p.135.
4. Ibid.
5. See: SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, 1988, No 1, p.13.
6. "Documents," p.136.
7. See: V.I.Lenin, "Collected Works," vol.30, p.57.
8. See: "Documents," p.136.

9. Lenin, op.cit., vol.47, p.219.
10. See: "Documents," p.139.
11. See: PRAVDA, June 30, 1988.
12. See: "Documents," p.139.
13. See: PRAVDA, December 6, 1988.
14. "Documents," p.137.

Copyright: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda". "Voprosy istorii KPSS". 1989.

Reasons for Estonian CP Members Quitting Discussed

18001008a Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 8 Apr 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Commentary by Chief of the Estonian CP Central Committee Organizational Party Work and Cadre Work Department E.I. Cherevashko"]
[Text] I think that we must be primarily analytical in our approach to the numerical indicators reflecting changes in the makeup of the Estonian Communist Party. It is important to know and understand what lies behind these figures. Life shows that cases of voluntary withdrawal from the party are often explained by people's inability to recognize the complexity and innovative nature of the processes taking place, confusion and spiritual perplexity in the face of these processes, and sometimes skepticism that what is being done now is correct.

In fact, why is it precisely now, when the party itself has called down fire on itself after revealing its past mistakes and is talking honestly and frankly and directly about the distortions and crimes of earlier years, that the authors of the letters published today have given up their party membership? It would seem logical to stay in the party ranks precisely now, and fight for the renewal of Leninist norms and principles and for perestroika in our entire lives, which the party has also initiated. We know from history that even previously, in periods that were complicated for the party, there were people dissatisfied with it, when the numbers of new members joining declined. There was a certain self-purging of the party.

I think that those who have today given notice of their withdrawal from the party are not lost to it. It is essential to talk to each of them, and to gain an understanding in the primary party organization and in the party raykom or gorkom. For it so happens that those who are withdrawing are precisely those who have not been heard, whose opinions have not been considered, who are leaving with a sense of being offended and misunderstood. It happens that they also lack the courage to gain an understanding of their own mistakes and delusions and the ability to assess their own positive correctly. And they must be helped. Not importunately, but

with tact. For often in the processes and phenomena and a, so to speak, general analysis of a situation, we forget the specific individual with his thoughts and hopes, delusions or errors, and that he perceives things through the prism of his own particular fate.

Today the Estonian Communist Party is living and acting in a complex political situation. It has been seized by processes that have resulted in complexity and contradictoriness in perestroika processes in general, and by the complexity and different ways in which different people and different social and national groups perceive it. There is an antagonism and clash of opinions in this, and sometimes heated passions, and not everyone has been prepared to accept democratic methods in the political struggle. This must be taken into consideration, and this requires time and most of all patience, but we would by no means want to go to extremes—to allow ourselves to push the party and perestroika into an abyss of national schism.

As is known, the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Buro has decided to hold an expanded plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee on 12 April in order jointly with the party aktiv to analyze the situation that has taken shape and to work out common approaches that will unite communists and direct their efforts toward finding solutions to urgent political, economic and social problems.

These approaches together with constructive positions should be reflected in a program of action for the Estonian Communist Party. The idea of the need to draw up such a program of action was stated as long ago as the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 13th Plenum. The program should stem organically from the general CPSU Program and should precisely define the specific directions in which the Estonian Communist Party should direct its efforts, and the thoughts and ideas on which our party organizations and all communists should be consolidated, giving due consideration to the processes taking place in the republic.

After proposing this idea at the plenum the Central Committee reckoned that the broad party aktiv should be involved in work on and discussion of the program. And this process is now under way. Some gorkoms and raykoms have discussed or intend to discuss at their own plenums what should and could be put into this program. As is known, with the approval of a group of their colleagues, four gorkom and raykom chairmen have decided to express their view of this problem and their scenarios for work on such a program of action. Their articles have recently been published in a number of rayon newspapers. In my opinion this should be perceived as an initiative from below but in no way a finished document requiring either discussion or approval.

The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee in turn has set up a working group that includes members of the central committees, workers from the party Institute of the History of the Party and the party apparatus, and scholars. The task for this group is to work on the theoretical part of the program of action and coordinate it with the general party program, and to consider some of the directions of its activity.

I think that A. Talis is right in the article published today, as are other communists, when he says that the program of action for the Estonian Communist Party should be based on the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 11th and 13th plenums and should take into account the specific nature of the republic and the tasks facing precisely the communists of Estonia.

It is a question exactly of a program of action and not of a program and rules separately, since that would mean a return to federalism in the party. I emphasize that today, precisely today, in the complex political situation, there is no argument that mutual relations with the Estonian Communist Party leadership should occupy our attention, and there will still be time for this on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress. It is more important now to find common interests linked to the fate of perestroika in the republic, and specific matters around which communists in the republic and the entire Estonian Communist Party can rally.

ESSR Supsov Commission on Language Meets To Discuss Problems

18001008b Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 8 April 89 p 3

[Interview with Yan Kross, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission on Language, by ETA correspondent A. Ploompuu: The Law on Language Is Alive!"]

[Text] The first meeting of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission on Language took place on 6 April. ETA correspondent A. Ploompuu met with its chairman, people's writer Yan Kross, and asked him some questions.

[Ploompuu] What was discussed at this meeting, which lasted much longer than had been planned?

[Kross] We have a Law on Language. Now we must move from words to deeds. We reviewed two documents, namely, on procedure for language study and on the requirements for language mastery. In order to make the Estonian language the official language in fact it is necessary to deal with its years-long neglect and disregard, and overcome the many years of its rejection. The primary form for establishing the Estonian language as the official language is its study by people working in jobs that assume mandatory fluency in Estonian. A language group set up under the republic Council of

Ministers has drawn up the draft foundations of language study. How to organize studies, whom to recruit for the work, where to find funding and so forth—all these things must be clarified.

We also worked carefully on a document that defines the requirements for mastering the language. Of course, certain editorial questions also arose that were assigned to the members of the commission working on this document.

[Ploompuu] Which of the various departments must implement the Law on Language, and in what sequence?

[Kross] We think that first and foremost the operations services should become involved in this: the fire services, water rescue services, medical establishments. We decided, for example, to appeal through the Council of Ministers to our Ministry of Health with a request that until medical personnel have an adequate command of the Estonian language, information should be available on the doors of offices, stating the language—Estonian, Russian or both—in which the patient may be treated. This would be a step forward.

We also dealt with questions of the protected or unprotected nature of the Law on Language, and asked the representatives of the Ministry of Justice to conduct an exchange of opinions within its own department on the issue of sanctions that can be applied in the case of violations of the Law on Language.

[Ploompuu] What did you say about the use of Estonian by those for whom it is their native tongue?

[Kross] It is poor, shamefully poor. We have a great deal of work to do in order to correct the situation. I believe that writers and journalists can do a great deal to reduce what irritates the ears and eyes. To the point, with regard to the Estonian-speaking public mastering the official language, there is a danger here that we shall have an entire generation of citizens speaking Estonian poorly. Even more we must try to avoid any distortion of the language, and be more exacting toward its use by those for whom Estonian is their native tongue.

[Ploompuu] We have a long working day behind us. When will the commission meet again?

[Kross] We planned to meet about twice a month. But obviously, at first it is necessary to meet rather more often since new documents are already coming along and the letters have started to arrive.

Deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium M. Leosk took part in the work of the commission.

Estonian Suspov Presidium Discusses Economic Accountability

18001009a Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 2 April 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] We have become accustomed to the fact that the idea of cost accounting for Estonia, declared heretical only 18 months ago by a highly placed official, will soon be submitted for national debate. As a result of extraordinarily stepped-up work, in which more than 100 scholars, economic leaders and workers from state institutions have participated, documents have now been prepared based on a summary of the concept of cost accounting for the Estonian SSR and the draft Estonian SSR law "On the Bases of Cost Accounting for the Estonian SSR." On 31 March these documents were discussed by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

One thing is clear: we stand on the threshold of an extraordinarily important decision and once again we are approaching a major boundary. Hence the sense of responsibility and tension at the meeting. The half-hour statement by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers I. Toome dealt with the course of work on the summary concept and draft legislation and the content, thrust and possibilities in the realization of republic cost accounting. Academician A. Keerna spoke on behalf of the Commission on Legislative Proposals and the Planning-and-Budget Commission of the republic Supreme Soviet, and also made known the commission's recommendation, namely, to submit the drafts for national debate.

A few words about the discussion that followed. The rector of the Tallinn Polytechnical Institute B. Tamm reviewed cost accounting in the Estonian SSR in philosophical terms. All the large-scale tasks that also relate to IME are being posed under conditions of indeterminacy and are mathematically uncorrected. Procedure for task-solving cannot be foreseen but the task must be formulated in such a way that ideas are viable. A model is being created and the task is being resolved simultaneously with improvements in the model. Documents on republic cost accounting can also be perceived in terms of such a model. The idea that if it is impossible to present the course of events in detail then the task cannot be resolved is incorrect. B. Tamm and other speakers emphasized that it is essential to explain in the labor collectives and through the mass media the content and goals of republic cost accounting. And it is particularly important to do this work in the all-union organs.

The chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A. Ryuytel said that the goal of republic cost accounting has now been defined clearly and unambiguously. We see in it a way to improve our economy and

develop it rapidly. What is needed for this is a unified platform for the inhabitants of Estonia that does not depend on national affiliation, a platform that is supported by all the people.

The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to submit the republic summary on cost accounting from the republic Council of Ministers and the Estonian SSR draft law "On the Bases of Cost Accounting for the Estonian SSR" for national debate during April. The drafts will be published in the newspapers RAHVA HAAL AND SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA. Then the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers will generalize the proposals and comments received and present them to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, after which the two drafts will be submitted for discussion in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Chief of the Presidium admissions department, Yu. Lepp, reported on the statements being received by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. In 1988 a total of 40,760 letters were received by the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. Most were received immediately before the 16 November 1988 session. Many were also received on the subject of the Law on Language. A detailed review of the letters received in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the results of their examination will soon be published.

A plan was approved for improvements in the legislation of the Estonian SSR for the near future. The plan contains more than 30 draft laws of the Estonian SSR and ukases of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has decided to publish for national debate the draft Estonian SSR law "On Citizen Associations" in the newspapers RAHVA HAAL and SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA.

A Commission on Language Protection was set up, headed by the writer Ya. Kross.

Questions of pardons and certain other questions were also discussed.

City, Rayon Chairmen Meet To Discuss Economic Accountability

18001009b Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 2 April 89 p 1

[Report by ETA Correspondent S. Lyaene: "Ispolkom Chairmen Meet"]

[Text] A regular conference-seminar of the chairmen of republic gorkoms and rayispolkoms, organized by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, took place 31 March and 1 April, this time on the subject of "Realization of Republic Cost Accounting and the Political Situation in the Estonian SSR." For 2 days the leaders of local soviet

organs discussed general republic problems and problems that are arising in various regions. Comrades A. Ryuytel, I. Toome, M. Titma, G. Tynspoyeg and A. Soydl, deputy chairmen of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers R. Otsason, V. Rayevskiy and P. Palu and many other leading workers in the republic took part in the work of the conference.

A detailed analysis was made of upcoming tasks for the ispolkoms connected with sociocultural plans directly affecting the public interests, and the viewpoints of a number of departments were expressed concerning the most effective ways to resolve them. Emphasis was laid on the special role of issues connected with construction, and at the same time their special complexity and the need to consider the interests of and the situation in each specific region were noted.

In connection with the extended foreign links, protocol questions in international dealing were also considered, on both the theoretical and practical planes.

Solutions were found to many problems during the course of the conference-seminar, while many require further serious consideration also with the participation of leaders and specialists from the corresponding ministries and departments and gorkoms and rayispolkoms.

The conference-seminar was extremely effective and accordingly at I. Toome's suggestion it was decided to convene again in May.

Kazakh CP CC Criticizes Education Minister Shayakhmetov

18300515 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 2 Mar 89, p 2

[Unsigned KazTAG article: "In the Kazakhstan Communist Party CC"]

[Text] As has already been reported, an account of the personal participation in work on the interethnic and patriotic education of pupils and students of CPSU member and Minister of People's Education of the republic Sh. Sh. Shayakhmetov was heard in the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee.

In the resolution approved on this question it was noted that taking into account the growth of national consciousness and the processes going on in the sphere of interethnic relations, Sh. Sh. Shayakhmetov recently increased attention to making true young patriots and interethnicists who respect the language and culture of the representatives of all nations and peoples.

Under his leadership, the Commission on National and Interethnic Relations is functioning, and distortions are being eliminated in the national composition among ministry workers and institute rectors. He is conducting

meetings with pupils and students of the city of Alma-Ata, with foreign students, and interethnic militants, and measures to improve the life and leisure of young people have been taken.

At the same time, he still has not been able to create an atmosphere of purposeful and effective work on interethnic and patriotic education of pupils and students in the ministry's apparatus and dependent institutions, as the corresponding decrees of the CC CPSU and the XII plenum of the CC of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan demand.

The Minister reconciles himself to the tardiness and inertia of the leaders of scientific institutes, higher educational establishments, and departments of social sciences in working up new approaches to the questions of interethnic and patriotic education. The condition of moral development of persons and interethnic relations among young people have not become an object of thorough scientific research and elaboration. Pupils in the older classes and students of the final year show a weak understanding of program regulations on the national question, the theory and practice of interethnic relations, and the culture and traditions of nations and peoples of the USSR. Sh. Sh. Shayakhmetov timidly takes care of solving organizational questions connected with the development of national-Russian bilingualism.

These and other negligences are brought about in many respects by the ministry's inadequate demands on the workers of the apparatus. Hearing the accounts of educational institution administration heads has ceased to be the norm here. It is said that the reorganization of the management of people's education did not result in the renewal of the ministry by cadres capable of solving the problems by restructuring the forms and methods of instruction and education in schools of general education and higher.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan recommended to Sh. Sh. Shayakhmetov that he eliminate the noted deficiencies. On the basis of a critical analysis of his action he must take measures for working out new methods for forming students into peoples education workers of a Marxist-Leninist world view and ideological maturity, and for their thorough and concerned study of the theory and practice of the nationality question, culture and traditions of the nations and peoples of the USSR. It is necessary to include the republic scientific-methodical center and the departments of social sciences of the higher educational establishments more actively in this work.

It is necessary to show exactingness and persistence in the further development of ethnic-Russian bilingualism, to resolve concretely and effectively the questions of providing schools with textbooks and school-method supplies, didactic and technical instruction, dictionaries and phrase-books. The possibility of expanding the enrollment of post-graduate students in methods of

teaching the Kazakh language and literature ought to be examined, and should opening a specialized academic council for defending dissertations of this type in the republic.

It is proposed that the board of the Ministry of Peoples Education apply in practice the accounts of leading workers on their personal contribution to work on interethnic and patriotic education of pupils and students.

11 Mar Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum

Second Secretary Mendybayer's Report

18300488 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Mar 89 pp 1-3

[Report of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee Buro on Organizational Work of the Republic Party Organization in Implementation of Decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, presented by Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee Second Secretary M. S. Mendybayer]

[Text] Comrades! Sufficient time has passed in order to fully evaluate the level and scope of our work in implementation of decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. It opened a new phase of restructuring before communists and all laborers—the phase of practical solution of major problems associated with satisfying the Soviet people's day-to-day material needs, creating a legal socialist state, restoring the sovereignty of the soviets and developing popular self-government.

The task facing us today is to determine, from principled party positions, exactly what has been done by the republic party organization to implement the course charted by the party conference, to define the ways of correcting existing shortcomings and completing unfinished work, and measuring our actions against the dependable reference points developed by the party.

Accelerating Solution of the Urgent Problems of Socioeconomic Development

If I were to attempt to concisely formulate the principal question facing delegates of the All-Union Party Conference, I would say that it has to do with how to deepen restructuring and make it irreversible. Recognizing the full urgency of this question in the present time, the Buro of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee has come to a substantiated conclusion: In the last 8 months the positions of the forces of restructuring in the republic have grown noticeably stronger, and the public consciousness has attained a qualitatively new level in the perception of the problems facing us. The policy of revolutionary renewal, which has been embodied in specific socioeconomic programs, is acquiring increasingly larger numbers of proponents, and is becoming a vitally important cause to the republic's laborers.

How important this is in a period in which restructuring has attained the wide horizons of creative work was discussed at a recent meeting with the republic's active party members by CPSU Central Committee Secretary G. P. Razumovskiy, a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

With the assistance of the party committees, the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee and its Buro are gradually shifting the focus onto developing strategy and organizing the effort to achieve the tactical objectives, and on searching for constructive approaches by which to ensure the end results.

Shifts in the work style of many party committees are noticeable, and their influence on the most important transformations occurring in all spheres of the national economy is increasing. Actively progressing processes of restructuring the economic mechanism are beginning to produce results. New methods of economic activity based on the principles of full cost accounting and self-financing are being confirmed. A tendency toward social reorientation of the economy is distinctly evident, the effectiveness of social production is rising, and the rate of growth of national income has increased.

Since the beginning of the five-year plan, labor productivity in industry increased by 13.4 percent, as opposed to the planned 9.2 percent. Last year in comparison with 1987 the undelivered volume of products contracted for delivery decreased by a factor of two. In 3 years of the five-year plan the plan for construction and installation was completed for the first time. The rate of housing construction increased. In this period more than 23 million square meters of housing space were built, to include 1.7 million in excess of the plan. Over 393,000 housewarmings have already been celebrated under the "Housing- 91" program, and the apartment waiting list has advanced 41 percent.

Attention to implementing the integrated program for development of production of goods and services has intensified. In addition to new construction, a course toward accelerating reequipment of local and light industry enterprises has been assumed. Up to 70 percent of allocated capital investments are now being used for these purposes. A special program has also been written and is already being implemented for enterprises of group "A" sectors.

As a result in 3 years the plan for producing various goods has been exceeded by 1.3 billion rubles. The commodity turnover quotas have been fulfilled, and the stress in money circulation has been reduced somewhat. In a word, we can definitely conclude today that the positive changes that have been initiated in the economy are creating a good foundation for successfully solving the urgent problems of restructuring and for raising the welfare of the laborers.

How satisfied we are with the rate of these changes is another question. Unfortunately the state of affairs in the economy and in the social sphere is changing for the better much more slowly than it must. The republic's national economy continues to develop along the extensive path to a significant degree, and a turning point has not been achieved in accelerating scientific and technical progress, intensifying resource conservation and upgrading product quality. The needed return from the existing production potential has not been achieved. Material expenditures and energy requirements have been allowed to grow. The number of enterprises and organizations that are not attaining their profit targets remain significant, and the average wages of workers exceed growth of the productivity of social labor by more than a factor of three.

All of this indicates that we are still not working effectively enough to deepen the processes of restructuring, and we are slow in assimilating the political methods of leadership. And finally, we need to eradicate the psychology of red tape and dictatorial bureaucratism; we need to take specific actions to ensure the unity of personal, collective and social interests. Only on this basis can we achieve a qualitative leap forward in raising production effectiveness.

We have become good at drawing up various programs, looking 10-15 years ahead, and believing wholeheartedly that the presence of strategic plans itself guarantees attainment of the desired end results. Such was the case, for example, with the "Intensification-90" program, which was felt to be almost a panacea for all misfortunes, and with other projects of this kind. Life persuasively demonstrated that it is important to know not only "what" to do but also "how" to achieve a goal. And here again the decisive prerequisite is not dictatorship "from above," no matter how correct and reasonable it might be, but creative, interested, active initiative "from below," thoughtful solution of problems by the laborers themselves.

Clear confirmation of this can be found in implementation of our "Housing-91" program, in the course of which we have been able to unify strategic and tactical measures directed at attaining the end result, and to create a strong alloy of economic and organizational political work, which has made it possible to concentrate all of the corresponding available forces, and orient them on unconditional forward progress.

Or consider the progress in preparing for spring planting. This year the party committees did not resort to its traditional "pumping" to get repair of agricultural equipment going. But even without it, the work went on as it should have, because the people at the bottom felt themselves to be owners, and they were themselves interested in preparing the equipment well. For the first time all equipment has been prepared on time for the forthcoming planting.

The conclusion from this is that the organizational and mobilizing effort of party committees in the economic sphere should be based today on a fundamentally new foundation, with regard for the basic interests of the labor collectives, and with an orientation on competent use of economic levers and stimuli in all things. We need to decisively abandon the grating slogans calling for a proprietary interest in the work, and make a real, serious effort to instill the pride of ownership into the people of labor.

We have the real, concrete base for this. It is represented by the Law on the State Enterprise. It is represented by developing democratization and glasnost, the possibilities of which are being utilized timidly for the time being, and sometimes even incompetently.

I can't help recalling, for example, the Pavlodarskiy Traktorny Zavod Association in this regard. For a long time it has been in a fever, to put it mildly. And chiefly because the people have not recognized themselves to be the real owners of the enterprise, and they continue to produce tractors that fail to meet the requirements of agriculture. The association employs 350 designers who are making practically no useful contributions to production. If the collective were interested in working creatively, it would first ask itself: Do we need such a cumbersome design office? Would it not be more advantageous to purchase a license for production of a modern tractor, and achieve a tangible impact in this way? Instead, in response to the connivance and more likely the helplessness of the party committee and the party city committee, the council of the labor collective has busied itself with "playing" democracy—its solution has been to pay out the collective's hard-earned money in support of the far-fetched objective of finding a director. But when it comes to ways to instill a sense of ownership, to do away with the dependent frame of mind that had evolved over the years, and to orient the workers on new approaches, no one is doing any real thinking, including the oblast party committee.

In a word, acceleration of socioeconomic development would be unimaginable without an increase in the role of political leadership of the economy. We need to assimilate the methods of implementing party policy by way of the communists, with reliance on democratic principles and with regard for public opinion, faster. We need to upgrade the quality and the grounds of the decisions we make, and ensure unity of personal, collective and social interests by deepening cost-accounting relations and activating economic levers and stimuli.

But at the same time, what sort of legitimate cost-accounting relations can we talk about when we still devote little attention to intensifying production, when we lack an integral program to solve one of the most acute problems—eliminating the shortages in the republic's economy, and arriving at an optimum structure of

social production corresponding to today's requirements of preferential development of machine building and other high-income sectors of the national economy?

The development of main planning and economic administrations has slowed down unjustifiably in the oblasts. It is precisely these administrations that are to become the main organizers of economic activities locally.

And consider this: Behind each of these shortcomings and unsolved problems, there stands a specific communist executive, a specific party organization and, finally, a commission of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee bearing the full responsibility for solving one of the enumerated problems.

Can we really condone the fact that technical development of enterprises and associations is still proceeding basically along the lines of improving traditional equipment and production processes, and not of introducing new ones as quickly as possible? The proportion of manual labor remains as it was, at 30 percent in industry and 60 percent in construction.

Among the new production processes, only a sixth could be referred to as wasteless or low-waste processes, and even that would be stretching the point. Nor do any of these processes ensure a high level of resource conservation. It is no accident that the quotas for economizing on rolled metal have never been fulfilled in the 3 years in Guryev and Kzyl-Orda oblasts, that the quotas for conserving boiler and furnace fuel have not been fulfilled in North Kazakhstan and Ural oblasts, or that the quota for conserving petroleum products has never been fulfilled in Dzhambul and Kustanay oblasts. Waste ash from electric power plants, metallurgical slag and pulp waste are being utilized extremely poorly.

In this connection it would also be appropriate to rebuke the scientific institutions that are conducting research in the basic directions of scientific and technical progress. Restructuring in them is slow. The coordinating role of the republic's Academy of Sciences (U. M. Sultangazin) remains little noticeable. The attention of G. P. Razumovskiy was also turned to this in a meeting with the scientists. Steps to activate the scientific and technical complexes, engineering centers and planning and design offices existing in the republic have not yet been taken, and the effort to strengthen the ties between science and production are still weak.

The chronic failure to fulfill plans for introducing fixed productive capital is seriously hindering improvement of end results. The rate of renewal of capital in power engineering and machine building has dropped by almost a factor of two, and in the chemical complex it has decreased by a fourth. The quotas for producing excavators, machine tools, washing machines and engine blocks have not been met. The rate of assimilation of many types of new products remains at the level of the

10th Five-Year Plan, and the average "age" of these products has attained 7 years in machine building as a whole. For comparison we can point out that in developed capitalist countries, articles are said to be obsolete in as little as 2 years, and a maximum of 3 years after their production begins.

As before, capital construction remains a sore spot in the economy. Last year the republic failed the construction and installation plan, including in nine oblasts and in Alma-Ata. Gosstroy, for example, managed to place only 24 out of 42 new facilities into operation. The quotas for production of cement, brick and prefabricated reinforced concrete were not met. The flawed practice of dispersing assets is continuing, the volume of unfinished construction is growing, and approved measures are not being implemented.

As we know, when the housing construction program was being drawn up, plans were made to increase the output capacity of all of the republic's housing construction combines to the planned level, and especially to devote attention to development of support to construction industry and monolithic housing construction. Two years have gone by, and capacities for erection of 300,000 square meters of housing space are still not providing a return. Only two or three oblasts are seriously involved in monolithic construction. As far as the construction base is concerned, out of the capacities for producing prefabricated reinforced concrete structures and articles that were to be placed into operation, realistically a little more than half were introduced.

Everyone probably understands how much this slows down the effort to eliminate the imbalances existing in the social sphere. Although the quotas for building schools, nursery schools and medical institutions have been met for the first time in many years, the shortage of these facilities continues to be felt rather acutely; moreover we need to consider the serious difficulties that have arisen in connection with the tragic disaster in Armenia. Fulfilling its international duty, the republic will unconditionally provide necessary assistance to its Armenian brothers, and it will make its full contribution to rebuilding the cities and towns that were destroyed by the earthquake. But some people have already begun suggesting that the Housing-91 program is in jeopardy, and that there is supposedly no way we can fulfill it now.

Such talk is not only fundamentally wrong, but also harmful. We have enormous reserves. And we need not go far to find examples of their sensible use. It would be sufficient to look at the progress of housing construction in Kokchetav and Taldy-Kurgan oblasts. Not only are the annual plans being fulfilled within 9 months here, but also the apartment waiting list has decreased by more than 60 percent in 2 years! If such a rate becomes the norm everywhere—and this is something we need to strive for, the program would naturally be completed in full.

Especially serious shortcomings are being tolerated in production of consumer goods and in the organization of trade. This is perhaps the tightest knot of problems, one having an extremely unfavorable effect on the morale and the psychological disposition of the people. The sources of the tension are known: an imbalance between solvent income and goods. We should also add to this the unhealthy tendency to reduce production of inexpensive articles. The state of "well-being" based on market-induced growth of prices in the absence of competition has been very advantageous not only to producers but also to trade. Nor does it raise objections from financial experts, since 45 percent of the price increase for goods produced by light industry goes into the state budget. In a word, things are good from everyone but the customer, who ultimately turns out to possess the fewest rights.

These are not simple processes, of course, but we should know how to control them, we should know how to find constructive ways to improve the economy, and the correct approaches to achieving the fullest satisfaction of the needs of the laborers.

It is no secret that for many long years capital investment policy has not been working in favor of sectors producing consumer goods. However, despite the changed conditions, the inertia of the former approaches and the former stereotypes are making themselves known. The public's demand for footwear in the republic is presently being only 50 percent satisfied by local production, but construction of a footwear factory in Karatau is moving at a turtle's pace. The set production volume is being fulfilled by only a fourth.

And consider how much discussion there was about organizing production of goods out of fur and leather materials, about expanding production of clothing, and about providing paid services out of shops and affiliates built out of light metallic structures in labor-rich areas. But actually, out of 115 modular buildings allocated to the republic by the USSR Council of Ministers at our request, only 15 have been erected. The Guryev, Karaganda, Semipalatinsk and Pavlodar oblast executive committees, Gosstroy, the State Agroindustrial Committee, the ministries of light and local industry and a number of union-subordinated enterprises have been irresponsible in this important effort.

Party committees and executives of the ministries, departments and production associations are obligated to make an abrupt change in their habitual impression of consumer goods production as something secondary. The methods of persuasion and, where necessary, public pressure should be used in order to make production of goods for the people a priority direction in the activities of every enterprise.

Significant changes have not yet occurred in the organization of trade either. Executives of the Ministry of Trade (N. D. Tantsyura), of Kazakhstan's Consumer Cooperative (U. S. Sarsenov) and of many soviets of

peoples deputies are making a poor show of restructuring themselves, to be frank, for practical purposes they are not supporting fulfillment of previously adopted decisions, and they are not making the right conclusions from the criticism. Just for this reason alone artificial shortages are created even of articles which are produced in sufficient quantities, and the lines at the stores do not grow any shorter. The practice of hiding goods and overcharging and cheating customers is continuing. We still encounter coarseness among trade workers, indifference and a low level of services. Steps have not been taken to improve the business hours of stores and dining halls. Effective public control should promote correction of all these shortcomings. But even this important effort is developing too slowly.

The possibilities contained in development of cooperation and of private labor are still being utilized poorly as a means of satisfying the needs of the people. Last year cooperatives produced consumer goods and rendered services to the public worth 60 million rubles. This is an insignificant sum, one would have to agree, and it does little to influence the state of affairs; moreover the extent of the effort does not satisfy the requirements of the 19th Party Conference.

What is keeping us from raising the effectiveness of the cooperative movement? Besides known objective causes such as the absence of the corresponding habits among the overwhelming majority of the population and the inability of the people to display their own initiative and resourcefulness, our own shortcomings are having a negative influence. Owing to the connivance of local soviets, shady dealers with unclean hands use cooperatives as a front for speculative deals and line their pockets with illegally earned money. This seriously undermines the authority of the cooperative movement and repels honest laborers away from it.

Another factor having an effect is that the creation of cooperatives is practically unregulated, and many of the unnecessary public organizations and middleman cooperatives that are formed produce nothing but only redistribute. At the same time the kind of cooperatives we need, which do the growing, the manufacturing and the processing, are being created in extremely small numbers.

It is time for us to learn how to control these processes, and to approach them from the positions of state and national interests. In each specific case we need to deeply analyze the essence of new cooperatives, and do everything we can to encourage formation of cooperatives under industrial, transportation and communication enterprises, and create the most favorable conditions for their existence. We need to get the law on taxation of cooperatives working faster, and prevent any sort of imbalances and ambiguities.

The food supply problem, which the party conference ranked among those of the highest priority, remains exceptionally urgent and acute.

In November of last year the 13th Plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee examined the state of affairs in this sphere deeply and thoroughly, made weighted assessments of the work done, and mapped out the basic directions and strategy of accelerated implementation of the Food Program. Therefore the Central Committee Buro feels that there is no need to return in detail to issues that have already been discussed. The one thing I would like to do is focus attention on some of the fundamental factors that became an object of serious discussion at a conference on the problems of improving management of the country's agroindustrial complex, held recently in the CPSU Central Committee.

In particular, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev had this to say in his statement: "When we abolished the peasantry in the country we lost a great deal in the sense that we tore the individual away from the land, away from the implements of production, and in this way we did considerable harm to all agrarian affairs, and chiefly to the relationship between the people and the land." These words convey the very essence of the difficult problems of today's rural society. The question facing us now is how to recover what was lost, step by step, how to resurrect a proprietary interest in rural laborers.

The solution is seen to be persistent, planned introduction of cost-accounting relations, and development of the leasing system. Everyone seems to understand this well enough. But here is what is troubling. Once again we are seeing pursuit of quantity in introducing the leasing system, pressure from a dictatorial bureaucracy, and cases of artificial inhibition of the leasing system under all kinds of excuses. It must be understood that the initiative should come from below in this area, it should come from the individual, and executives of all ranks, from sovkhoz director and kolkhoz chairman to the republic leadership, are obligated to help him in every possible way.

Unfortunately we also sometimes encounter cases where as soon as a leaseholder begins enjoying substantial results, and as soon as purchasing departments begin receiving figures indicating solid earnings, bureaucrats suddenly develop an administrative itch—a desire to cut, to reduce, to take away. We must put a decisive end to such throwbacks.

The role of party committees and bureaus of primary party organizations is especially great in this important effort. They now face a difficult question: How do they organize party work under the conditions of leaseholding relations? One thing is clear: This work must differ fundamentally from presently known forms and stereotypes. And in order to rid ourselves of them faster, we

instructed two departments of the Central Committee—agrarian, and organizational, party and personnel work—to prepare the corresponding recommendations that could become a dependable reference point for rural communists, and a support to their activity.

In addition to this, in order to solve the food supply problems we need to increase the role and responsibility of the republic's Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] and its governing board and party committee. The style and methods of the work of this substantial institution were subjected to impartial criticism at the 13th Plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee. Serious complaints were also directed toward E. Kh. Gukasov, a candidate member of the Central Committee Buro and chairman of Gosagroprom. In the months since then, some things have improved. More attention is now being devoted to the problems of introducing the new economic mechanism and making effective use of the accomplishments of scientific and technical progress, and progressive experience.

This to a certain extent explains some of the changes for the better. In particular, during 3 years of the current five-year plan we have been able to raise per-capita meat consumption by more than 9 kilograms, and milk consumption by 33. Significant positive changes have occurred in the social development of rural areas.

However, this provides no grounds at all for "resting on our laurels." As we know, not one of the oblasts of Kazakhstan ever reached the targets planned by the Food Program. As of the beginning of the five-year plan we were short over 16 million tons of grain, more than a million tons of potatoes, 35,000 tons of meat and 513,000 tons of milk. The gap between the supply levels of the republic's different oblasts is still too large. The blame for this is borne primarily by oblast agroindustrial committees and oblast executive committees. There is also a great deal of work to be done by CPSU members and ministers T. B. Kuppayev and V. V. Milov and Gosagroprom deputy chairmen V. A. Kosarev and A. K. Kusainov. In the estimation of the Central Committee Buro these comrades have started working more energetically and assertively. But their actions lack coordination. It frequently still happens where each maintains responsibility for his own area and shows little concern for the situation evolving in a neighboring sector. Moreover when it comes to solving certain problems, Gosagroprom executives place too much reliance on the local leadership, allowing control and organization of the necessary work to slip out of their hands.

Another effective factor that should be placed into action is that of encouraging cities to develop the agrarian sector. Their scientific, technical and intellectual potential could and should influence solution of rural problems to a much greater degree than before. And we need to introduce existing progressive experience faster.

The CPSU Central Committee is conducting a plenum this week on agrarian issues. It would also be suitable for us to return to this discussion once again. We should prepare for it right now. That is, we need to make an all-out effort to raise the level of party leadership of agricultural production, accelerate introduction of cost accounting and leaseholding relations based on cooperative principles thoughtfully and without fuss, and achieve further improvement of the entire system of management of the agroindustrial complex, beginning with the farms and ending with the republic's Gosagroprom. All of this work must be carried on in full correspondence with recommendations of conferences recently held in Orel, Kharkov, Belgorod and Moscow.

In general, no matter what section of the economy we look at, it is clearly evident that what has been accomplished in the intervening period is much less than what could have been done, and that we have not yet been able to impart the needed acceleration to restructuring and achieve significant improvement of the work everywhere.

The task is to examine the status of the economy's development and the use of production potential, and determine effective ways to place the national economy on the path of intensification and to fulfill the five-year plan's quotas in each sector, in each region, in the shortest time possible.

Ensuring Successful Reform of the Political System

As was emphasized at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, it is impossible to ensure attainment of the goals set in the economic and social spheres without reforming the political system, democratizing the society and, most importantly, restoring the sovereignty of the soviets.

Much is being done in the republic in light of these requirements. The structure of party committees and soviet organs has been reexamined, and the process of delimiting their functions is gathering momentum. Democratization and glasnost are expanding, which is promoting growth of social consciousness. Quite recently, indifference and outright apathy were almost the norm, and now, everything that is happening in the republic elicits an acute reaction from the laborers, and a desire to participate actively in making the changes occur. The election campaign proceeded in the party organizations in this atmosphere. The same is happening today as well, on the eve of the elections of USSR peoples deputies.

At the same time we all feel that the political reform is not being implemented smoothly. For example serious difficulties are often encountered in establishing the sovereignty of the soviets. These difficulties are associated primarily with unequal and sometimes even conflicting relations between departments and local soviets, and with a tendency for bureaucrats to evade participation in the solution of social problems.

For example the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Light Industry (A. Ch. Dzhormatov) is finishing construction of knitted fabric factories in Tselinograd and Rudnyy. But not a single social, cultural or personal service facility has been built for the collectives of these enterprises. A significant gap in the rate of introduction of production and social facilities was allowed to develop at the Karaganda Integrated Iron and Steel Works and the Yermakov Ferroalloy Plant.

Can we tolerate such parasitic approaches today? No, of course not. Our attitudes should be fundamentally changed. Departments planning construction of production facilities are obligated to transfer the necessary assets for development of the region's infrastructures to the soviets on priority in accordance with the appropriate standards. Such a practice is already in place. In particular the Alma-Ata City Soviet of Peoples Deputies enacted standards for one-time per-resident and per-worker expenditures of capital investments for construction of social facilities, and submitted them to the enterprises. Now negotiations with departments proceeds as follows: If you want to build a production facility within our territory, provide the assets and allocations for social, cultural and personal service facilities; if you want to invite specialists from outside the city to work here, allocate the assets for the city's development. This is the basis for mutual business relations between the soviets and the departments. And it must be observed firmly.

There are also many other ways of forming unbudgeted funds requiring competent management, socialist resourcefulness, creative initiative and the desire to work in the new way on the part of soviet executives. But it must be said frankly that far from all of them are ready to accept the burden which is being transferred to their shoulders in connection with delimitation of the functions of party and state organs. Many soviet workers avoid independent solution of current problems, hiding as before behind the back of party committees.

There can be no doubt that the appeal for the new is not a rejection of the good and tested old. But even the forms and methods of work that have proven themselves must be made more dynamic, and they should be purified of templates and stereotypes. And there are still many of them both in the way local soviets and executive committees conduct their meetings, and in the activities of permanent commissions and executive and administrative organs.

The strength of the soviets lies in their deputies. Placing this powerful lever into action is a priority task of party committees. All the more so because as we know, their first secretaries soon become the leaders of the soviets.

The activities of public organizations need to be accelerated and restructured, as foreseen by the reform of the political system. Party committees are called upon to

increase the role and responsibility of communists working in the trade unions, the Komsomol and other public formations, in which very many shortcomings still exist. Take for example the trade union organs. They are slow in ridding themselves of clichés and inertia, and they continue to substitute active work by voluminous reports, and to display indecisiveness in questions of defending the socioeconomic rights and interests of the laborers. Many workers of the Kazakhstan Council of Trade Unions and of republic committees of the sector trade unions cannot bestir themselves to analyze the situation, and they are poorly acquainted with the atmosphere in the labor collectives. All of these shortcomings were openly revealed in the proceedings of the rather recent plenum of the Kazakhstan Council of Trade Unions, in which, in particular, an unhealthy discussion suddenly arose on the supposedly urgent need to grant trade union committees the right to announce strikes. It is simply hard to imagine a more far-fetched problem. For the sake of justice it should be said that the leadership of the Kazakhstan Council of Trade Unions (E. M. Zhakselekov) agreed with our remarks and is now taking steps to correct the imbalances.

Nor is everything going well yet in leadership of the Komsomol—an important area of party activity. For the moment the work style of the Kazakhstan Komsomol Central Committee, oblast committees, city committees and rayon committees does not correspond to the changes occurring in the youth environment. The Komsomol is obligated to boldly inject itself into the activities of all youth formations, and to wage a struggle against parasitic dispositions, materialism, and lack of spirituality, which continue to extend their roots ever deeper. Komsomol workers must make their presence known wherever passions boil, acute debates are conducted, and a struggle between ideas goes on. In this connection I would like to ask a question of Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary S. S. Kondybayev: Can the processes presently under way really be affected just by publishing resolutions alone, without ever leaving the office?

It stands to reason that the problems of educating the young are the business of not just the Komsomol, but also the party committees. Constant communication, assistance and support and, where necessary, strict exactingness—these are what the growing generation needs from us.

Women's and veterans' organizations, divisions of the Soviet Cultural Fund and the Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin, and other public formations, both ones that had been in operation previously and newly founded ones, have recently begun playing an active part in restructuring in the republic. It is the duty of the party committees to develop, in every possible way, their initiatives directed at raising the spirituality of our life, humanity and charity.

An enormous reserve for democratization can be tapped by encouraging public activity. But on the whole, this process requires meticulous and comprehensive study, under constant party control. It is no secret, after all, that the wave of restructuring which our party began has been capped by a considerable amount of "foam"—so-called informal leaders, whose actions and appeals contain a great deal of extremism and excess, and sometimes assume the form of unjustified attacks on party and soviet organs. And although the danger of this phenomenon was openly discussed at the 19th Party Conference, at that time we were not yet fully cognizant of this situation.

It is another matter today, now that we have become witnesses to the activation of various groups and formations. Speaking in support of restructuring, and making strong appeals that supposedly correspond to the times, the members of these organizations descend to open demagoguery, and by their rhetoric they try to win cheap popularity.

Nor should we close our eyes to the fact that politicization of some independent-action organizations in the republic has recently intensified. Moreover various sorts of emissaries from beyond Kazakhstan's borders have become a more frequent phenomenon in its cities. The so-called "Democratic Union" is attempting to create its "affiliates" in Alma-Ata, Karaganda and Uralsk. And representatives of the "Pamyat" society and the "All-Union Sociopolitical Club" are not far behind. "Appeals" and other such things containing requests "to support," "to start work," "to take action" are being addressed to many administrative organs from the Baltic republics and the Transcaucasus. A group of emissaries from the "People's Front" came from Latvia to Alma-Ata, to the Writers Union, in order to "teach" the people of Kazakhstan how to organize a similar formation here. It must be said to the credit of our writers that the uninvited "teachers" were shown the door.

And properly so. Every case in which someone tries to impose alien views in the name of the people and under the flag of democracy and glasnost should be evaluated as political activity of an aggressive form, and decisively repulsed.

Of course, no one is about to dispute the urgent need to raise the political activity of the masses. Moreover it is the decisive prerequisite for achieving the revolutionary changes toward which we are all stubbornly and sincerely striving. The channel into which this activity flows and the forms which public discussion acquires are another matter. Here as well, in my opinion, much depends on the quality of the political work of party committees, and on their capability for reacting promptly to the urgent problems that arise. Experience shows that wherever we have learned to anticipate these problems and competently head them off with effective counteractions, the excuses for spontaneous manifestations are absent.

We need to do everything to welcome the activity of those groups which sincerely desire to participate in reaching the objectives of restructuring. And not only welcome—we should meet them half-way, and provide all possible assistance and support to the useful, noble aspirations of the people.

We have experience in such positive cooperation, and much has been said about it in the press. In a word, we need to persistently accumulate the experience of democratizing all aspects of life, and we need to create democratic culture and introduce it into our daily practice. This must become one of the most important components of the ideological and organizational work of every party committee, of every party organization.

Persistently Improve the Style of Party Work, and Promote Democratization of Party Life

Changes in the life of the party itself are at the core of the political system's reform. The 19th All-Union Party Conference set a clear goal—restructuring the party's activity, and placing the forms and methods of the work of party organizations into correspondence with the role of the CPSU as the society's political vanguard. This is why deep democratization of all intraparty life and eradication of authoritarian methods of work and immunity to control became the key platform of the conference.

In correspondence with this, the republic's party organizations are implementing measures to improve democracy within the party and to ensure collectiveness of party leadership. But speaking objectively, the level and scope of the work being done hardly meet the targets yet.

As we know, restoring a Leninist definition of the role of an elective organ and making its members more active are among the directions of democratizing life within the party. The activity of permanent commissions of the party committees acquires important significance in this sense. Such commissions are formed everywhere. But let us be self-critical. The effort to make their work active has clearly bogged down, beginning with the Central Committee and ending with the rayon party committees. For practical purposes we did not hold our first meeting until just prior to the plenum, and many oblast party committees did not even do this.

You must agree that this situation could hardly be tolerated. We need to place this force into action faster, we need to make sure that these commissions promote democratization of life within the party and growth of the vanguard role of party organizations as soon as possible. Not only must party organizations participate in the discussion of particular issues, but they must also assume a clear position in the development of strategic and tactical measures by which to implement the plans, and actively seek optimum solutions that would ensure the end result. All elective organs must be prepared to do such work.

We need to awaken a certain faction of the communists from their passive state. It is important in this case to keep in mind that their passive relationship to the processes of democratizing intraparty life has a direct opposite—a clear extreme in the understanding of democratic norms by another, rather sizable faction of CPSU members. In the heat of discussion and debate, the latter often forget the requirements of the party Charter, and continue to insist on their line even after a collective decision is made. Lenin taught us in this connection "to strictly determine two categories of democratic functions: on one hand, discussions and meetings, and on the other hand, establishment of the strictest responsibility for executive functions, and unconditionally labor-oriented, disciplined and voluntary execution of prescriptions and instructions necessary to ensure that the economic mechanism would function like clockwork." He favored the freedom of criticism, complete and universal, as long as it does not violate the unity of a particular action, and he opposed any criticism that would undermine unity or hinder its attainment in an action decided upon by the party.

Under the new conditions, in which party committees are being oriented on political methods of leadership, it is very important to establish priority of elective organs over the apparatus, and to do away with the faulty practice where the apparatus dictates its terms to members of the party committee. This has not yet been achieved in all places. For example the apparatus of the Kokchetav City Committee continues to dominate over the elective organ, and ordinary instructors continue to dictate their will to members of the city committee in all things. And yet they themselves are rare visitors to the labor collectives, preferring to manage the primary party organizations by telephone.

The apparatus must be freed of responsibilities atypical of it. It must act as an assistant to the party committee in the performance of its political, organizational and educational functions.

Today the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee is developing the practice of having officials make visits within the oblasts not as dispassionate inspectors to collect preestablished facts, but to deeply study the state of affairs locally, to search for new, more effective approaches to attaining set goals, and to analyze everything valuable that has been accumulated by party organizations in the course of restructuring. This is precisely the way the work and the apparatus of oblast, city and rayon party committees should be organized.

The all-union party conference attached great significance to democratizing the life of primary party organizations, and to the problems of improving their leadership. In light of this, we need to increase their independence and authority in every possible way, and free them of petty regulation from above. However, as the recent elections showed, restructuring has not yet made an imprint on a significant proportion of the

primary party organizations, the shop organizations; nor, by the way, has a significant change occurred in their leadership on the part of rayon, city and oblast party committees.

A number of oblast committees do nothing more than proclaim the need for shifting the center of gravity of party work directly into the masses and raising the role of primary party organizations. An analysis shows that these goals are not being met. Last year oblast committees of the Kazakhstan Communist Party examined the work of only 111 primary party organizations, five shop party organizations and only one party group in meetings of the buro and the secretariats. At the same time they entertained reports from 255 city and rayon party committees. Why are rayon committees receiving twice the attention? Where has the center of gravity, which had been discussed so loudly in the reports of many first secretaries of oblast party committees, been shifted? And it is no accident that the work of the party buros and secretaries of 153 primary and 215 shop organizations and 218 party group organizers was deemed unsatisfactory in the last elections.

In the primary party organization of the Letovochnyy Repair Plant, Kellerovskiy Rayon, Kokchetav Oblast, communists found the work of the party buro to be unsatisfactory on two occasions. But this was troubling neither to the rayon committee nor the oblast party committee. What other signals of disaster does G. S. Lazorenko, first secretary of the rayon committee, need before she finally devotes attention to this party organization?

We sometimes wonder at the formal, callous attitude some party committees and administrative executives maintain toward the needs and interests of the laborers. How can we condone, for example, the fact that calf-herdswomen of Chistovskiy Sovkhoz, Bulayevskiy Rayon, North Kazakhstan Oblast, who achieve weight increases among their animals of 500-700 grams per day, receive but 90-100 rubles monthly wages? Sovkhoz director A. P. Vaganov asserts that the workers were switched to a leaseholding basis, and that they are being paid what they earn. But what sort of leasing system is this if the calf-herdswomen do not even know the accounting prices, and no one has made the effort to explain to them the mechanism by which their wages are formed, or suggested ways to reduce expenditures. And I. I. Kvashin, who has headed the rayon party committee for 8 years now, gazes upon this outrage indifferently and feels no need to delve into the essence of the matter and correct the actions of the sovkhoz leadership and party committee.

Such reluctance, and the inability to rely on primary party organizations in solving the priority problems of restructuring as well, are also characteristic of the Uralsk Oblast Party Committee (N. Iskaliyev). Is this perhaps not why average annual grain production in the oblast decreased by a fifth in comparison with the last five-year

plan, and why the plans for procuring potatoes and vegetables have been only 56 and 45 percent fulfilled? This oblast is the only one in the republic in which poultry is not sold freely in the stores.

It must be clear to everyone that restructuring will not be successful unless party workers immerse themselves totally in the life of the primary party organizations and labor collectives.

Party committees are also obligated to intensify their attention to increasing the activity of every communist. This is the most important prerequisite of restructuring. New forms and methods of individual work need to be sought and introduced. All of us have basically switched to the practice of organizing accountability reports and confirming performance reports. But even this means of increasing activity, which is effective in general, has been so formalized that it hardly works any more. No one is delving deeply into the organization of accountability reports. Many party committees are satisfied with general figures. And they are impressive. According to available data 157,000 communists in the republic have given such reports, including 40,000 executives. It would seem that should produce a colossal impact, but nothing of the sort is evident.

For example in recent years almost every other communist has made a report in Dzhabul Oblast, but the state of affairs has improved in almost none of the areas. Before, a third of the enterprises and farms suffered low profitability or operated at a loss, and today everything is still the same. Last year grain procurement decreased by 43 percent, while vegetable procurement dropped by 14 percent; the plan for introducing housing and schools of general education was not completed.

The passiveness of a sizable faction of party masses at the grass-roots level is associated with slow democratization of the important area of party admissions. This work is not being tied in with the objectives of restructuring everywhere either. In some places growth of party ranks has been left to its own devices, and political and educational work among party nonmembers, especially in the labor collectives, has fallen by the wayside; this is seen as the reason for the dramatic decrease in applications for party membership from the workers. Things are worst in this regard in Dzhezkazgan, Karaganda and Tselinograd oblasts. Nor can we be untroubled by the observed trend of growing cases where CPSU members break with the party and surrender their party tickets on their own initiative. While in 1986 there were 32 cases here, last year there were as many as 264. What are the causes of this phenomenon? They vary—from unsatisfactory progress in restructuring to purely personal ones, brought on for example by poor housing conditions. Each such case must become an object of the most persistent attention on the part of party committees.

Democratization of intraparty life foresees significant renewal of personnel policy, which is a dependable tool by which the party can attain its goals. This is why the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's party organizations are concerned primarily to promote to executive positions those who have actively demonstrated their capability for carrying out revolutionary changes.

The number of such resourceful people who understand the principles of economics well and are capable organizers is becoming larger at the executive level. The practice of electing leaders is promoting this. In the period following the 27th Congress the labor collectives elected around 4,500 enterprise executives, 7,000 middle-grade executives, over 12,000 brigade leaders, and 900 executives in science, culture, public health and trade. Thirty percent of party group organizers, 53 percent of shop secretaries and almost 42 percent of secretaries of primary party organizations were elected in the course of the last election campaign, in which there were two or more candidates for every position. Over 70 percent of city and rayon party committee secretaries were elected in this fashion as well.

The nomenklatura of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee was reduced by more than half. And it must be said that it has become easier to breathe. Fundamental changes also occurred in the reserve for promotion.

At the same time we should recognize that there are still many sins in this highly important area of party work. As before, some oblast, city and rayon party committees are maintaining a superficial approach to selecting and placing personnel, promoting people without deeply studying their moral, political and work qualities, and failing to listen to the opinion of primary party organizations and councils of labor collectives. Thus when the Zharminskiy Rayon Party Committee, Semipalatinsk Oblast recommended Turdin to be director of the Kriushinskiy Sovkhoz, it did not take the trouble to see what communists felt about this person. And need we be amazed that no one supported the rayon committee's candidate during the election?

Had the Dzhezkazgan Oblast Party Committee looked into Sadvakasov's personal qualities well before promoting him to the position of deputy chairman of the oblast executive committee, a year later it would not have become necessary to fire him for actions soiling the honor of a communist.

Even though the East Kazakhstan Oblast Party Committee (A. V. Milkin) knew that first secretaries of the Bolshenarymskiy Rayon Party Committee F. F. Lukyanov and of the Ulanskiy Rayon Party Committee Zh. Z. Shaldyrbayev did not enjoy the authority and respect of active party members, it nonetheless recommended their election to these positions. It was not even taken into account that CPSU Central Committee instructions had

been violated in selecting Lukyanov as a delegate to the rayon party conference. And it is fully understandable why delegates to the party conference clearly stated their negative feelings toward their "leaders." Ultimately both of them were dismissed from their responsibilities as party rayon committee first secretaries literally 3 months after their selection.

Democratization of intraparty life cannot produce the desired results if it is not supported by the strict monitoring function of party organs. We could actively discuss the objectives and problems, and adopt specific, purposeful decisions, but without due organization and control of execution, we are doing nothing more than shooting blanks. This is a time-tested truth. Nonetheless control and inspection of execution continue to be the bottleneck in the activities of a number of party committees, and chiefly the Karaganda, Dzhambul, Aktyubinsk and Guryev oblast party committees. Superficial approaches to monitoring execution of adopted decisions are also frequently encountered in the work of Central Committee departments, and especially in the socioeconomic and agrarian departments.

We need to resolutely correct this situation. After all, lack of control cools the people's ardor and disorganizes party committees. When we make decisions, we need to think out the entire control mechanism beforehand.

Nor have we rid ourselves of another flaw—suppression of criticism, and persecution for it. Some party committees even try to ignore this shameful phenomenon. In the end, the careers of people are shattered, and the work suffers.

A troubling case occurred in Alma-Ata's Moscow Dining Hall and Restaurant Trust. As soon as Sh. O. Yeleuova, a Komsomol member, a deputy and the chairman of the combined trade union committee, justly criticized the trust's leadership during a meeting of the rayon soviet for deficiencies in its work, an intolerable situation was created about her. To make matters worse, the young worker was labeled an intriguer, and she began to be subjected to abuse in every meeting. "Conspirators" were found who literally hid her admission documents for candidate membership to the CPSU, and the issue of her admission to the party was not reviewed by the rayon committee buro in time. Following Central Committee intervention, Sh. O. Yeleuova's file was found, and the culprits were punished. But she has still not been admitted to the party, inasmuch as some party committee officials, including the secretaries, apparently have no desire to spoil their relationships with the "all-powerful" trust director.

Such cases are not all that rare. Things of a similar sort have also happened in Kustanay, Pavlodar and Chimkent oblasts. And can we ever forget the tragic case that left a black mark on the republic party organization—the death of Sholpan Ismagulovna Orazgeldinova, secretary of the Zhaksynskiy Rayon Party Committee

and formerly of Turgay Oblast, who became the victim of the slander and spiritual callousness of those who worked with her? Even after her death, no one repented, or felt remorse for what had been done. It took a statement in PRAVDA to restore the good name of the prematurely departed party member.

Adherence to party principles and party comradeship are inseparable concepts. When one is allowed to slip, the other will inevitably suffer. Last year the Central Committee Buro restored the party membership of 49 persons, and significantly lightened the penalties imposed on nine communists. These figures stand for the destinies of people, of our comrades. We can never forget them under any circumstances.

As we can see, many problems have accumulated in intraparty life. Decisively freeing themselves of atypical functions, and of doing the work and duplicating the work of soviet and administrative organs and public organizations, the party committees are called upon to persistently implement their policy through organizational, personnel and ideological work. This is essentially one of the most important tasks of the party in improving the political system and confirming democratic principles of social life.

Raising in Every Possible Way the Level of Ideological Work and the Intellectual and Spiritual Potential of Restructuring

Restructuring and spiritual renewal of the society would be unimaginable without activation of the individual. This is precisely why the entire complex of political and socioeconomic objectives was examined at the 19th Party Conference in close association with ideological and educational work, through the prism of the society's moral problems. This line, and the demands posed in M. S. Gorbachev's speech at the February (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and in meetings with the chairmen of creative unions, the mass media and other ideological institutions, must be persistently implemented.

For these purposes a number of departments in the party committees have been reorganized, and ideological commissions have been formed. The range of issues associated with the problems of education has been widened significantly. Individual approaches to people have been intensified, and the desire to listen to the requests, proposals and opinions of different population groups has appeared. A system for studying and considering public opinion and for forming social consciousness is evolving in the republic's party organizations. More meetings, interviews and discussions are being held in worker collectives and with the scientific and creative intelligentsia and the press corps.

Nonetheless the pressure of obsolete forms and methods of work is still high. The main thing—concentrating effort on the most important directions of restructuring—has not yet happened. Sometimes the impression is created that ideological workers are "lying in wait" for the truth, waiting for the time when real life begins to fit the former schemes and principles.

Take for example the central problem of our activity—the human factor. The new economic conditions—cost-accounting, self-financing and the leasing and family contracts—require completely new approaches to educational work with people. The individual is now becoming the true proprietor of production, an owner of the land. And in this, he requires not only economic but also spiritual support; a fundamentally different moral atmosphere must be created in the labor collectives. And yet our ideologists and mass media continue to regale the individual with general appeals and slogans like "be a proprietor," "be thrifty" and so on.

And if the importance of the laborer and of good work, and respect for them, are slipping away from the social consciousness, is this not the result of a flaw in ideological work? In a word, we have not yet done away with the narrow bureaucratic idea that the individual is a means of attaining production goals, and nothing more.

I think that the main reason for the failures occurring in the ideological sphere ultimately concern personnel, the very people responsible for this area of the work. Speaking frankly, the changes in the personnel composition of party committees that recently occurred have affected the ideological corps least of all. Workers who have done little to show their worth in the course of restructuring still occupy executive posts.

It was validly noted at the 12th Plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee that not a single authoritative ideological worker who could influence the young, who could get their attention with meaningful and wise words, was to be found during the events of December 1986 in Alma-Ata. The situation has doubtlessly changed for the better, but not significantly. People of low initiative who carry weight only in the party apparatus occupy the chairs of party committee secretaries for ideology everywhere you look, especially in the city and rayon party committees. The public at large frequently does not even know their first names and patronymicals, not to mention what they look like. Could there possibly be any hope that the young and the old would come to them for advice, for help, or simply to talk intimately about current problems? Hardly.

Unfortunately most of our "ideologists," as we have gotten accustomed to calling them, are low-grade functionaries who emphasize prohibitive functions in their work and in their communication with the masses. And yet they should be known and respected among the people, they should possess the power of persuasion, and they should not tolerate hiding in one's office. Such

persons should be patiently sought, prepared and persistently encouraged to participate in ideological activity. And yet, 47 percent of rayon and city party committee secretaries for ideology do not have a higher party-political education, and what is totally unacceptable is that nowhere are they furthering their education.

A sound foundation of convictions must be laid beneath the restructuring effort, so enormous in its scale, and laborers must be taught to think and act with political maturity. However, the Central Committee's Ideological Department and the party committees have still not begun developing the practice of ideological renewal with regard for the unique features of the republic. The restructuring of Marxist-Leninist and economic education is proceeding extremely slowly. Many students do not even know the basics of the leasing contract, and they have a simplified idea of the causes of deformations in moral and social consciousness.

Some ideological workers view study as a goal unto itself, and not as a means of mastering the political methods of leadership and of ideological influence on the masses. Little attention is devoted to studying primary sources. In Aktyubinsk Oblast, for example, more than 70 percent of persons surveyed were unable to name works by V. I. Lenin which they studied recently.

It must be recognized that not all propagandists and lecturers are yet ready for frank discussion with students. Many do not know how to conduct debates on acute issues, or to defend the ideas of restructuring; frequently they are still on the defensive, waiting for some kind of commands and instructions from above. Only after we begin to observe Lenin's principle of knowing how to persuade people "not by the force of power but by the force of authority, by the force of energy, by greater experience, by greater...talent," will we assume firm control of the ideological situation. And for this to happen, we must fundamentally restructure the system for training ideological personnel.

Slow restructuring of public education of the young—one of the principal directions of the party's ideological activity—remains another major shortcoming in the work of party committees.

Even though we have pedagogical institutes in each oblast that graduate around 15,000 teachers annually, we are still unable to satisfy the continually increasing demand for them. Neither the Ministry of Public Education nor the republic's Gosplan possesses substantiated information on the actual need for pedagogical personnel. The extensive approach to solving this problem has negatively affected the quality of personnel training: Many teachers do not want to work in secondary schools, nor can they. It is no accident that 70,000 teachers, or 30 percent of all of the republic's pedagogical corps, are working in the national economy in positions not involving educational activity.

At the same time the schools are experiencing an extremely acute shortage of teachers of Kazakh language and literature and teachers specializing in esthetic education. An especially grave situation with pedagogical personnel has evolved in the secondary schools and vocational-technical schools of Aktyubinsk, Alma-Ata, Dzhambul, Kokchetav and Tselinograd oblasts. We are certain that the time has come to develop a special "Pedagogical Personnel" program for the period to the year 2000.

We must not forget the simple truth that the future of our country and development of the society as a whole depend on restructuring all spheres of public education. It is a question of our policy, our ideology, one requiring constant party leadership.

Now about glasnost, the significance of which in ideological work is hard to overstate. It has become perhaps the first real herald of restructuring; it has been a real means of purifying ourselves of various sorts of deformations, and a bitter but necessary medicine against age-old diseases. Development of glasnost, it was noted at the 19th Party Conference, is one of the most important political tasks of the party. The growing role of our press, television and radio can be noted quite rightly as a confirmation of this.

The mass media are receiving constant attention from the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee and the oblast, city and rayon party committees. For the first time in the history of the Kazakhstan Journalists Union the question as to its efforts to educate workers of the mass media in the spirit of high responsibility for the ideological and political orientation of publications was discussed. Journalists are now much better informed.

But glasnost is not a one-way street. It presupposes the journalist's high responsibility before society. Unfortunately there are still many broadcasts and publications that elicit serious complaints. Inertia is still being surmounted timidly in the work of the mass media, and an abundance of all kinds of didactic materials claiming to be the ultimate truth is observed. This is especially typical of Alma-Ata Oblast's newspaper OGNI ALA-TAU, and of some rayon and high-circulation publications.

We all remember the period when many newspapers, including central ones, lavishly publicized "meeting" democracy in the Baltic republics, in Yaroslavl Oblast and elsewhere. Sometimes in veiled form, and sometimes even in open text, these publications constantly promoted the thought that this was real democracy, that this was supposedly where the front of the restructuring effort passed! Life has demonstrated how harmful it is to pose the issue in this way. Even in our republic, some people citing these materials have been ready to publicize only the external side of the changes occurring in the society.

Today we can say with full grounds that the position occupied in this issue by the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee has justified itself completely. The repulse given in the press to various windbags and demagogues striving to distract the laborers from the tasks at hand and switch restructuring into a verbal dead end kept the situation in the republic from becoming destabilized and prevented obstacles to work on specific urgent problems.

Wherever the spiritual and physical energy of the people has had its release only through political "whistle-blowing," neither food nor housing has increased in availability. PRAVDA made a completely valid statement in an article on the citizens' movements in Latvia: "One cannot plow the land, bake a loaf of bread, smelt steel or build a house on the heat of passions and emotions, sometimes artificially fanned, alone...."

In a word, what we need is not glasnost in general but only that which would reveal the advantages of socialism and mobilize the people for their maximum development.

In this connection I would also like to talk about the quality of coverage of the problems of Aral in the press and on television and radio. The alarm of the public concerning the complex ecological situation in this region and the higher attention of the press to solving these problems are fully understandable. Many expeditions by scientists and journalists to Kzyl-Orda Oblast, and many round-table discussions both in Moscow and in the republic, which have elicited an enormous response from the public locally, have already been organized. But the authors of some of the press statements insistently try to prove that the Aral tragedy is supposedly a "natural disaster," and that the steps being taken to save the sea are insufficiently effective, that they are half-baked, and that they do not correspond to the dimensions of the catastrophe.

How would I want to respond to this? First of all there is no way that you can call the situation that has evolved in the Aral region a "natural" disaster. After all, a government decision had been made earlier (the proponents of the "natural disaster" version remember this, I'm sure) to significantly reduce the volume of the Aral basin in connection with diversion of waters of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya to increase production of agricultural products, primarily cotton. Enormous resources were expended purposefully over the course of decades in order to implement this supposedly noble idea, which was said to be directed at improving the welfare of the people.

Today we recognize our error. On 1 September 19⁸⁰ the CPSU Central Committee Politburo adopted the sole correct decision concerning preservation of the Sea of Aral. But can we possibly discount the fact that in the past decades, many dozens of sovkhozes providing the national economy with products it needs and employing

thousands of people were built?! If we approach the problem in the way we are advised by radically predisposed proponents of the "elemental" nature of what has occurred, we should do away with everything that had been built previously in a single swipe, and return the region to its initial state. Is this realistic? Can we instantaneously compensate for the inevitable loss of a large quantity of material and labor resources that would result from this? Unfortunately our opponents are not giving too much thought to these important social consequences. Or moreover to poor utilization of assets allocated to solving the problem of the Aral region. In 3 years, only 11 out of 60 production and social facilities foreseen by a decree of the republic's government have been placed into operation. For some reason our press says nothing about the causes of such a situation. And this is precisely where we need the maximum glasnost.

Persistently Confirm and Creatively Develop Lenin's Principles of Nationality Policy

Fulfillment of the resolution "On Interethnic Relations" adopted at the 19th Party Conference occupies a special place in ideological work. We can say today with absolute certainty that the republic has been unable to not only achieve significant positive results in ethnic and interethnic relations, but also develop sufficiently effective approaches to solving the political, socioeconomic and spiritual problems associated with such relations.

These problems were discussed in detail at the 12th Plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, during which the thought that an ethnic problem as such does not exist in pure form, that it manifests itself only in close interaction with many other phenomena of life, was especially emphasized.

Owing to purposeful actions by party, soviet and Komso-mol organs, and with the active participation of the public, an integral system for controlling processes in interethnic relations is being created and is now operating in the republic. This control system is permitting us not only to see the real picture of the present state of affairs, but also to eliminate unneeded confusion and possible outbreaks of undesirable excesses in solving particular acute problems. This is especially important today, at a time when the republic party organization is preparing for the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on interethnic relations.

Three groups of pressing problems associated with reexamination of the republic's status, with expansion of its rights, with the powers of the government and government organs locally, with socioeconomic construction and with development of linguistic culture have now been brought up for broad discussion. The results of the discussion of these problems have made it possible to develop a package of proposals in anticipation of the CPSU Central Committee plenum.

The language problem is the most acute today. It is being raised persistently by representatives of the intelligentsia and studentbody. The causes of such concern are understandable. In particular it is the product of the low quality of language instruction in children's nurseries, in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education, of a failure to comply with the principle of bilingualism in cultural and sociopolitical measures, and of a shortage of phrase-books, dictionaries, textbooks and teaching manuals. And can we really say that it is normal for business to be conducted in Russian in most of the rayons of Aktyubinsk, East Kazakhstan, Guryev and Semipalatinsk oblasts where the population is predominantly Kazakh?

There are also many other reasons for concern about the fate of Kazakh language. But one thing of special concern is that some participants of the debate feel that all of the existing problems could be solved automatically by making Kazakh the state language. But would this really be so? Can we seriously hope that the language would take root simply by the force of law? Of course not. In the same way that the absence of the corresponding legislation cannot prevent real concern for preserving and developing the language.

What in fact is keeping us today from fully implementing the well known decrees of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's Council of Ministers on Kazakh and Russian languages? Only our own immobility, and sometimes even our open indifference to this important matter. But it would be at the least naive to fight these phenomena by the force of law alone. The prestige of a language is raised not by slogans and decrees, but by its specific bearers—the people. And we could hardly hope that legalized conversion of the entire state and social life of the republic exclusively to one language, Kazakh, would not infringe upon the rights of the absolute majority of the citizens.

Then what is the solution? A constructive line is beginning to reveal itself in the process of discussing the question of linguistic culture which, incidentally, is being covered from pluralistic positions both in the republic and the central press.

It would be premature to speak today about final resolution of the problem, inasmuch as the discussion is still going on, and public opinion has not yet been conclusively determined. Nonetheless I have been asked to state the position of the Bureau of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee on this issue, one which we arrived at unanimously in the course of thorough discussion with the participation of the first secretaries of oblast party committees. Our position is state Kazakh-Russian bilingualism, with guarantees for free development of the languages of all ethnic groups and nationalities residing in our republic without exception. This solution most fully satisfies the interests of their development and of their political, social and cultural needs.

We also feel that the time remaining before the CPSU Central Committee plenum on interethnic relations begins its work should be devoted to intensifying the effort to fulfill all points of the language decree we adopted, and to eliminate all sins which keep us from confirming bilingualism in a real way. This is including in areas such as administration, public health, transportation and communications, in various information services and so on. We need to determine the list of occupations requiring a knowledge of Kazakh and Russian languages, naturally with regard for the local conditions of each region taken separately.

Considering the spread of bilingualism, and the special program developed in the republic for increasing the role of nationally oriented secondary schools, problems concerned with changing the profile of pedagogical VUZes must be solved right now. I'm referring to the need for significantly increasing the training of teachers of Kazakh language and literature.

Nor can we reduce our attention to the problems concerned with representation of different ethnic groups in party and soviet organs. A serious effort was recently made to correct former imbalances in this regard. But things are still being done in the old way in some places. Thus there are from two to five thousand persons of the indigenous nationality residing in Stepnogorsk and in Krasnoznamenetskiy Rayon, Tselinograd Oblast, but there are no representatives of this ethnic group among the executives of city and rayon party committees and executive committees. And on the other hand, in Moyunkumskiy Rayon, Dzhambul Oblast, where Russians make up a third of the population, you won't find any of them in the rayon party and executive committees. And these are far from solitary examples.

Complacency is the greatest evil, one capable of unnoticed and unwittingly throwing us back from conquered positions. As soon as adherence to party principles declines, as soon as people begin to forget about the need for constant, systematic work in interethnic relations, past practices immediately experience a rebirth.

One would have thought that at the Central Committee's 12th Plenum we approved and firmly agreed upon unswerving implementation of the principle that Russian executives should accept the responsibility for satisfying the needs and requests of representatives of the Kazakh nationality while on the other hand Kazakh executives should concern themselves with all other ethnic groups, including Russian. Life itself has demonstrated that this is the most constructive approach; it relieves us of former reticence and unnecessary friction in solving all of the most acute ethnic problems. However, very little time has passed, and some people are already beginning to do things in the old way again, "hogging the blanket," as they say. This is evident especially in personnel issues. It is time to end the discussion on this topic once and for all.

As we make preparations for the CPSU Central Committee plenum on the ethnic issue, it is important to concentrate our effort on activating processes that would bring people of different nationalities together and decisively curtail the actions of those who would wittingly or unwittingly promote division of ethnic groups and distract the people from solving the truly urgent problems. The party favors a respectful attitude toward national interests and the uniqueness and worth of each ethnic group and nationality, and real international unity of the Soviet people. Our task is to see that this position would be reinforced by the concrete work of each party committee, of each state and public organization.

Intensify the Struggle Against Bureaucratism and Stagnation, and Persistently Reinforce Socialist Legality

As was specially noted at the 19th Party Conference, the struggle against bureaucratism and reinforcement of socialist legality and the rule of law are an inseparable part of political reform and development of democracy. Stagnation, bureaucratism, and callousness and formalism in relation to people are still serious obstacles on the road to renewal.

During the time of stagnation we became so encrusted with an enormous quantity of all kinds of prohibitions, instructions, clauses and other petty regulations that it was impossible to take a single step in either economic activity or day-to-day life. But once we looked at these obstacles from the positions of restructuring, we realized that many of them are simply against the law. Two thousand decrees of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers and over 6,000 acts of republic ministries and departments were recognized to be null and void within just a year. And contrary to the "forecasts" of some officials, the edifice of socialism has not collapsed as a result; instead, there is now more room for independent action and creativity. We need to continue this work into the future, we need to rid ourselves of obsolete dogmas and instructions, and we need to rely on the principle that everything that is not prohibited by law is permitted.

It is no secret that a disdainful attitude toward the law evolved in the society over a period of many long years. This resulted in growth of violations of labor discipline, crimes and malfeasance, and a decline of morality. Drunkenness, drug addiction and indifference to cruelty have their roots in this as well. Serious deformations occurred in law enforcement organs.

The party proclaimed a decisive struggle against these negative phenomena and promoted the idea of creating a socialist legal state. All of this is causing certain positive changes in the moral climate of society and in the effort to reinforce socialist legality. The situation is improving in our republic as well. A tendency for cases of murder, rape and malicious hooliganism to decrease has been noted. Recidivism of criminals and juvenile crime have decreased, several long-standing burglary and robbery

rings have been revealed and eliminated, and two bands credited with 20 murders and a group that had committed 80 crimes of property in Alma-Ata resulting in a loss exceeding 300,000 rubles were rendered harmless.

An intensive search is continuing for ways of reinforcing socialist legality and the rule of law. A system of measures to renew the style, forms and methods of performing law enforcement functions is being implemented.

But let us be self-critical. The needed turning point has not yet been reached, and the steps being implemented are not producing the anticipated end results. The robbery rate is not declining, and the number of crimes committed in public places has risen.

A dependable barrier has not been placed before misappropriations and spoilage of property, which cause a loss of over 275 million rubles annually. Each day pilferers take around a ton of meat products just from the republic's meat packing plants.

Drunkenness continues to have a significant influence on the status of crime. Each year over 15,000 crimes are committed in a drunken state. The struggle against speculation and malfeasance in the distribution and marketing of goods enjoying a higher demand is unsatisfactory.

A month ago commissions against speculation and malfeasance began functioning in the republic. We hope that these commissions will rely on workers' control, organize the effort to put trade in order, and determine the causes of shortages of goods.

Mention must be made of the poor work being done by procuracy organs (G. B. Yelemisov); the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (G. N. Knyazev) are being restructured too slowly.

We also need to put a decisive end to the shameful phenomenon of "telephone law," where certain party and soviet organs instruct the courts who to punish, who to pardon, and what case to initiate or terminate. The principle of independence of the courts must be observed unfailingly.

As we put the law enforcement organs in order, we must increase the legal culture of the public. Many party committees have distanced themselves from management of this highly important direction of ideological education. The soviets of peoples deputies, executives of ministries and departments, and trade union, Komsomol and other social organizations are not participating adequately in legal education either. Our attitude toward this issue must be changed fundamentally. The demand of the party conference to improve legal education of citizens must be satisfied. All units of the party, Komsomol training and economic education system must be encouraged to participate in this effort.

In a word, we rightfully await a more-persistent effort by party committees to strengthen legality and improve legal education of laborers, which will doubtlessly promote an increase in the social activity of the masses in all areas of restructuring.

Comrades! Even the briefest analysis of the work that has been done to implement the principles of the 19th All-Union Party Conference clearly illuminates our shortcomings, the urgent matters and the unutilized reserves. The main thing now is to concentrate on specific life-troubling questions. The people await real improvement of their life. And we are obligated to do everything to see that they sense such improvement as soon as possible. To do this, we must decisively change our work style, raise the responsibility of communists and intensify the struggle against all kinds of laxity and inactivity. We need to significantly improve economic and managerial activity, and we must make a real daily effort in all spheres and in all areas of restructuring.

The oblast, city and rayon party committees must persistently upgrade the quality of political and ideological work in the masses, constantly maintain the initiative, be aware of the situation, and control it. Only real changes for the better can serve as the criterion by which party activity is assessed.

And I am certain that the party organizations, communists and broad laboring masses of Kazakhstan will do everything possible to fully implement the ideas of restructuring contained within decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

Resolution on Health, Environment

18300488 *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 12 Mar 89 p 4

[Resolution of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, issued on 10 March: "On the Work of the Republic's Soviet and Economic Organs to Implement the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree 'Basic Directions of the Development of Public Health Protection and Restructuring of USSR Public Health in the 12th Five-Year Plan and in the Period to the Year 2000'"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic notes that in fulfilling the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference, as with all Soviet people, the republic's laborers are consistently implementing the party's idea of restructuring and renewing all spheres of social life, and the plans for accelerating socioeconomic development, for increasing the work effectiveness of the national economy's sectors on the basis of full cost accounting, self-reliance and self-financing, for deepening democracy and for widening glasnost and participation in state and public efforts.

The republic is consistently implementing measures to preserve and strengthen the population's health, to create conditions allowing for the necessary medical care, and to improve the working, personal and leisure conditions of urban and rural laborers.

Capital investments into public health in 1986-1988 were 304.8 million rubles. Eighty-six hospitals containing 100,000 beds, and polyclinics and rural medical outpatient clinics capable of accommodating 27,500 visits per shift have been placed into operation.

Over 40 percent of the capacities that have been placed into use are directed at strengthening the material base of children's therapeutic and preventive institutions and obstetric institutions as priority subdivisions of public health. Efforts to improve the working and personal conditions of laborers, labor protection and work sanitation conditions have been activated; over 700 million rubles have been assimilated for these purposes.

Steps are being taken within the framework of integrated "Health" programs, written in the oblasts, in many cities and in most enterprises, to upgrade mass physical culture and sports, and to improve and develop tourist and travel services as the most important means of improving the population's health. The network of sanatoriums, preventive health clinics, Pioneer and sports and health improvement camps, and physical education and improvement complexes located at places of employment and residence is being expanded.

Efforts are being made to improve medical services to the rural public, especially to persons living in remote areas and those involved in distant-pasture cattle rearing. Medicinal assistance to the public has been improved, and a more convenient work schedule has been established for therapeutic and preventive institutions.

Implementation of health improvement measures and practical introduction of modern diagnostic, preventive and therapeutic methods have strengthened the health of the republic's population. Morbidity in relation to a number of diseases has been decreased, and morbidity involving temporary incapacitation has been reduced.

As analysis shows, however, the level of the work being done by soviets of peoples deputies and public health organs of the Kazakh SSR to develop public health and to organize medical services does not yet meet modern requirements, and the possibilities existing in this are not being fully utilized. A lessening of attention to the problems of health protection, especially in rural areas, has led to a decrease in the rate of renewal of the material and equipment base of public health, and to a reduction of the effectiveness of health improvement measures. In many rayons the availability of hospitals, polyclinics and pharmacies is below standard. Over half of the republic's therapeutic and preventive institutions are located in crowded makeshift buildings, over 40 percent of them

need to be rebuilt, and around a third do not have central heating, water lines, sewage systems and hot water. At the same time the assets allocated to erection of public health facilities are not being utilized from one year to the next. Soviet executive committees are not displaying initiative and persistence in solving the problems of establishing cooperative use of the resources of kolkhozes, sovkhoses, enterprises and other organizations to build public health facilities and finance active use of leisure time by laborers.

The importance of preventive work—the principal direction of protecting the public's health—is understated. Ministries, departments and local soviets of peoples deputies are not doing enough to create healthy and safe conditions for work on the job, to reduce air contamination by gas and dust, noise and vibrations, and to protect against pollution of the air, the soil and open-air water basins by industrial discharges and domestic sewage. Considering that increasingly wider use is being made of mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals, the sanitary norms and rules of handling them are not always observed.

In some regions and cities, especially in the Aral region and in Alma-Ata, Dzhambul, Karaganda, Pavlodar, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Chimkent, Zyryanovsk and Temirtau, a stressful ecological and sanitary situation has evolved.

Job-related injury and morbidity of blue and white collar workers involving temporary incapacitation remain high in agricultural sectors, in metallurgical, chemical and light industry and in construction and transportation organizations, and occupational morbidity is decreasing too slowly.

The status of efforts to protect the health of mothers and children raises special alarm. The ministries, departments, administrative organizations and local soviets of peoples deputies have not solved the problems of protecting the labor of women and of providing proper nutrition to pregnant and nursing mothers and children of young age, and more than 318,000 women are working in conditions that do not meet the labor protection requirements and norms; of these, 234,000 are employed by the State Agroindustrial Committee. A significant proportion of the women of Guryev, Kzyl-Orda, Ural and Chimkent oblasts suffer anemia. More than 35,000 children are born ill. The demand for health improvement camps and sanatorium-type camps is not being satisfied.

The demand of therapeutic and preventive institutions and of the public for medical equipment, medicines, dressing materials and patient care articles is not being fully satisfied.

Problems concerned with the organization of public food services, including with production of food products for children, the availability of which is less than 50 percent,

have not been fully solved. In a number of the republic's regions centralized water supply systems have not been introduced, especially for the rural population of East Kazakhstan, Kustanay, Guryev and Pavlodar oblasts, the effort to provide services and amenities to rural population centers and improve their sanitary condition is weak, plans for building and repairing public baths are not being fulfilled, and over half of the republic's towns do not possess such facilities.

Many oblasts are not devoting the necessary attention to efforts to develop a healthy way of life. Over two-thirds of the population does not engage in physical culture, sports and tourism, and over half of the population smokes. The struggle against drunkenness, alcoholism and drug addiction is ineffective. Inertia is being displayed in hygienic and sanitary education, especially among the young.

The Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Health is doing a poor job of encouraging medical scientific research and educational institutes to solve the problems of improving the public's health, improve diagnosis and treatment of patients, and widely introduce progressive accomplishments of medical science into public health practice; the ministry has not taken effective steps to eliminate existing shortcomings in training medical workers, staffing the republic's public health institutions with qualified personnel and raising the responsibility of republic and local public health organs for organizing prompt, high quality medical care for the population.

The executive committees of local soviets are not displaying the needed concern for creating proper working, housing and personal conditions for public health workers. Over 18,000 of the workers employed in this sphere are in need of housing today. The worst housing situation has evolved in Dzhambul, Karaganda, Kzyl-Orda, Kokchetav and Pavlodar oblasts and in the city of Alma-Ata.

These and other shortcomings have had a negative influence on the health of the republic's population. Infectious morbidity remains at a high level. The tuberculosis morbidity indicator almost twice exceeds the average union-wide level, with the situation being especially unfavorable in Guryev, Kzyl-Orda and Ural oblasts. The republic is credited with almost 50 percent of all cases of brucellosis in the country.

The level of maternal and child mortality is still high in the republic, and oncological and cardiovascular diseases are still widespread. The average life span of the population is low.

The republic's national economy suffers considerable losses due to incapacitation of blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz farmers owing to disease and injury, as well as because of the need for caring for sick children. Each day more than 230,000 persons stay home from work for these reasons. The average daily outlays to

finance hospital stays are over 1.5 million rubles, and in 1988 425 million rubles were paid out in assistance to temporarily incapacitated workers.

The Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic resolves that:

1. The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, the ministries, state committees and departments and the republic's local soviets of peoples deputies are to intensify, in accordance with the principles set forth in the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, organizational work directed at fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "Basic Directions of the Development of Public Health Protection and Restructuring of USSR Public Health in the 12th Five-Year Plan and in the Period to the Year 2000," and to make fuller use of existing possibilities for fundamentally improving protection of the public's health.

2. The Kazakh SSR State Planning Committee, the Kazakh SSR State Construction Committee, the Kazakh SSR State Agroindustrial Committee, the Kazakh SSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Health, the ministries, state committees and departments of the Kazakh SSR, and executive committees of local soviets of peoples deputies are to:

- ensure unconditional fulfillment of targets concerned with public health and foreseen by the plans for economic and social development of the sectors and territories;
- develop specific measures to surmount the gap in development of the material and technical base of public health, and to provide medical institutions with modern therapeutic and diagnostic equipment;
- foresee, as of 1989, allocation of construction materials for overhaul and current repair of public health facilities—enough to support the full demand as defined by planning documents and estimates;
- rebuild all hospitals, polyclinics, outpatient clinics, public health centers and nursing-gynecological centers requiring it in the 12th Five-Year Plan;
- task the republic's industrial enterprises to manufacture articles of medical equipment and small mechanized tools and certain types of equipment and furniture for therapeutic and preventive institutions;
- ensure allocation of the necessary capital investments for construction of housing in conjunction with the erection of district hospitals, medical outpatient clinics and nursing-gynecological centers;

—when writing state plans for the republic's economic and social development, provide the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Health with capital investments for proportionate participation in construction of housing using the available funds for social and cultural measures of the enterprises and ministries;

—when solving the problems of integrated build-up of urban and rural population centers, foresee creation of therapeutic and preventive institutions, physical culture and health improvement complexes, and other structures intended for public physical culture and health improvement functions at places of employment and residence;

—expand the network of children's preschool institutions by building them on the basis of modern, improved plans, increase the number of Pioneer and out-of-town camps and sanatorium-type camps, and satisfy the needs of children and adolescents for these institutions;

—implement plans to improve working and personal conditions on the job, implement sanitation and health improvement measures directed at preventing job-related injury and occupational morbidity of workers, and accelerate removal of women from heavy work and jobs harmful to their health;

—make wider use of the sanatoriums and preventive institutions of industrial enterprises and construction organizations to improve the health of pregnant workers and children;

—outfit industrial sanitation laboratories of the ministries, departments and enterprises with monitoring and measuring instruments by which to determine noise, vibrations, dust and gas content and illumination at enterprises;

—achieve a 20-30 percent decrease in morbidity involving temporary incapacitation of blue and white collar workers by 1995;

—regularly entertain reports from executives of state organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations on progress in fulfilling socioeconomic, medical and sanitation measures and in conforming with public health legislation;

—consider the health of workers when making an integrated evaluation of the activities of enterprises;

—solve the problems of water supply, chiefly to the population, and of high quality drinking water quickly and successively;

—attain an annual improvement of 3-5 percent in the basic indicators of public health prior to 1995;

—provide the necessary assistance in construction of a combined sanatorium and preventive medical institution in the city of Alma-Ata for public health workers.

3. The Kazakh SSR State Committee for Nature Protection, the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services, the Kazakh Republic Hydrometeorological Administration, the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Health and the republic's soviets of peoples deputies are to intensify surveillance over fulfillment, by the enterprises, organizations, institutions, officials and citizens, of legislation and measures directed at improving the environment, preventing pollution of water basins, soil and air, ensuring effective work of sewage treatment facilities and gas and dust trapping devices, and making fuller use of the powers of organs of the State Sanitary Inspection in these matters;

—recommend development of oblast integrated inter-sector programs for protection of nature and improvement of public health during 1989.

4. Republic ministries, state committees and departments are to ensure, jointly with trade union organs, expansion of the network of sanatoriums, preventive medical institutions, vacation centers and other institutions for the treatment and rest of laborers, and be more resourceful in encouraging enterprises, institutions and organizations to pool their assets for the construction of these institutions.

Create health centers, including ones operating on a cost-accounting basis, at the expense of the labor collectives in order to strengthen and preserve health, prevent illness and organize rehabilitative treatment.

5. The Kazakh SSR State Agroindustrial Committee, the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Health and the executive committees of the local soviets are to implement measures to increase production and upgrade the quality of children's food products, and expand the network of dairy kitchens;

—organize production of fruit and vegetable juices and canned fruits and vegetables for children in small containers, and in an assortment and a volume completely satisfying the demand for them in both the cities and the countryside;

—determine the list of farms that are to supply agricultural products to enterprises and shops producing children's food products;

—provide the republic's population with food products of high quality while strictly observing the maximum permissible norms for the nitrates, pesticides and other toxic substances they contain.

6. The Kazakh SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and the Kazakh republic administration of the USSR State Committee for Standards are to deeply analyze the status of efforts to certify work stations with the purpose of increasing their efficiency, introduce standards of the labor safety system into food industry enterprises, and provide assistance to republic ministries in solving these problems.

7. Jointly with other interested organizations, the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Education and the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Health are to:

—implement measures to improve medical support to and hygienic education of children and adolescents in children's preschool institutions and schools of general education, and implement systematic medical observation of the organization of food services, physical development and health of children, and conduct of improvement measures;

—introduce rewards to workers of preschool children's institutions everywhere for improving the quality of education and reducing child morbidity;

—create and expand sanatorium groups in children's preschool institutions with regard for full satisfaction of the demand for them;

—study and introduce progressive experience in physical education of schoolchildren, and consider the issue of increasing the amount of class time allocated to physical culture.

8. Jointly with the Kazakh SSR Council of Trade Unions and sector trade union committees, the oblast, Alma-Ata and Leninsk city soviets of peoples deputies are to make changes in the appropriate territorial and sector integrated specific-purpose "Health," "Concern" and "Charity" programs, foreseeing in them a complex of measures to intensify preventive treatment of disease, fundamentally improve medical assistance to the public, provide safe and healthy work and leisure conditions for citizens, raise their sanitary and hygienic culture, and form a healthy way of life and relationship of every person to his health as something of importance to the entire nation;

—establish constant surveillance over implementation of integrated programs, and actively encourage permanent commissions, deputies and public independent action organizations of the population to participate in this work.

9. Jointly with the trade union and other public organizations, the Kazakh SSR State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports, the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Education, the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services, Kazakh SSR ministries, state committees and departments, and the executive committees of local soviets of peoples deputies are to:

- introduce a unified program of physical education for the public in the course of the 12th Five-Year Plan;
- improve the organization of active rest, develop mass physical culture, sports and tourism at enterprises, in organizations, institutions and schools, and at places of residence, make maximum use of all forms of encouraging workers and their families to participate in physical culture and health improvement measures, and fully utilize health centers and cultural, sports and health improvement complexes to improve the physical fitness of all categories and ages of the population and reinforce their health;
- encourage laborers more actively to make a specific contribution to health protection, and encourage their direct participation in health improvement and preventive measures and in publicizing and confirming a healthy way of life.

10. The Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Health must:

- eliminate shortcomings in medical support to the public, achieve effective use of the existing potential, and sharply raise the quality of medical care, devoting special attention to laborers in remote rural areas and workers involved in distant-pasture cattle rearing, to the disabled and to participants of the Great Patriotic War, and to labor veterans. Take effective steps to satisfy the population's demand for medicinal preparations and patient care articles;
- activate the efforts of polyclinics and dispensaries to prevent illness and improve the health of the population, raise their role in medical and social rehabilitation of patients, and ensure continuity in the activities of these institutions. Finish organizing preventive medicine and rehabilitative therapy wards (offices) in all polyclinics by 1995;
- take vigorous steps to significantly reduce infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis and brucellosis, and chiefly in epidemiologically unfavorable regions;
- take immediate steps to develop and improve protection of motherhood and childhood, and organize perinatal centers and medical genetic consulting offices in all oblasts;
- ensure regional planning of the admission of university and secondary school students in accordance with the material and technical base of the training institutions;
- concentrate efforts of scientific collectives on fundamental biomedical, clinical, epidemiological and social hygienic research, the results of which must lead to radical solution of the problems of practical public health;

—introduce a system for evaluating the work of public health organs and institutions and physicians on the basis of public health indicators and the quality of medical support, and display persistence in eliminating shortcomings in protection of the public's health and in discussion of the corresponding issues by soviet and administrative organs and public organizations.

11. The Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and permanent commissions are to establish systematic control over the activities of state administrative organs and local soviets of peoples deputies in regard to implementing the principles of the 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference directed at protecting and reinforcing the public's health and restructuring the entire public health system in the republic.

12. The Kazakh SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the editors of republic newspapers are to provide wide coverage to the activities of soviet and administrative organs aimed at developing and improving public health, and more actively publicize the best experience in providing laborers with the necessary conditions for highly productive labor and reinforcing public health.

13. By 1 June 1989, the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers is to approve a republic interdepartmental program for improving protection of the health of mothers and children;

—examine proposals and remarks presented in the joint report of the permanent commissions and in statements by deputies of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet at a meeting of the latter, and take the necessary steps in relation to them.

Inform the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet in February 1990, and deputies by the deadline established by law, on progress in fulfilling this decree.

The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet expresses the firm conviction that as they implement the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference, soviet and administrative organs, medical workers and all laborers of the republic will apply all effort to improve the organization of efforts to protect and reinforce public health and to successfully fulfill the quotas of the current year and the five-year plan as a whole, and that they will make a substantial contribution to implementing the party's course toward further improvement of the welfare of Soviet people. *[Signed] M. Sagdiyev, chairman, Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet S. Nurpeisov, secretary, Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Alma-Ata, 10 March 1989*

First Secretary Kolbin's Speech

18300488 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 14 Mar 89 p 1

[Concluding remarks by G. V. Kolbin at the 19th Plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee]

[Text] Comrades! Preparing for this plenum, the Central Committee Buro tried to be as objective and self-critical as possible in approaching its evaluation of the effort started in the republic to implement decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. I think that I would be expressing the general opinion if I said that both the report and the speeches that rang forth today from this podium were fully permeated by the spirit of principles and exactingness which the party summons us to maintain.

We rightfully refer to the 19th Party Conference as an unprecedented event. And chiefly because it marked a long-awaited return to truly democratic, Leninist norms of comprehensive and open discussion of urgent problems, and to free, pluralistic expression of different approaches and opinions. The wholesomeness of the debates and the clearly pronounced public activity of the participants of the party forum persuasively demonstrated the high viability of the ideas born in April 1985. It is precisely under their influence that a healthy moral and political atmosphere is evolving in the party and the country, promoting release of the constructive energy of the masses.

This constructive energy is also readily felt in our republic. Its concrete expression takes the form of significant changes that have occurred both in the socioeconomic and in the political and spiritual spheres. What has been achieved in the course of implementing the housing and food programs cannot but please us. However, if we assess the results not from the standpoint of what has been done but from the positions of what has yet to be done, we would have to recognize that restructuring has only just begun in the republic. Therefore it is very important not to flatter ourselves with the first successes, not to deceive ourselves with the pacifying thought that things will all go from here by inertia, so to speak, without a hitch. The momentum of renewal, no matter how powerful it has been, will inescapably begin attenuating unless we constantly feed it with new energetic actions by the progressive forces of restructuring.

True, there are different ways of acting. As was already noted in the report, some people are prone to assessing the level of restructuring only on the basis of the pitch and acuity of the debates, on the basis of emotional outbursts of the social consciousness. I would like to emphasize once again in this connection that the practical results and the specific advances we make in each area of the work are the main criterion in the present stage. This is why it is precisely in support of business-like, constructive activities that we must continue to

direct all of our efforts, and raise a dependable barrier against attempts by various sorts of demagogues to distract the people from solving the urgent problems. We cannot allow the energy of restructuring to exhaust itself in unproductive chatter.

The reforms of the political system and the economy being implemented by the party and the persistently followed course toward democratization of social life are a firm foundation on which to harmonize relations between peoples and the republics, between peoples of different nationalities. We all readily sense how much easier it has become to resolve nationality issues when they have a proper economic base beneath them, when they are discussed in an open, respectful and truly democratic atmosphere. The republic's party organs have tried to create all of the necessary conditions permitting the most urgent problems to receive the necessary public resonance and the support of the majority. For example competent commissions tasked to work out the status of the republic and the approaches to solving important socioeconomic and linguistic problems were organized in the course of preparations for the CPSU Central Committee plenum on ethnic issues. Their activities are being provided constant coverage by the republic's press.

We can say with full grounds today that as a result of such calm, business-like discussion, we have been able to arrive at weighted, mutually acceptable solutions that account most fully for the interests of the multinational population of Kazakhstan. I would like to once again dwell on some issues associated with the status of the language problem because of the special public attention it is attracting.

It is now totally indisputable that the absolute majority of the republic's population unanimously favors making Kazakh the state language. In addition to this, the course toward full confirmation of bilingualism adopted in Kazakhstan has also received the support of all the people. In other words public opinion favors awarding state status to both languages—both Kazakh and Russian, with the guarantee of free development of the languages of all ethnic groups and nationalities residing in our multinational republic without exception. I think that this resolution of the issue will become the most just, that it will satisfy most fully the most fundamental social and spiritual needs of different ethnic groups.

The line toward Kazakh-Russian and Russian-Kazakh bilingualism is acquiring more and more proponents in the course of discussion of the language problem in various organizations and in the production collectives. This discussion should be lengthened so that before we make a final decision by constitutional procedure, we could develop a statute on the status of state bilingualism and on the use and development of the languages of other ethnic groups residing in Kazakhstan. Everyone must deeply recognize that the variant suggested today still requires enormous effort from the aspect of both

discussing it widely and introducing various sorts of corrections and refinements, so that we would be fully guaranteed against all possible omissions and errors.

There is also another factor I would like to focus attention on: Considering that Kazakh will doubtlessly become the state language, we need to begin the necessary work right away, without waiting for an official decision. It would be a great mistake to feel that just the fact of awarding state status to the language would automatically eliminate all difficulties along the path of its development. This is why we need to take real steps everywhere directed at confirming Kazakh in business, in public activity, in work, in science and in culture—in all spheres in which it is not yet as widespread as it should be. While we recognize that both Kazakh and Russian have an equal claim on statehood, nonetheless we need to develop the appropriate system of measures that would foresee concern primarily for Kazakh as the language needing it the most.

Today, 36 of our rayons conduct business in Kazakh. All other rayons, cities, oblasts and republic organizations conduct business in Russian. The objective is to get each rayon, city and oblast making preparations for conducting business in Kazakh to coordinate this issue with higher party and soviet organs, and to immediately get to work. It is important of course not to allow any kind of extremes in this case, which unfortunately sometimes occur. For example, how do many define conversion of business correspondence to Kazakh today? They feel that we need to stop writing documents in Russian completely. The moment the discussion turns to confirming bilingualism, others are prepared to print equal quantities of Russian and Kazakh documents, creating mountains of unnecessary paperwork.

The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee has already switched to bilingual conduct of business, and I think that our experience will be useful. We have almost 250 Central Committee members and candidate members, 33 of whom request documents in Kazakh, while the rest do so in Russian. It is on the basis of this need that the General Department of the Communist Party Central Committee prepares its materials.

I am very happy that the number of persons desiring to read in Kazakh has begun to grow, and that our comrades are attentive to this change, and are making the appropriate adjustments in their work. As a result there is no extra paperwork, and needs are being satisfied without excesses and overinsurance. While I fully allow that the practice of bilingual business correspondence will suggest other acceptable variants, the main thing is to get on with this very important matter without hesitation.

I would wish that the conduct of business in Kazakh would not be introduced by dictate and pressure "from above." What we need here is the initiative not of the chiefs but of the broad masses, we need truly democratic approaches based on the real needs of the population of the given region.

We must also create conditions allowing confirmation of the principle of free choice of language. After all, in order that each person could speak in the language with which he feels more comfortable during the time of various social functions, we must provide for their simultaneous translation. Such translation is provided today in the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, though for the moment only from Russian to Kazakh and from Kazakh to Russian. In the future we will mandatorily increase the number of languages.

But where else have similar conditions been created? Even in yesterday's meeting of the republic's Supreme Soviet, the discussion proceeded only in Russian. Simultaneous translation was attempted at a previous meeting, but it was found that this is possible only with a preprinted text. But more and more speakers are now preferring to speak without notes, freely, without constraining themselves by a prepared speech. Thus it turns out that because of such inaction, such slowness in solving pressing problems, the rights of people are being seriously infringed and the culture of interethnic communication is diminished.

How can we fail to recall in this regard the Central Committee Buro's well known decision that the first leader is responsible for the state and level of interethnic relations in any organization or labor collective? And that if some issues remain unresolved in this aspect, he is the one who should be blamed primarily for violations of the principles of Lenin's nationality policy? Hence follows the conclusion that the time has come to be more demanding of first leaders for the organization of international education, including for its material base. After all, the training of typists skilled in typing in Kazakh, acquisition of typewriters with Kazakh type, and organization of simultaneous translation are all necessary components of practical implementation of bilingualism, which in turn is an important component of instilling international sentiments.

Discussing the principle of free choice of a given language, I am implying that each person residing in Kazakhstan should have an inner need to master the language of the people that gave the republic its name. Confirmation of state bilingualism also requires solution of many other problems.

I would like to note that we often encounter cases where the zeal for full-fledge existence of Kazakh as a native language is limited only to theoretical wishes, but is never transformed into specific action. Blind faith in the force of law is what motivated, for example, the group of linguists who recently sent a letter to the Central Committee in which they substantiated the need for making Kazakh the state language. And what is surprising is that there is not a single line in the letter suggesting how the level of the language is to be raised in fact, and how the

sphere of its use is to be widened. Of all people, the scientists who deal with these problems are the ones who could provide exhaustive recommendations in this regard.

Many are saying very correctly today that most Kazakhs are bilingual, while a knowledge of Kazakh is a rare exception among the Russian population. This is in fact so. But how do we help them master Kazakh? Add to this that it must be mastered very quickly! We should recognize that a few things have been done in this direction in recent years, but they are precisely that—just “a few things.” The textbooks, phrase-books and Kazakh language teaching manuals that have been published recently do not withstand any kind of criticism. As a rule these are textbooks for Kazakh secondary schools conscientiously translated into Russian. Naturally they would not be appropriate to the Russian-speaking population. I am not even talking about the quality of the phrase-books that have been published. I became convinced from my own experience that it is simply impossible to engage in a more or less coherent discussion on their basis, since the methodology on which they are based is formalistic, and does not satisfy day-to-day needs at all.

The same can also be said for the Kazakh language study program in Russian-language schools. It is set up no better, and perhaps much worse, than foreign language programs.

During a meeting with workers of the Center for Propaganda of Leninist Nationality Policy, which was established in the republic, I raised the issue as to the need for efficiently preparing recommendations on how to improve the study of Kazakh language in the republic's preschool institutions and secondary schools. I came away with the feeling that we had agreed that such work would be done without delay. A month has passed, but there are no proposals. I think that with such an attitude toward the matter, with such a slow start-up, we will not go very far. What we are talking about, after all, is creating an integrated language teaching system. In one of its versions we might drop foreign languages from the training program of the 9th and 10th years so that the freed hours could be used for deeper study of Kazakh, followed by examinations in this subject in pursuit of the school-leaving certificate. Other proposals could also be examined, but mandatorily with the participation of competent workers of public education, and with the contribution of the republic's and country's best scientific forces.

In a word, there are many things that we can do right now to develop Kazakh language, without waiting for the adoption of any kind of legislative acts. In the final analysis the issue rests not on them but on a sincere desire to begin real work, not to wait until someone corrects previous mistakes, but rolling up our sleeves and tackling this work ourselves. For the moment, unfortunately, such a desire is not to be noticed among scientists

and specialists of the republic's Ministry of Public Education, the Linguistics Institute of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences and workers of the Center for Propaganda of Leninist Nationality Policy.

Last week I read a short report from Astrakhan Oblast: “The newspaper ZARYA KASPIYA, which is published in Volodarskiy Rayon, is now being printed with a supplement in Kazakh. Preparations for printing the same kind of two-page inserts are being made in Krasnoyarskiy Rayon, where many Kazakhs live....”

I was overjoyed by this communication, and I extended my thanks to our Astrakhan neighbors. I also experienced the same feeling of gratefulness when I received a letter from Professor Zh. K. Kalymbetov from Tashkent, in which he presented the details on measures being taken in Uzbekistan to preserve and develop the language and culture of the Kazakh population residing in the republic.

Of course, much is also being done in this aspect in our republic, but I must admit that we are far from doing everything we can. Sometimes we are even unable to requisition school textbooks from a neighboring republic for Uzbek schools, not to mention creative literature in one of the languages of the peoples of the USSR. And it is not such a hard thing to do—just study the demand, and submit an order. We somehow forget that the practice of international education consists specifically of such seemingly unimportant actions. And can there be anything at all that might be unimportant in this most important party effort? I am certain there cannot.

The next issue I would like to dwell on is housing construction. As I noted earlier, on the whole the “Housing-91” program is being implemented in our republic in full correspondence with the planned rate. But one thing does trouble me. We evaluate our work generally, on the average, which is why we see a more or less satisfactory result. But if we take a differentiated approach to the results of housing construction, a rather variegated pattern immediately catches the eye—dense in some places, and vacant in others. Some oblasts, such as Kokchetav and Taldy-Kurgan for example, significantly surpass their quotas, while others cannot break out of the prison of the formerly low rate. Such nonuniformity is also observed when we compare individual enterprises, departments and organizations.

And it is no accident that it was precisely among the lagging organizations that a rumor began circulating that in the next five-year plan the quantitative norms of apartment acquisition will supposedly remain the same as before—6 square meters per capita. Otherwise, they say, we would not be able to solve the housing problem. And there are some who are prone to supporting these rumors. It is also being said that upon filling their quotas, enterprises that excel in the “Housing- 91”

program are obligated to help those that are behind. All of these are just the idle thoughts of those who have not yet broken away from a parasitic way of life.

We need to pose the question on an entirely different plane, and namely, we need to boldly begin preparations for the housing program for the 13th Five-Year Plan. As we know, the 27th Party Congress determined this program for the period to the year 2000—that is, for the next 15 years. In application to the conditions of Kazakhstan we divided it into three phases, with a quota for each five-year period. If in the 12th Five-Year Plan we are solving the problem of providing apartments to those who have less than 6 square meters per family member, and we allocate housing space at a rate of 9 square meters per person, in the 13th Five-Year Plan it would be desirable to foresee allocation of apartments to those who have less than 9 square meters, and issue warrants correspondingly for an area of 12 square meters.

We must of course calculate everything carefully, and determine the real possibilities in each oblast. I fully recognize that in some regions we can increase these figures without detriment, and perhaps reduce them in others. But one way or another, during 1989 we need to make accurate calculations, prepare a new waiting list and determine the realistically necessary rate of housing construction in the future.

The waiting list for apartments in the 13th Five-Year Plan must be formed in 1990. In those collectives in which the "Housing-91" program will be completed this year—there are many such collectives in the republic, by the way—we need to begin preparing the new waiting list right now.

We should also consider that because of the transition to an improved layout of housing and an increase in its comfort and quality, the cost of construction is rising. Our possibilities may turn out to be somewhat limited in the conditions of cost accounting and self-financing. Therefore we need to encourage maximum contribution of the personal savings of laborers to housing construction in all places. This can be done by selling presently existing housing for private use by citizens, and selling new homes for cash and credit, and then allocating the accrued assets to expansion of construction.

Special attention must be devoted to developing individual housing construction. It should be kept in mind in this case that it would acquire the needed scope only in the event that the corresponding organizations display some concern for centralized heat and water supply, sewage systems and other amenities for individual housing. Moreover erection of children's institutions, stores, hospitals and polyclinics—in a word, everything necessary for the normal life of people—must be foreseen mandatorily in regions of individual construction. All of this must be done wisely, and accurate calculations must be made, so that the housing program of the future would not elicit any doubts.

There is also much to do to improve rural housing construction. After all, if we seriously wish to solve the food problem, if we sincerely want to repay our long-overdue common debt to the countryside, we must place priority on social development of the rural areas. Today's rural laborer is interested not just in having a roof over his head, but also comfortable, functional housing that would compensate in some degree to the objectively existing gap between the urban and rural standard of living.

Many examples of successful solution of this problem at the highest level have already been accumulated. Many of those present here have visited sovkhozes in Tselinograd and Kokchetav oblasts, and seen the fabulous homes that we can build. We have also sent our highly placed visitors there on several occasions to show them what we are capable of in our republic. I think that a transition from construction of specimens "for exhibit only" to quantity construction is long overdue. All the more so because the possibilities for this exist, and the approaches to solving the problem are well known to everyone.

Comrades! In my speech I touched upon but two issues troubling the republic's society today. There are of course significantly more of them that are no less acute and urgent, ones affecting literally all spheres of political, socioeconomic and spiritual life. But no matter what problems we might examine today, they all have one common denominator rooted in the nature and the very essence of the new stage of restructuring, the beginning of which was marked by the 19th All-Union Party Conference. I am referring to the stage of specific acts, of real implementation of the ideas of restructuring.

The thing to do now is to utilize all of the ideological and moral stimuli of constructive effort with maximum return, to organize the work of the national economy's sectors as effectively as possible, and to do everything to allow the people to participate in renewal of socialism on their own initiative. Herein lies the chief meaning of the activity of party committees.

Resolution on Political Reforms

18300488 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 14 Mar 89 p 2

[Resolution of the 14th Plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee "On Organizational Work of the Republic Party Organization in Implementation of Decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference"]

[Text] The plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee notes that following the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, all of the organizational and political work of the republic party organization was directed at practically implementing its decisions concerned with deepening the restructuring effort, carrying out the reform of the political system, democratizing

social life, conducting a radical economic reform, intensifying the role and authority of party committees and organizations, and confirming political methods of leadership in their activity.

The premises of the 19th All-Union Party Conference were given concrete expression in the course of party election meetings and conferences, and during preparations for the elections of USSR peoples deputies. They helped to encourage laborers to actively solve the pressing problems of restructuring.

The increasing momentum of restructuring processes is embracing all spheres of the sociopolitical and economic life of Kazakhstan. The economy began to develop more dynamically with conversion of the sectors of the national economy to cost accounting and self-financing. The rate of growth of national income and of labor productivity and industry increased.

Positive shifts were noted in the solution of social problems. The housing conditions of more than 393,000 families were improved in the course of implementing the "Housing-91" program, which reduced the waiting list by over 41 percent. The quotas for placing schools, children's nurseries and public health facilities into operation are being met.

Changes for the better are also occurring in the agroindustrial complex. The production increment increased by 16 percent, and the five-year plan's production quota for 3 years was exceeded by more than 2 billion rubles. Average per-capita meat consumption in the republic was increased by 9 kilograms and milk consumption was increased by 33 kilograms as a result. The new methods of management are gathering momentum. Conditions for wide introduction of the leasing and family contract, cooperation and other progressive forms of organizing and stimulating labor are being created everywhere.

Consumer goods production was increased by a factor of 1.2, and the population's real income grew by 9.2 percent.

The style of party leadership is improving. A transition from administrative and dictatorial to political methods has been noted, and measures are being implemented to raise the effectiveness of party work, widen intraparty democracy, strengthen ties with the laborers and increase the role of primary party organizations and of elected party members. The structure of party organs was reorganized, the composition of executive personnel has been significantly renewed, and Lenin's norms of party life are being confirmed everywhere.

At the same time the plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee feels that the republic party organization has not yet been able to achieve a decisive turning point in many of the most important directions of restructuring noted by the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

The economy continues to develop extensively. The attained rate of increase of national income is half of what was planned. Outlays on gross production exceed its volume increment. Only a sixth of the new production procedures that have been placed into operation are wasteless. The shortfall in erection of production capacities for processing sectors and in production of consumer goods has not been surmounted.

The restructuring of the national economy's structure is proceeding ineffectively. The system of interactions between the sector and territorial levels of control has not been adjusted properly. Development of the main economic planning administrations is taking too long. Effective steps to create a dependable foundation for self-financing and regional cost accounting are not being taken.

Not one of the republic's oblasts reached the targets of the Food Program or satisfied the requirements of the 19th Party Conference to significantly improve the supply of food products and to achieve faster sustained growth of their production.

Imbalances persist in the social sphere. The plans for building social, cultural and personal service facilities are not being fulfilled in all of the rayons and oblasts. The output capacities of the republic's construction complex do not satisfy the growing demand. Reconstruction of their base is proceeding extremely weakly. The faulty practice of dispersing assets among numerous construction projects is continuing, and the volume of unfinished work is not decreasing. The financial situation remains complex, the population's solvent demand is not being met by growth in industrial and agricultural production and services, and the consumer's market remains stressed.

Many party committees, soviets of peoples deputies and administrative executives have still not joined the restructuring effort in any real way, or displayed adequate initiative in searching for effective approaches to solving urgent problems as quickly as possible. Some personnel continue to work stereotypically, in the old ways, and maintain an affinity for a dictatorial, bureaucratic style of work.

The reform of the political system is proceeding too slowly. The effectiveness of measures being implemented to democratize management of the national economy is low. The administrative apparatus remains cumbersome, and significant changes are not occurring in the work of the ministries and departments. Emphasis on local interests, dictatorship of central departments and self-will are still widespread. There is no aggressiveness in the struggle against bureaucratism and violations of the laws on the enterprise, cooperation, the rights of labor collectives and cost-accounting associations. The sovereignty of the soviets and their influence upon development of the infrastructure of the oblasts and rayons are being confirmed too slowly. The process of

delimiting the functions of party, state and administrative organs is taking an unjustifiably long time. Cases where party committees usurp the role of local soviets, meddle in their affairs, and unjustifiably interfere in their activities continue to occur.

The effort being made by some party committees to carry out the directives of the 19th Party Conference concerning transition to political methods of leadership is weak, and they are showing little concern for developing intraparty democracy, for raising the role of elected organs and the authority of primary party organizations in the new economic conditions, and for nurturing fighting qualities in every communist participating in the restructuring effort.

The process of democratization has not yet had its full impact on admission of new members to the CPSU, on personnel policy issues and on formation of the party apparatus.

The role and responsibility of communists and of workers in trade unions, in the Komsomol and in other public organizations and creative unions expressing the interests of different strata of the population are not being increased sufficiently.

There are significant shortcomings in the training and education of the growing generation. Not all party organizations have assumed a leading role in solving urgent problems such as protecting the environment and deeply studying the history of the country and the republic, and the language and other problems contained in the resolution "On Interethnic Relations"; not all party organizations are finding effective forms of creative cooperation with public independent action formations.

Positive experience accumulated in the course of restructuring by many primary, rayon and city party organizations is not being studied, generalized and utilized well. A number of party committees are not utilizing the power of the press and other mass media to achieve the objectives of restructuring.

The plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee resolves that:

1. The Buro and commissions of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, oblast, city and rayon party committees and primary party organizations must intensify organizational and political work aimed at fulfilling decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and of subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums. An abrupt turn must be made in the effort to democratize intraparty life, and petty regulation of the activities of party units at lower levels must be curtailed. Lenin's definition of democratic centralism is to be fully rehabilitated, and an atmosphere of openness, criticism and self-criticism, true collectivism and party comradeship is to be created in every party organization.

The role and significance of elective party organs as empowered representatives of the communists must be raised. The responsibility of party committee members for developing and implementing collective decisions must be increased, their reports are to be regularly entertained at plenums, in buros and in primary party organizations, and the right of recalling elected officials who are not fulfilling their responsibilities must be exercised more widely. The principle of strict subordination and accountability of the party apparatus to elective party organs is to be unfailingly observed, and workers of the apparatus are to be promoted only with the appropriate recommendation of primary party organizations.

2. Democratization of the election process is to be developed in every possible way in party organizations. The formal nomenklatura approach to personnel selection and placement is to be eliminated on the basis of broad glasnost and consideration of public opinion. Creation of a dependable reserve, training and retraining of workers, and their education with regard for their possible recommendation for executive positions on a competitive basis, ensuring full representation of all social strata and nationalities in elective organs, are to be laid at the basis of the work of party committees in this area.

Oblast, city and rayon committees and primary party organizations are to comply unfailingly with the democratic principles of selection of party members, and make preliminary discussion of applications for admission to CPSU membership at meetings of labor collectives and in open party meetings a regular practice. The demands and responsibility imposed on party members for objectivity of their recommendations, and for constant and comprehensive assistance to young communists during their candidate apprenticeship, are to be raised. A persistent political effort is to be carried on among nonmembers in such a way as to encourage workers, young people and women who are active proponents of restructuring to join the CPSU. The role of party groups in organizations not affiliated with the party and of communists working in them is to be increased.

The center of gravity of all of the work must be shifted to checking actual fulfillment of decisions and political directives of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The recently started effort to improve the situation in the republic is to be continued and a vigorous repulse is to be offered to manifestations of bureaucratism, stagnation and abuse of official position, while confirming Lenin's style and approaches. In the conditions of further democratization, the party's activity and its intraparty life should be based on the idea that not one party organization, not one worker should remain outside of control.

3. The Commission for State and Legal Problems of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee must determine the basic directions and principles of development of legal policy in the republic. The forms of party

political leadership of the activities of law enforcement organs are to be improved, and fundamental reinforcement of legality and the rule of law and defense of the constitutional rights of citizens is to be achieved.

Party organizations are to initiate universal legal training everywhere as a necessary element of creating a legal state.

4. The party committees and the Central Committee's Ideological Commission must subordinate their activity to the goals and priorities spelled out in resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and pursue it in close association with life, with regard for the public opinion of the population. Wider use be made of long-range and current social forecasting. Conservatism, dogmatism, uncritical dogmatism and formalism must be eradicated from scientific, agitation and propaganda work. Effective training and advance training of ideological personnel must be carried out.

Party leadership of the press, television and radio is to be improved, and wider use is to be made of their possibilities for propagandizing and confirming the ideas of restructuring and illuminating its experience, difficulties, problems and the specific ways of solving them. The responsibility of communists working in the mass media for the ideological orientation and objectivity of published materials must be raised. Glasnost must be developed as the basis of Soviet society's democratization. Socialist pluralism of opinions must be confirmed, the ability to maintain open public dialogue must be nurtured, and the culture of criticism must be developed. Democratic methods are to be strictly complied with in ideological work, eliminating from it a dictatorial tone, edification, prohibitionism and absence of appeal.

Party committees are to direct all of their mass political work toward forming a socialist social consciousness and improving Marxist-Leninist education. Active participation of social scientists and the leading specialists of the national economy is to be ensured in this effort.

The role and responsibility of communist executives of scientific institutions for working out the urgent problems in the theory and practice of social development in the present stage of restructuring are to be raised.

The forms and methods of patriotic and international education of the population are to be consistently enriched, and problems arising in the sphere of ethnic and interethnic relations are to be promptly solved. The necessary conditions for further development of national-Russian bilingualism are to be created everywhere.

Restructuring of higher and secondary education and democratization of the entire process of training and education is to be continued. Activity is to be developed, and the civic responsibility of the creative intelligentsia for the spiritual and moral enrichment of people is to be raised.

5. The republic's party, soviet and administrative organs are to direct their organizational, political and administrative activity toward successive implementation of the directions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference concerned with carrying out radical economic reform and forming the new economic mechanism.

Innovations in the economy are to be publicized and developed persistently, and the cooperative movement, lease relations and other progressive forms of business management are to be widened.

Creating the basis for conversion of the republic and the oblasts to self-government and self-financing, restructuring the structure of the republic's national economy, surmounting its orientation on resource and raw material acquisition and increasing the proportion of processing and science-intensive production operations are to be treated as among the principal objectives. Investment policy must be directed at these objectives. Associations and enterprises are to be rebuilt and reequipped, and the role of science in substantiating the priority directions in the development of the republic's public forces is to be raised with regard for union-wide division of labor. Measures to accelerate scientific and technical progress are to be developed and implemented. Growth in the volume of production in industry, construction and transportation is to be achieved mainly through growth in labor productivity. Fulfillment of contracted obligations for deliveries based on state orders and direct ties is to be ensured.

A persistent struggle to implement the program of financial improvement of the national economy and to eliminate unprofitableness of enterprises by converting them to cost accounting, leasing them out and creating cooperatives out of them is to be waged.

6. The Buro and departments of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, the oblast, city and rayon party committees and the primary party organizations are to focus the efforts of the labor collectives, soviet and administrative organs, public organizations, communists and all laborers on the priority objectives of accelerating socioeconomic development determined by the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

Wide use is to be made of leasing, private farming, cooperation and agroindustrial integration as a means of increasing the gross grain harvest to an average of 31.5 million tons per year, and raising, in comparison with the mean annual indicators of the current five-year plan, potato production by 13 percent, vegetable production by 28 percent and procurement of rough and succulent fodder by 20 percent in the two remaining years.

Farm animal overwintering is to be completed in organized fashion. Growth of production and procurement of meat and milk of not less than 5 percent is to be achieved in comparison with the level attained last year, while consumption is to be increased by correspondingly 3 and 4 kilograms.

The volume of housing construction is to be increased in every possible way, including by using the assets and resources of the laborers, and laborers are to be encouraged to participate in the repair of housing and in creating municipal and personal services in population centers. The annual plan for introduction of housing (8.5 million square meters) is to be completed by 1 November 1989.

Expansion of the production of consumer goods and of the services sphere is to be treated as an inseparable part of the economy's social reorientation. The party committees are to persistently continue their organizational efforts to attract every labor collective to the production of consumer goods, and especially complex household equipment.

The quota set by the five-year plan for production of consumer goods other than food is to be surpassed this year by 348 million rubles, that for paid services is to be surpassed by 399 million rubles, and retail commodity turnover is to be increased by 150 million rubles.

Party committees and soviet and administrative organs are to take specific steps to accelerate social restructuring of rural areas and create the necessary working and personal conditions for rural laborers, and widely encourage the forces and resources of industry and construction to participate in this effort.

7. Efforts to raise the role of soviets as sovereign management organs in territories subordinated to them are to be accelerated once again. Preparations for forming soviet presidiums and organizing the forthcoming elections of peoples deputies of the Kazakh SSR and election of local soviets of peoples deputies are to be initiated.

Party committees and all communists are to activate their struggle against bureaucratism and its manifestations in all spheres of economic and social life. A fundamental assessment is to be given to cases of violation of Soviet laws and infringement of the constitutional rights of citizens and the powers of labor collectives under the conditions of the new production relations. Attempts by the administrative apparatus to engage in petty interference, unjustifiably complicate the decision making procedure and increase the volume of reports and information collection are to be decisively curtailed.

Great care is to be taken to see that reorganization of the apparatus would promote fundamental improvement of the style, methods and functions of leadership in correspondence with the changes occurring in the society. The forms of socialist self-government are to be widely developed, the laborers are to be consistently encouraged to participate actively in state and social activity, and the conditions for maintaining effective public control over the work of the apparatus at all levels and over fulfillment of adopted decisions are to be created. Special attention must be turned to organizing reception of citizens and examination of their petitions, and systematic meetings of executives of all ranks with communists and labor collectives, and to their reports on progress made in resolving the most urgent problems.

The plenum expresses the firm conviction that the republic's party organizations will do everything necessary to achieve practical movement forward in all directions of restructuring and to successfully reach the objectives defined by the 19th All-Union Party Conference and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee.

Roy Medvedev On Brezhnev's 'Weak' Leadership
18300428 Moscow *RABOCHIY KLASS* 1
SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 6,
Nov-Dec 88 pp 142-161

[Article by Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, candidate of pedagogical sciences, historian and publicist: "L.I. Brezhnev: Outlines of a Political Portrait"]

[Text] *R.A. Medvedev is relatively unknown to the Soviet reader as an author, although he has written more than 20 books, which have been published in many countries throughout the world.*

His father, I.R. Medvedev, brigade commissar and professor at the Military-Political Academy of the RKKA, was subject to repressive measures at the end of the 1930s. In 1943 Roy Medvedev was drafted in the Armed Forces. After the war he graduated from the philosophy department of Leningrad University and worked as a principal of a rural school and, subsequently, at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences.

In the 1960s to 1980s, R. Medvedev honestly and objectively discussed many important and painful problems in the history of Soviet society.

This article was written at the start of the 1980s and may not reflect in all of its aspects the level of our present knowledge and concepts of L.I. Brezhnev's activities. Some of the author's assessments are debatable. Nonetheless, it seems to us that to the readership at large this article is of interest, as we have realized from numerous responses to excerpts from the present article, which were published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. Medvedev's work is distinguished by qualities such as its restrained tonality, avoidance of impulsiveness and sensationalism, a considerate attitude toward facts accessible to the author, and a fine understanding of the psychology of political struggle. But let the reader himself form an opinion of all this.

Death of a Politician and Political Death

V.I. Lenin said that true political leaders do not die in terms of politics after their physical death. Politics, actually, is not very different in this respect from any other area of human activities. Many are the people who remain our contemporaries although they died dozens or hundreds of years ago. Such people continue to live not only in history textbooks but in modern politics and culture, still influencing the views, feelings and behavior of individual groups, parties, nations and, in some cases, all mankind, although this influence is not always necessarily beneficial. However, there also exist a larger number of politicians or men of culture whose influence does not extend beyond their earthly life. They may abandon the political stage and lose their importance to their own country or party even while still alive. That is known as political death. As Tito believed, such a death may prove to be to a politician more terrible than physical death.

Such was precisely the fate which destiny prepared for L.I. Brezhnev. By virtue of a number of circumstances, for nearly 20 years he held a very important political position and played a major role in international life and in the country's political life. He may have earned a few lines or even a few pages in history textbooks. However, he was such a mediocre personality and such an ordinary politician that it would have been difficult for him to rely on living a long political life. Indeed, Brezhnev is beginning rapidly to abandon the political stage both in the direct and the figurative sense of the term.

End of Brezhnev's Life on Earth

In his 50s and even 60s, Brezhnev was not particularly concerned with his health. He did not deny himself any of the pleasures of life, something which by no means contributes to a long life.

Apparently, the first serious health problems which Brezhnev encountered appeared in 1969-1970. He had physicians on permanent duty by his side and treatment premises were installed in his residences. At the start of 1976 something usually known as clinical death occurred with Brezhnev. However, he was revived although, for 2 months, he was unable to work, for both his thinking and speech had been disturbed. Since then, a group of reanimation physicians were constantly at Brezhnev's side, armed with the necessary equipment. Although the state of health of our leaders is one of the most deeply guarded state secrets, Brezhnev's progressive sickness was obvious to anyone who could see him on television. The American journalist Simon Head wrote: "Whenever this stout figure decided to leave the walls of the Kremlin, the outside world would closely look for symptoms of declining health. With the death of M. Suslov, that other pillar of the Soviet regime, such terrifyingly close attention can only increase. During the November 1981 meetings with Helmut Schmidt, when Brezhnev almost fell as he walked, occasionally he looked as though he could not survive another day."¹

Actually, he was slowly dying in front of the entire world. In the last 6 years of his life he had several heart attacks and strokes and the reanimation physicians brought him back from a condition of clinical death on several occasions. The last time this took place was in April 1982, after the Tashkent accident.

Naturally, Brezhnev's morbid condition began to influence his ability to run the country. He was forced frequently to interrupt his work or shift it to the steadily expanding staff of personal aides. Brezhnev's working day was shortened to a few hours. He began to take leave not only in summer but also in spring. Gradually, it became increasingly hard for him to perform even simple protocol duties and he was no longer aware of what was taking place around him. However, a great many influential people, who were deeply involved in corruption, among his retinue, were interested in having Brezhnev appear in front of the people from time to time, even

simply as the official head of state. They literally took him by his hand and achieved the worst: The old age, weakness and sickness of the Soviet leader became a subject not only of sympathy and pity on the part of his compatriots but of irritation and mockery, expressed ever more openly.

On 7 November 1982, during the parade and the manifestation, Brezhnev stood up for several hours, despite the bad weather, on the rostrum of the Mausoleum, and the foreign press wrote that he looked even better than usual. The end, however, occurred only 3 days later. In the morning, during breakfast, Brezhnev went to his office to pick up something and did not re-emerge for a long time. Concerned, his wife left the dining room looking for him and found him lying on the carpet, near his desk. This time the efforts of the physicians failed. Four hours after Brezhnev's heart had stopped, they announced his death. The next day the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government officially informed the world of L.I. Brezhnev's death.

Start of Brezhnev's Political Death

In their reports, the foreign journalists in Moscow noted the indifferent calm with which many ordinary citizens welcomed the news of Brezhnev's death. This event had been expected for a long time. "He suffered through it," said an elderly worker who, until recently, sympathetically had told me: "He is so old and sick and they are still making him work." This woman and her husband were younger and healthier than Brezhnev but they had long retired and spent most of their days watching television. Indeed, the notification of Brezhnev's death was accepted calmly by most people. There was nothing resembling a "national grief."

The CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Appeal to the Soviet People stated that "L.I. Brezhnev's life and activities will always remain an inspiring example of loyal service to the Communist Party and the Soviet people." One also heard at the extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which was held in the Kremlin on 12 November 1982, that L.I. Brezhnev "will be remembered forever by grateful humanity as a consistent, impassionate and tireless fighter for the peace and security of the people." The same could be heard from the rostrum of the Mausoleum on the day of the funeral.

But only 2 weeks later, at the regular Central Committee plenum, albeit indirectly, a sharp criticism was voiced of many of the shortcomings of the previous leadership and the bureaucratic style of the administration which had been established under it. Brezhnev's name began to appear less and less frequently in the press and his portraits were removed both from the walls of homes in Moscow and from official premises. Quotations from and references to Brezhnev virtually disappeared in

newspapers and journals. The various steps to perpetuate his memory, which were taken in December 1982, were quite formal. Announcements on meetings and rallies on this subject were brief and reported on the back pages of newspapers. At the ceremony on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR Brezhnev's name was mentioned only once, in K. Chernenko's introductory speech. On the other hand, the speaker's words to the effect that the party and the people "must be oriented toward actions rather than big words" were perceived as criticism of Brezhnev. The sentence was welcomed with applause. Press comments on the publication of the ninth volume of L.I. Brezhnev's works "*Leninskim Kursom*" [The Leninist Course] and excerpts from his memoirs² were very restrained. The CPSU Central Committee theses on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the RSDWP mentioned Marx, Engels, Lenin and Andropov but not Brezhnev. Any mention of Brezhnev's name virtually disappeared after February 1983. Brezhnev's name was mentioned only once by M.S. Gorbachev in his report at the ceremonial session in Moscow on the occasion of the 113th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth. This process of consigning Brezhnev to oblivion took place not only in the press. There is increasingly less talk about Brezhnev by people at home and his memory is vanishing from the people's awareness. We are thus witnessing not only the gradual dismantling of the "cult" of Brezhnev's which had been unsuccessfully instilled in the country for such a long time but also the beginning of his political death.

Main Reasons for Brezhnev's Political Death

The main reasons for Brezhnev's physical death were published on 12 November 1982 in a short medical bulletin. The reasons for his political demise would be difficult to present with the same type of brevity. In this connection, let us point out that, above all, Brezhnev left his heirs a hard legacy of difficult problems. Actually, the last 5 years of his rule were years of ever growing economic and political crisis. No single plan for economic development was fulfilled during that time. The national product was increasing by no more than 2 percent annually while many important economic indicators were worsening. Tremendous difficulties appeared in the power, coal and timber industries, in transportation and in the production of many consumer goods. For 4 consecutive years the harvests were poor and could not be blamed on the bad weather alone. Grain production dropped especially. The shelves of food stores were emptying and in most industrial centers it became necessary to restrict the distribution of food-stuffs. The system of trade at higher prices expanded. All of this triggered the discontent of the broadest possible population strata.

The international situation of the USSR worsened gravely. Little was left from the times of detente, and relations with the United States began to look like the worst periods of the Cold War. In the East and the West the countries were on the threshold of a new round in the

spiral of an increasingly dangerous, expensive and senseless arms race. To the east, the Soviet leadership was now faced with the difficult problem of Afghanistan and, to the west, the equally difficult problem of Poland. The Sino-Vietnamese conflict, the problem of Cambodia and the assumption of power by a conservative leadership in the FRG were all facts which complicated the solution of problems facing Soviet foreign policy.

The political capital which had been gained by the administration during the period of detente and the relatively fast economic development of the 1960s was subsequently almost totally wasted. In analyzing the Brezhnev age, many foreign observers have noted that under him the Soviet Union had achieved unparalleled military strength and, for the first time in its history, was equal to the West in terms of military power. This is true. However, even the most energetic supporters of the increase in Soviet military power realized that, actually, the military-industrial complex is nothing but a painful tumor on the economic body of any country and that its development is always limited by the development of the civilian sectors of the economy. Therefore, without a strong and well-organized economy, progressive technology and prosperous agriculture, which would ensure the proper feeding of the entire population and the necessary strategic reserves, not only the further expansion but also maintaining the military power of the USSR could prove to be extremely difficult or, in general, impossible.

Naturally, political, economic or even military failures and difficulties cannot be the only reason for the political death of a person heading a country or party. Many great political leaders have failed in their undertakings and had the sad opportunity of seeing the decline of their work toward the end of their life. However, this did not automatically lead to their political death. The scale of the individual and the activities of a politician or a cultural personality may sometimes even grow in the grateful memory of his heirs and descendants.

The truth, however, is that Brezhnev was not a truly great or even outstanding person. If I had to depict him very briefly, I would describe him, above all, as an individual weak in virtually all respects, which distinguished him from his predecessors. He lacked Lenin's intellectual power and political genius; he lacked Stalin's superhuman willpower and evil lust for power. He lacked the exclusive independence and tremendous reform plans and huge work ability displayed by Khrushchev. In terms of character and intellect Brezhnev was a mediocre and shallow politician but a great master of intrigue within the apparatus.

Unquestionably, Brezhnev's weakness as a leader and person was bound to reflect on the state of affairs in the country. This was not merely a case of simple automatic connection, for the worsening of both the domestic and the international situation of the USSR was related to a number of objective reasons as well. However, the extent of the experienced difficulties was determined also by a

number of subjective reasons and, in particular, the advancing senility of Brezhnev and his closest fellow-workers. The head group of the Soviet leadership, as it had developed in 1978-1982, proved unable to block the adverse influence of objective trends. This was affected not only by the fact that Brezhnev, Suslov, Kirilenko and, partially, Kosygin were already old and gravely ill people, who could work no more than a few hours daily, and who were excessively concerned with the state of their health. Let us recall that in 1922-1923 Lenin himself was gravely ill and that in frequent cases physicians allowed him to work no more than 10-15 minutes daily. However, that which he had been able to say, write and dictate at that time became just about the most important and mature part of his legacy. Stalin as well was gravely ill between 1949 and 1953. However, this did not weaken the terrible power of his despotic rule. As to Brezhnev, during the entire period of his illness he abandoned almost entirely the leadership of the country, delegating his power to the clique of his numerous favorites and assistants.

In his 12 November 1982 speech at the Central Committee plenum, Chernenko spoke of Brezhnev's outstanding capabilities, sharp mind and exceptional courage, his resourcefulness, exigency toward subordinates, intolerance of any manifestation of bureaucratism, etc. With equal success he could have spoken of the outstanding literary gifts of the deceased (after all, he had received the Lenin Prize for Literature), his most profound scientific erudition (he was, after all, the recipient of the Karl Marx Gold Medal) or his outstanding gifts as a military commander and orator. Even many articles about Brezhnev published in the Western press described him as a strong personality, as a man with a strong intellect, who had skillfully and subtly "beaten" his rivals. However, all of these assessments were far from the truth. Brezhnev had never been someone usually referred to as a "strong personality." He was a weak-willed person with a weak character. In many respects he was not only well-wishing but even spineless. However, qualities which could be considered even praiseworthy for the rank-and-file philistine are not all that suitable in the case of a head of a mighty superpower.

'The Silent Coup' of 1970

By the end of the 1960s Brezhnev was only one among equals in the Politburo; many of the Politburo members had risen under Stalin and, at that time, held higher positions than Brezhnev. Other members of the Politburo had been promoted under Khrushchev. However, by becoming CPSU Central Committee general secretary, Brezhnev acquired the opportunity for promoting many of his closest friends. Thus, for example, the decision was made in 1966 to restore the All-Union Ministry of Internal Affairs, which had been abolished under Khrushchev. On Brezhnev's suggestion, N.A. Shchelokov, a fellow graduate of the Dnepropetrovsk

Metallurgical Institute, who was still working in Moldavia as central committee second secretary, became the new minister of internal affairs. Shchelokov quickly moved to Moscow and was given a big apartment in the house on Kutuzov Prospekt, in which Brezhnev himself lived. Above him, in the same house, was the apartment occupied by Yu.V. Andropov.

K.S. Grushevoy, a friend of Brezhnev's and Shchelokov's, had been made member of the military council and chief of the Moscow Military District Political Directorate, as early as 1965. The important position of CPSU Central Committee administrator of affairs was assumed by G.S. Pavlov, former graduate of the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute who, previously, had held a minor position in the Party Control Committee. An even more important position, that of head of the CPSU Central Committee general department, was assumed by K.U. Chernenko, who transferred from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium office. Brezhnev's personal secretariat, headed by G.E. Tsukanov, began to rapidly expand as well. By the end of the 1960s it numbered about 20 aides, secretaries and advisers, each one of whom developed his own support staff. Brezhnev's friend N.A. Tikhonov was promoted not only from candidate member to full member of the CPSU Central Committee but also from the more modest position of deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan to deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The fast promotion of S.P. Trapeznikov triggered a great deal of discontent in numerous circles. From a relatively modest position he held at the higher party school, he became head of the CPSU Central Committee Science, Schools and VUZs Department. Trapeznikov was noted for his phenomenal ignorance. During his speeches, the audience entertained itself by drawing up lists of gross errors and slips of the tongue committed by the speaker. Within a short time the Moscow publishing houses published several books by Trapeznikov on party history and agrarian and ideological problems. In all likelihood, he submitted for publication manuscripts which he had failed to publish in the past. The books which were published included so many factual and simply stylistic and grammatical errors that excerpts from these books, with their absurd, illiterate and stupid statements were being passed from hand to hand among the Moscow intelligentsia alongside Samizdat materials. I found it difficult to understand how these books, in general, could find their place on the shelves of bookstores: Trapeznikov either had editors who were even more ignorant than he, or else the publishing house had deliberately limited itself merely to minimal editing of his manuscripts in order to compromise the author. Having become a member of the CPSU Central Committee after the 23rd congress, and thus having strengthened his position, Trapeznikov applied to become candidate member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In the preliminary vote taken at the Social Sciences Department, Trapeznikov's candidacy was approved. However, at the general assembly of the voting members of the

Academy, he failed to obtain not only the required two-thirds vote but even a simple majority. A scandal broke out and many conservative scientists of the Social Sciences Department demanded a second vote. Academy President M. Keldysh reported all of this to Suslov. The latter said that if the members of the Academy called for a second vote, it should be held, but that no pressure on the voting members should be applied. Although a conservative person, Suslov nonetheless was sufficiently literate to be aware of the true nature of his new subordinate. However, Suslov was unwilling to clash with Brezhnev on the question of Trapeznikov. Academicians V.M. Khvostov and B.A. Rybakov, both from the history department, spoke for Trapeznikov at the second session of the general assembly of the Academy of Sciences. However, the outstanding physicist Academician I.Ye. Tamm spoke against Trapeznikov. Very skillfully he analyzed Trapeznikov's three main books, to which he gave a negative assessment. The excerpts he quoted needed no comment, and at the second vote Trapeznikov's candidacy was once again rejected by majority vote. This entire situation became public knowledge and some Politburo members suggested that Trapeznikov be relieved from his position as head of a Central Committee department. The question was also discussed of making Trapeznikov minister of education. However, this was firmly opposed by Kosygin. The matter was postponed and, in the final account, Brezhnev succeeded in protecting his favorite. It was true, however, that Trapeznikov would no longer advance in his career. Nonetheless, he remained head of the department until 1983, and it was only Yu.V. Andropov who pensioned off this hack.

By the 23rd congress the feeling had already developed that the conductor's baton was in Suslov's hands. It was precisely to him that the personnel of the apparatus was turning by the end of the 1960s in settling disputes. Brezhnev himself would not initiate anything without coordinating it in advance with Suslov. This fact irked Brezhnev's circle, which consisted essentially of his old friends and fellow workers from Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia, and several newly acquired friends and aides. They wanted to make Brezhnev more independent in solving ideological, political and foreign policy problems. However, since because of his indecisive and incompetent attitude Brezhnev feared to make independent decisions, this meant that the role of his apparatus increased. A turn in relations between Brezhnev and Suslov occurred in December 1969. Traditionally, by the end of the year, the CPSU Central Committee would hold a plenum at which, on the eve of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, the results of the past year would be discussed and the main directives relative to the plan for the next year would be considered. Usually, the main speaker would be the USSR Council of Ministers chairman, after which a brief debate would follow. At the December 1969 plenum, however, soon after the report, Brezhnev delivered a major speech on problems of management and development of the national economy. The speech included an extremely sharp criticism

of economic management authorities. The speaker mentioned quite frankly the poor condition of the Soviet economy. The speech had been drafted by Brezhnev's personal secretariat. Naturally, in this case Brezhnev was not the featured speaker. He had spoken out in the course of the debates and, therefore, one would think, could have freely expressed his personal opinion. However, he was not an ordinary speaker but the leader of the party, and his speech, which was made public the following day, was accepted as a directive. Brezhnev's unusual independence not only amazed but also concerned many Politburo members, who feared that an increase in Brezhnev's influence and power would not only diminish theirs but would also disturb the "stability" in the cadres, to which everyone was beginning to be accustomed. Naturally, Suslov, with whom Brezhnev had not found it necessary to consult, was more displeased than the others. Suslov did not dare to stand out alone against Brezhnev. He drafted a special "note" for the Central Committee and Politburo members, which was signed also by A. Shelepin and K. Mazurov. The note criticized Brezhnev's speech as a politically wrong address in which, allegedly, the entire attention had been focused on negative phenomena and in which the speaker had said virtually nothing of the ways through which the shortcomings and faults in the national economy could and should be corrected. It was suggested that the argument which had broken out would be discussed at the March 1970 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Brezhnev as well was concerned by the opposition which had appeared within the Central Committee and was unwilling to take matters to the point of a discussion at the Central Committee plenum. On the advice of his assistants, he took the then unusual step of postponing the Central Committee plenum indefinitely and took off for Belorussia where, at that time, the Soviet Armed Forces were engaged in a large-scale exercise personally headed by Defense Minister A. Grechko. No Politburo member accompanied Brezhnev who went to Belorussia only with a few of his most trusted assistants. Brezhnev spent several days in Belorussia, consulting not only with Grechko but with other marshals and generals as well. This independent and unexpected Brezhnev presence at the military exercises made a major impression on the Politburo members. They now saw a new, a more distinctive and independent Brezhnev. No one was knew the nature of the talk which Brezhnev had had with Grechko and the marshals. Furthermore, in this case Brezhnev did not have to report to the Politburo members who were not part of the defense council. It was obvious, however, that the military leaders had promised Brezhnev their full support in case of possible complications. Soon afterwards it became known that Suslov, Shelepin and Mazurov had "withdrawn" their note which was never discussed. On Brezhnev's return to Moscow, Suslov was the first to express to him his total loyalty. The entire printed and oral propaganda apparatus and the ideological apparatus subordinate to Suslov rapidly turned to praising Brezhnev as the "great Leninist" and "outstanding fighter for peace" who, henceforth, became not only a leader, not only the first among

equals, but also the unquestionable leader, the "head" of the party and the actual head of state. Before holidays and some other ceremonies, usually the portraits of all members of the Politburo would be exhibited on squares and main streets in Moscow and several other cities. Such was the case also before 1 May 1970. Now, however, everywhere huge portraits of Brezhnev alone appeared, along with a greater number of posters with quotations from his speeches and reports. In many cases Brezhnev's photograph was bigger than that of the other members of the Politburo. His photograph appeared in the press almost daily. Editorials in newspapers and theoretical articles in party and social science journals almost always included quotations from Brezhnev's "works." The scale of this entire propaganda campaign to strengthen and assert the authority of the party "leader," which was initiated in the spring of 1970, greatly exceeded anything which had taken place in Khrushchev's times.

Brezhnev's attitude changed after 1970, something which was immediately noticed by Western politicians. In recalling his initial meetings with Brezhnev, W. Brandt wrote: "There were a number of different reciprocal relations, from which I could feel the changes which had taken place in the status of my counterpart. Above all, it would have been hardly possible to indicate more clearly his status as the ruling member of the Soviet leadership; ...He showed exceptional self-confidence in discussing international affairs."³

This refers to the start of the 1970s, when Brezhnev was in fact revealing his "greatest self-confidence in discussing international problems and, although not being as yet officially head of state, was signing most important treaties with the Western countries, although this was in violation of universally accepted protocol standards. To be self-asserting, however, does not as yet mean to be wise or even to have a strong character. Even at that time Brezhnev would become flustered when meeting with an equally self-confident but more skillful and experienced politician. At such meetings Brezhnev invariably felt a sense of inferiority, for he would later ask his assistants as to what type of impression he, Brezhnev, had made. It is quite doubtful that their answers were truthful and accurate. In 1972, when one of Brezhnev's aides cautiously expressed to his boss a few critical remarks and gave some advice, Brezhnev became clearly annoyed and soon separated this adviser from his retinue. Furthermore, the first stroke he suffered in the winter of 1976 affected not only the coordination of his movements and his speech but his intellect as well. Both Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter were able to see this. In 1979, when an eye-to-eye meeting, i.e., in the presence exclusively of the interpreters, was to be held between the two presidents, within the framework of the SALT II talks in Vienna, Carter was unable to have a serious political discussion with Brezhnev and was forced to treat him not as a "self-confident" politician but, rather, as a sick child subject to sympathy.

Attitude Toward the Work

Brezhnev's work style as head of the party and the government also stemmed from his political temperament. He was quite conscientious when it came to his obligations but did not like very much to burden himself excessively with work. Naturally, there were times when he had to work quite intensively. However, the moment he became the main personality in the Politburo, his work day did not extend but, conversely, began to shorten. He never tried to retain in his hands all the threads of management of even the most important affairs, not to mention the solution of problems which could and should be solved by lower-ranking personnel. He did not study the details of the structure of new tanks or aircraft, or artillery weapons or layouts for dams, as Stalin had done. He did not interfere in agronomy problems of agricultural production or the standard layout of house buildings, as had done Khrushchev. He refused to meet with Sholokhov to hear the writers' grievances against PRAVDA. In Brezhnev's opinion, every leader had to assume full responsibility for his area of work. One could say that this was an entirely proper attitude toward the obligations of the head of the party and the state. Brezhnev's shortcoming, however, was that in such a case he did not supervise all that carefully his aides and subordinates, frequently assigning to them problems which can be efficiently dealt with only by the head of the party and the state personally. Not only his colleagues in the Politburo but also the rank-and-file personnel of the apparatus did not fear the usually calm and even indecisive Brezhnev. Under Brezhnev any obkom secretary or minister was more independent in his actions than he had been under Khrushchev or Stalin. Combined with the course of "stability" of cadres, this gave them great power in their own establishments or territories under their jurisdiction. It could be said, therefore, that during the Brezhnev period the rather strict centralization of the party and state apparatus weakened. Occasionally this was all to the good but, frequently, also to the detriment of the state and the population. By this we mean not only the growth of parochial or departmental moods but also naked abuse of power and corruption.

In the last 15 to 20 years, some decentralization has been combined with the increased number and rights of various types of central institutions. The bureaucratic machine did not decline but expanded under Brezhnev, although it worked not better but worse than in the past. The party machinery headed by Brezhnev tried more to hinder than to promote the development of central autonomy of economic authorities. It was this that, first of all, reduced to naught the economic reform which Kosygin had initiated.

Brezhnev's insufficient activeness and stamina led to a steady expansion of his personal staff of assistants, secretaries and aides, gradually developing into a major and influential apparatus officially known as the Secretariat Under the CPSU Central Committee General

Secretary. This secretariat operated alongside the machinery of the Central Committee, which could only confuse the system of party leadership and create bureaucratism. Brezhnev had become accustomed to rely excessively on his assistants and subordinates, for which reason he was excessively dependent on his own circle, which consisted of people who were quite disparate in terms of their practical and moral qualities. As a result, Brezhnev gradually began to live in a world created both by himself and the illusions imposed upon him. He had virtually no contact with simple people and nor was he aware of their complaints and moods. "Petitioners" from the people, whom Lenin frequently saw, were not allowed to see Brezhnev. It is true that he regularly attended meetings of veterans of the 18th Army, in which he had spent most of the war. Here as well, however, the talks were not all that frank. "How well have now the Soviet people begun to live!" Brezhnev said in one of his last meetings, to a group of veterans, many of whom had come from cities whose stores had long been stripped of meat, butter or cheese. The veterans, however, did not undertake to correct Brezhnev.

Some Features of Brezhnev's Political Career Until 1964

Brezhnev was about 32-years old at the time he was appointed to his first senior position in the Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom, in 1938. At that time Brezhnev's career was not among the fastest. He was not a careerist who made his way upward by elbowing out other claimants or betraying his friends. Already then he was distinguished by his calm and loyalty to his colleagues and superiors, and his promotions were the work of others rather than his own. The very first of his promotions was the result of the efforts of his friend Grushevoy from the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute, who was first secretary of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Party Gorkom. Grushevoy remained in political work in the Armed Forces after the war. He died in 1982 holding the rank of colonel general. Brezhnev, who attended the funeral, unexpectedly dropped down on his knees at his friend's grave, sobbing. This event puzzled many people. During the war Brezhnev had no strong backing and he advanced little. At the start of the war he was given the rank of colonel. By the end of the war he was a major general, having been promoted only once. Nor was he spoiled when it came to awards. By the end of the war he had been awarded two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy and two medals. At that time, this was not much for a general. At the victory parade on Red Square, where Major General Brezhnev marched alongside the commanding officer, at the head of a representative group of his front, there were considerably fewer awards pinned on his chest than on those of other generals.

After the war Brezhnev owed his promotions to Khrushchev, something which he carefully fails to mention in his memoirs. Stalin's name is mentioned in his book

"*Vozrozhdeniye*" [Rebirth] but nothing is said about Khrushchev. When he worked in the Ukraine, naturally, Brezhnev quite frequently recalled Khrushchev. Thus, for example, in the 13 October 1946 issue of the newspaper *BOLSHEVIK ZAPOROZHIA*, Brezhnev wrote: "Great support was provided by the Ukrainian Communist Party(b) Central Committee and the government of the Soviet Ukraine, headed by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the loyal fellow worker of the great Stalin."

After working in Zaporozhye, again on Khrushchev's recommendation Brezhnev was promoted to first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom and, in 1950, to first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party(b) Central Committee. At the 19th Party Congress, in the autumn of 1952, as head of the Moldavian Communists Brezhnev was made member of the CPSU Central Committee. For a short while he was also member of the Presidium (as a candidate member) and the Central Committee Secretariat, which had been substantially increased on Stalin's suggestion. The first time that Stalin saw Brezhnev was during the congress. The old and sick dictator noted the big and well-dressed 46-year old Brezhnev. Stalin was told that this was the party leader of the Moldavian SSR. "What a handsome Moldavian," Stalin said. Brezhnev assumed his place on the rostrum of the Mausoleum for the first time on 7 November 1952. Until March 1953, like the other members of the Presidium, Brezhnev was in Moscow, waiting to be summoned to a meeting and assigned obligations. He had already been released of work in Moldavia. However, as it were, Stalin did not summon them even once.

After Stalin's death the membership of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and Secretariat was immediately reduced. Brezhnev as well was left out of it but did not return to Moldavia. Instead, he became head of the USSR Navy Political Directorate. He was given the rank of lieutenant general and, once again, was asked to put on his military uniform. In the Central Committee, Brezhnev invariably supported Khrushchev.

At the beginning of 1954 Khrushchev sent him to Kazakhstan to head the development of the virgin lands. Brezhnev returned to Moscow only in 1956 and, after the 20th CPSU Congress, once again became one of the Central Committee secretaries and CPSU Central Committee Presidium candidate member. Brezhnev was put in charge of supervising the development of heavy industry and, subsequently, defense and aerospace. However, all the main problems were being solved by Khrushchev personally, while Brezhnev acted as his calm and loyal assistant. After the June 1957 Central Committee Plenum, Brezhnev was made member of the Presidium. Khrushchev valued his loyalty but did not consider him a sufficiently strong worker.

Brezhnev took over from K.Ye. Voroshilov, after the latter retired, as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Some Western biographers rate this as a

virtual defeat of Brezhnev in the struggle for power. In reality, Brezhnev was not an active participant in that struggle and was quite satisfied with his new appointment. Nor was he aspiring at that time to become the head of the party or the government. He was entirely satisfied to play the role of "third man" in the leadership. As early as 1956-1957 he had been able to transfer to Moscow several people with whom he had worked in Moldavia and the Ukraine. Trapeznikov and Chernenko were among the first. They began to work in Brezhnev's personal secretariat. In the Supreme Soviet Presidium it was precisely Chernenko who became chief of Brezhnev's office.

In 1963, when F. Kozlov not only lost Khrushchev's favor but also suffered a stroke, Khrushchev took a long time to appoint his new favorite. In the final account, his choice fell on Brezhnev, who was then made CPSU Central Committee secretary. Khrushchev was in very good health and expected to remain in power for a long time to come. Meanwhile, Brezhnev himself was displeased by Khrushchev's decision, although his transfer to the Secretariat increased his real power and influence. He was not eager to perform the extremely difficult and very troublesome work of Central Committee secretary. It was not Brezhnev who organized Khrushchev's replacement, although he was aware of the preparations for that step. The main organizers of the action could not agree on many problems. In order not to exacerbate differences, which could have wrecked the entire project, they agreed on the election of Brezhnev, in the assumption that this would be a temporary solution. Leonid Ilich accepted.

Sometimes the Age Demands Weak Leaders

In the first years after the revolution, the party aktiv was engaged in a tense and deadly struggle, under Lenin's leadership. No one, however, disputed Lenin's authority. These were still young and strong people, full of enthusiasm. They were inspired by their role in the revolution. Furthermore, they shared the deep faith that Lenin alone, who was the founder of the party and the principal author of its theory, would be able to lead the party and the young Soviet state out of the incredibly difficult situations in which they had found themselves at the start of the 1920s. They worked unsparingly, wearing themselves out, but unafraid.

Most of those people, who belonged to the "Leninist party guard" were physically annihilated by Stalin in the second half of the 1930s. Stalin replaced them with younger but also more obedient managers, whom he forced to work to exhaustion. Many of the leaders of this "Stalinist generation" proved to be good administrators professionally, but virtually all of them had a tremendous fear of Stalin, for he continued to practice, in their case as well, the most cruel terror, although on a lower scale. The members of the party and state apparatus frequently even feared any promotion so that they would not find themselves too dangerously close to Stalin. Even

the members of the Politburo feared Stalin's summons. It was natural that Stalin's party aktiv became tired less from the work than from this permanent fear for its life. That is precisely why these people supported Khrushchev, who firmly opposed the continuation of the terror and repressions.

However, Khrushchev as well proved to be not entirely a person who could be satisfied with the already existing party and governmental elite. It was not only the fact that, with his phenomenal work stamina, Khrushchev forced all the administrative personnel to work most intensively. Khrushchev did not like the bureaucracy and fought it although he did not resort to terror. He constantly promoted a variety of reforms, changing institutions and managers. He lowered the privileges of the high administrators and introduced in the party statutes the principle of mandatory replaceability of party leaders. The leading party and state membership became tired of such reforms and of the fear of losing if not their heads, their positions, and the constant changes and uncertainty of their future.

Following Khrushchev's replacement, the high party-governmental apparatus no longer wanted an excessively strong leader. These people wanted a more peaceful way of life and work. They wanted stability in their position and confidence in the future. The bulk of the membership of the party's Central Committee feared any kind of new "strong" leader, such as Shelepin, about whom Mikoyan himself had said at one point that "This young man could make a great deal of trouble." However, nor did the party elite sympathize all that much with dogmatists and ascetics like Suslov. It found perfectly acceptable precisely a weak and well-wishing leader who had neither strong intellect nor strong will. It was this thirst for stability and the "stability" slogan which Brezhnev formulated that made a perfect match.

I was told by one of my acquaintances, who frequently accompanied both Khrushchev and Brezhnev in their trips around the Soviet Union, that Brezhnev was welcomed by various party aktivi much more hospitably than was Khrushchev, whose visit was usually perceived as that of a stern auditor. Brezhnev's visits were a type of demonstration of unity between him and the local party and state bureaucracy. It was with the support of that bureaucracy that Brezhnev gradually removed from the Politburo people who entertained political ambitions. It was thus that A.N. Shelepin, G.I. Voronov, K.T. Mazurov, P.Ye. Shelest and D.S. Polyanskiy were removed.

Finding himself at the head of the party and the state, judging by his behavior, Brezhnev constantly felt a feeling of inferiority. Deep within himself he nonetheless realized, during the first years of his rule, that he lacked many of the qualities and knowledge needed to lead a state such as the Soviet Union. His assistants kept assuring him of the opposite. They began to flatter him

and the more gratefully Brezhnev accepted this flattery the more frequent and excessive it became. Gradually, he began to need it, like a steady fix.

A variety of myths began to circulate, particularly on the subject of Brezhnev's military biography. As a political worker, Brezhnev did not participate in the biggest and decisive battles of the Patriotic War. One of the most important events in the combat biography of the 18th Army was the seizure and holding for 225 days of a bridgehead south of Novorossiysk in 1943, known as "Malaya Zemlya." Not the entire Army but only its landing element participated in the battles for Malaya Zemlya. Army headquarters and its political department were on Bolshaya Zemlya, in relative safety. According to Brezhnev's small book, he visited Malaya Zemlya only twice, once with the brigade of the party's Central Committee and a second time to present party cards and awards to soldiers and officers. In the big documentary novel by G. Sokolov "*Malaya Zemlya*," whose author, as we read in the preface, spent "the entire 7 long months on Malaya Zemlya," we find only two mentions of Brezhnev: "a thin colonel with big black eyebrows" (Moscow, 1971, p 203). In the second half of the 1970s, this heroic event which, however, was of no great significance in terms of the overall scale of the war, began to be excessively inflated. There was more writing and talk about it than about truly big battles in the war. Brezhnev's little book was included in the list of mandatory readings for secondary school, VUZs and the party education system. Brezhnev's role itself in the battles on Malaya Zemlya was excessively exaggerated. Naturally, trips to Malaya Zemlya involved a great deal of danger. As S. Borzenko wrote, as early as 1958, "On one occasion, the seiner on which Brezhnev sailed hit a mine. The colonel was thrown into the sea and, already unconscious, was picked up by seamen."⁴

We also read in G. Sokolov's book the following: "The soldiers told me," Zelentsov went on to say, "that the seiner on which Brezhnev sailed was hit by a shell and the blast threw the colonel into the sea. The seamen dove and rescued him. He was unconscious...."

"'Brave seamen!' Petrakov said with pride."⁵

In his little book "*Malaya Zemlya*," Brezhnev only briefly mentions the "April battles" which followed this memorable crossing, "during which I took a swim in the water."⁶ However, in the tremendous flow of articles, pamphlets and memoirs on Malaya Zemlya, which were published later, one could find a description of the way Colonel Brezhnev, who had been thrown into the sea by the explosion, not only swam back to the ship but also rescued a wounded seaman.

The solemn ceremony in the course of which Novorossiysk was awarded the title of city-hero, the inauguration of a huge memorial site, and the organization of museums dedicated specifically to the combat path of the 18th Army exceeded any sensible measure to

such an extent that it gave food to numerous jokes which came out of the military as well. Even the sector near Moscow, where Brezhnev's big dacha was built, next to which were the dachas of his daughter, son and grandchildren, were known by the local population as "Malaya Zemlya."

Brezhnev's amazing predilection for the tinsel of honors and awards generated not respect but simply mockery. I already wrote that after the war only four orders and two medals had been pinned on the chest of Major General Brezhnev. After the war, while Stalin was still alive, Brezhnev was awarded the Order of Lenin. In the 10-year tenure of Khrushchev's leadership, Brezhnev was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Patriotic War First Class. After Brezhnev himself took over the leadership of the country and the party, awards began to pour on him as though out of a horn of plenty. By the end of his life he had been awarded more orders and medals than Stalin and Khrushchev combined. In this case, his great desire was to be awarded combat orders especially. He was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union four times although, according to regulations, this title be awarded no more than three times (the sole exception was G.K. Zhukov). On dozens of occasions he was awarded the title of Hero and the high orders of all socialist countries. He was even awarded orders by Latin American and African countries. Brezhnev was awarded the high Soviet combat order Pobeda, which could be presented only to the greatest military leaders who had won decisive victories on the scale of a front or a group of fronts. Naturally, with such a large number of high combat orders, Brezhnev could not be satisfied with the rank of lieutenant general. In 1976 he was made Marshal of the USSR. Brezhnev attended the next meeting with the veterans of the 18th Army wearing a cape. Entering the premises, he issued the command: "Attention! Marshal coming!" Removing his cape, he appeared in front of the veterans in his new marshal's uniform. Pointing at the marshal's insignia on his shoulders, Brezhnev proudly said: "I qualified!"

The custom, when burying a Soviet leader, is to carry his awards on small velvet cushions. At Suslov's funeral, there were 15 senior officers marching behind the casket, carrying his orders and medals. Brezhnev, however, had more than 200 orders and medals! It became necessary to pin several orders and medals on each velvet cushion and limit the honor guard to 44 senior officers.

Although he lacked even the slightest talent as a speaker, Brezhnev tried to deliver speeches or reports almost weekly. They were broadcast on television throughout the country or included in special newsreels. Naturally, this only harmed his reputation. However, it could also serve as a clear illustration of the degradation of oratorial art among the leadership.

We know that Lenin never wrote the text of his speeches or even reports at party congresses in advance. He merely drew up general outlines. Stalin prepared at

length and thoroughly for his speeches. He had a weak voice and a strong Georgian accent and by no means were all his words and sentences understood by the audience. Although flatterers described him as a great orator, he knew that such was not the case, for which reason he spoke quite rarely, particularly in the 1930s and 1940s. In any case, his reports and speeches were his own. Khrushchev spoke quite frequently and could expatiate 3 to 4 hours without a stop. This verbosity frequently led to mockery and even irritation. Khrushchev, however, did not simply read his speeches. He gathered the speech writers ahead of time and discussed with them at length the main ideas which had to be reflected in the text they were drafting. However, he could also speak extemporaneously and engage in extemporaneous debates or press conferences. Furthermore, even in his most important speeches, Khrushchev frequently departed from the text and improvised.

Brezhnev simply read the speeches and reports drafted for him. However, even such reading came very hard to him. He mispronounced words frequently. Brezhnev would become flustered when speaking in public or in front of television cameras. He was unable to deliver even a brief congratulatory speech in presenting orders to his Politburo colleagues, without reading from a paper. Only once, in October 1971, during a state visit to France, where the art of public speaking is so highly valued, at the reception in his honor at the Elysee Palace, Brezhnev delivered his speech without reading it. I heard the direct relay of this ceremony on the radio and it was clear that Brezhnev had carefully studied his short speech in advance. However, in his excitement he skipped words or prepositions, which made some of his sentences either confused or meaningless. Naturally, the Soviet delegation interpreter had studied this speech better than Brezhnev, for which reason the French could not detect any errors.

As early as the 1960s, when Brezhnev's extensive reports and speeches were being broadcast on radio or television, virtually no one listened. In the 1970s, even in public places, such as hotel lobbies or hospitals, at the very beginning of such broadcasts the people would go away or turn off their set. On one occasion, I noticed in Kislovodsk how, one day before the elections to the Supreme Soviet, a 3-4-hour long Brezhnev speech was being transmitted on all loudspeakers of the resort park. However, thousands of people resting in the park did not pay the slightest attention to the speaker.

Brezhnev in His Close Circle

Brezhnev became flustered at various types of ceremonies, occasionally concealing his confusion behind an unnatural immobility. In a more intimate circle, however, at private meetings or days off, Brezhnev could become an entirely different person, more independent and resourceful, occasionally showing a sense of humor which, in truth, was not all that refined. This is recalled by virtually all politicians who have had anything to do

with him, naturally before he became gravely ill. Clearly, realizing this, Brezhnev soon began to prefer to hold important discussions in his dacha in Oreanda in the Crimea or at the hunting preserve of Zavidovo near Moscow.

W. Brandt, the former FRG chancellor, with whom Brezhnev frequently met, wrote in his memoirs the following:

"Unlike Kosygin, my direct partner in the 1970 talks, who was basically cold and composed, Brezhnev could become impulsive or even angry. There would be shifts in his mood and his Russian soul, and even quick tears. He had a sense of humor. He not only spent hours bathing in Oreanda but also talked and laughed a great deal. He spoke of the history of his country but only of the last decades.... It was obvious that Brezhnev tried to take care of his appearance, which was not consistent with the picture which was shown in his official photographs. He was in no way impressive and, despite the heaviness of his body, he made the impression of a refined, lively, and energetically moving and vital person. His mimicry and gestures revealed the southerner, particularly if he felt that he could talk freely. He came from a Ukrainian industrial area in which a variety of national influences had become intertwined. World War II was what had influenced Brezhnev as a person more than anything else. With extensive and somewhat naive excitement he spoke of the way Hitler had been able to dupe Stalin...." (7, No 46, pp 148-149).

Henry Kissinger as well described Brezhnev as "a real Russian, full of emotion and rough humor." When Kissinger came to Moscow in 1973, as U.S. Secretary of State, to discuss Brezhnev's visit to the United States, almost all of the 5-day talks took place at the Zavidovo hunting grounds, during walks, hunting, lunches and dinners. Brezhnev even demonstrated for the guest his driving skills. In his memoirs, Kissinger wrote that "Once he led me to the black Cadillac which Nixon had presented him the previous year, on Dobrynin's advice. With Brezhnev at the wheel we drove speedily along the narrow and twisted rural roads and one could only pray that a policeman would show up at the nearest cross-roads and put an end to this risky game. This, however, was quite implausible, for if here, outside the city, any policeman on duty would appear, he would hardly dare to stop the car of the party's general secretary. The fast drive ended at the dock. Brezhnev asked me to join him in the hovercraft which, luckily, he did not drive personally. My impression, however, was that this launch would beat the speed record which the general secretary had set during our automobile trip" (7, No 9, p 166).

Brezhnev conducted himself quite informally at many receptions such as, for example, the one on the occasion of the Soyuz-Apollo joint Soviet-American flight. However, the Soviet people neither saw nor knew of such a cheerful and informal Brezhnev. Furthermore, the picture of a much younger Brezhnev, which at that time was

not all that frequently shown on the television screens, had been replaced in the people's minds by the image of a gravely ill, slow-moving and sickly speaking person, who had appeared almost weekly on our television screens in the last 5 to 6 years of his life.

Goodwill and Sentimentality

As a whole, Brezhnev was a person of goodwill. He did not like any complications and conflicts in politics or in his personal relations with his colleagues. If such a conflict nonetheless appeared, Brezhnev tried to avoid extreme solutions. In conflicts within the leadership very few people would be pensioned off. The majority of the "disgraced" leaders nonetheless remained part of the "nomenclature," but by two to three ranks lower. A Politburo member would become deputy minister and a former minister or secretary of an important party obkom and member of the CPSU Central Committee would be appointed ambassador to a small country, such as Denmark, Belgium, Australia or Norway.

Frequently this type of goodwill turned into connivance from which dishonest people as well profited. Brezhnev frequently left in their positions not only people who had committed an offense but even thieves. We know that without the sanction of the Politburo the judiciary was not allowed to conduct an investigation into the affairs of any CPSU Central Committee member. For example, a great deal of time and effort were needed to remove from Georgia its party leader of many years, Mzhavanadze, whose greed and corruption had become legendary in the Georgian SSR. He was pensioned off and his case, as it were, did not reach the courts. Nor was Ishkov, the USSR Fishing Industry minister punished essentially, in whose department for a number of years deals of unparalleled scale had been taking place and for which dozens of senior ministry personnel had been detained and one of the deputy ministers had been sentenced to death by firing squad. Meanwhile, Medunov, first secretary of the Krasnodar Party Obkom, felt quite unruffled although the question of his abuses had been repeatedly raised in various agencies, including the USSR Prosecutor General's Office. For a long time people close to Brezhnev, such as Shchelokov, USSR minister of internal affairs, and some others were able to misuse their influence and power with impunity.

We already quoted Brandt on the subject of Brezhnev's "quick tears." This sentimentality on the part of the head of the Soviet state amazed many people. In 1973 an acquaintance of mine was a member of a group in charge of making the technical preparations for the World Peace Congress. During the speech by R. Chandra, an Indian, who was the chairman of the World Peace Council and who praised, in the most lavish and refined terms Brezhnev's love of peace and merits, my acquaintance, who expected to see on Brezhnev's face an expression of annoyance or impatience, was quite amazed to see him crying. R. Chandra's Oriental flattery had touched Brezhnev, who had taken it at face value.

Brezhnev also cried during his visit to Bulgaria, when Todor Zhivkov welcomed the Soviet leader at the airport with most enthusiastic statements.

Such sentimentality, which is so rarely inherent in politicians, was occasionally to the advantage... of the arts. Thus, for example, the movie "The Belorussian Railroad Station" was filmed at the beginning of the 1970s. It was a good picture but the censorship did not allow its showing, believing that the movie had not depicted Moscow's militia in the best possible light. The defenders of the picture managed to have it screened for the Politburo membership. In the movie there is an event depicting how, accidentally and after many years, veterans from the same regiment meet and sing a song about the landing battalion in which they had served in the past. The song, which was composed by B. Okudzhava, touched Brezhnev and he started crying. Naturally, the film was immediately allowed for release and, since then, the song on the landing battalion was always part of the repertoire of concerts attended by Brezhnev.

A similar event occurred with the film "Beautiful Kalina." The film includes the following event: The character, a former felon, visits his old mother, with his lady friend. Hiding behind the door, the son hears his mother speak of him as having long died but still beloved and respected. The son does not dare show himself to his mother and, leaving the hut, slowly moves away, crying, and collapses on the grass near a semi-wrecked church. The fault-finding censors demanded that this scene be deleted, let the character cry wherever he wishes but not near a wrecked church. However, it was precisely at that point in the movie that Brezhnev started crying. The picture was allowed to be screened without cuts and brought its maker deserved success.

Brezhnev's goodwill, combined with great power, occasionally led to actions which could be described as "reverse arbitrariness." Brezhnev had always loved movies, particularly American war movies and westerns. He was familiar with Ronald Reagan as a Hollywood actor long before the latter had become the American President. In the last 2 or 3 years of his life, Brezhnev frequently watched old Soviet movies which he had been unable to see previously for lack of time. Thus, for example, Brezhnev greatly liked the movie "And Quiet Flows the Don," the four parts of which had been shown as early as 1957-1958. The young actor Petr Glebov was successful as the main character of the movie. Subsequently, however, that actor had done nothing very distinguishing. Having seen the film, Brezhnev said that this actor should be given an award. He was told that the movie was very old and that Glebov's artistic career had not been all that successful subsequently. Brezhnev insisted, however, and several days later, to the great amazement of the artistic world, an announcement was made that P. Glebov was to be awarded the Order of Lenin and the title of People's Actor of the USSR. Brezhnev also liked very much the 12-part television crime movie "Seventeen Instantaneous Springs," which

had been filmed more than 10 years earlier. Brezhnev even rang up some of the leading actors who had appeared in that movie and congratulated them for their success. Virtually all of them were awarded orders. Brezhnev broke into tears in the first performance of A. Pakhmutova's song "Malaya Zemlya, Soviet Land!," which was performed by the military ensemble of the Pacific Fleet during Brezhnev's visit to Vladivostok. It was a rather primitive song but it told of the battles at Malaya Zemlya. The soloist of the ensemble who sang the song was awarded an order and the title of Honored Artist of the RSFSR.

Nepotism and Power Instinct

Not being a strong personality, Brezhnev had a peculiar power instinct. Although in the past he had not shown any clearly manifested aspiration to dominate, gradually he entered into the role of the actual head of the party and the state, a role which he began to like increasingly. Nonetheless, he realized or felt that he could strengthen the foundations of his personal power and influence only by appointing to responsible positions in the key agencies of the party and state power not simply suitable people but his closest friends and fellow workers from the institute, Dnepropetrovsk, Moldavia, Army service or even his own relatives and his wife's relatives. The gregarious Brezhnev always had a great deal of such friends and acquaintances. This group was frequently known as the "Dnepropetrovsk unit," although it included many people who had never worked in Dnepropetrovsk. A more accurate term would have been Brezhnev's "team."

Obviously, every major political leader in an authoritarian or democratic country develops his own "team" consisting of particularly trusted people. Under Brezhnev, however, this "team" reached excessive dimensions. Furthermore, it included not exceptionally gifted politicians and administrators but a large number of weak managers who could remain in their positions only thanks to Brezhnev's support. Looking at the biographies of many CPSU Central Committee members, one may think that the metallurgical institutes in Dnepropetrovsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk were training less metallurgical engineers than politicians. In their time, the following former officials had graduated from these institutes: N.A. Tikhonov, G.E. Tsukanov, assistant to the Central Committee general secretary, Army General G.K. Tsinev, first deputy chairman of the USSR KGB, I.T. Novikov, USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman, G.S. Pavlov, manager of affairs at the CPSU Central Committee, N.P. Tolubeyev, a diplomat, Central Committee member, and others. V.V. Shcherbitskiy, N.A. Shchelokov, K.S. Grushevoy, V.I. Drozdenko and several other members of the CPSU Central Committee, had begun their political careers in Dnepropetrovsk. Alongside Brezhnev, noted members of his "team," such as K.U. Chernenko, S.P. Trapeznikov and S.K. Tsvigun,

had worked in Kishinev. By 1970 B.P. Bugayev, Brezhnev's former personal pilot, who had held an insignificant position in civil aviation in 1964, had become minister of civil aviation and, subsequently, CPSU Central Committee member and Chief Marshal of Aviation. The worse Brezhnev's health became, the more people from his "team" were promoted to leading positions. At the 26th Party Congress Yu.L. Brezhnev, Brezhnev's son, and Yu.M. Churbanov, who made a headlong career in the internal affairs, were elected CPSU Central Committee candidate members.

However, he was not able to promote many of the members of this "team" to leading positions in the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat. Therefore, despite Brezhnev's obvious efforts, the leadership of the country and the party is today in the hands of people whose political biography owes nothing to him. Nonetheless, Brezhnev's "team" was clearly not the best part of the legacy which the party received from its deceased leader.

Today a great deal more is being said about Stalin and his monstrous crimes than was said during Khrushchev's time. Novels and stories, memoirs and political articles, motion picture features and movie reels give us grounds to condemn Stalinism on a virtually daily basis. Nonetheless, the ranks of the admirers of this tyrant and despot, who died 35 years ago, are not thinning all that rapidly. The cult of Stalin became all too deeply-seated in the conscious and subconscious minds of several generations of Soviet people and surmounting it proved to be more difficult than the active opponents of Stalinism would have liked.

The criticism of Brezhnev is heard today quite indistinctly and in not particularly specific terms. Nonetheless, even that criticism proved sufficient for his cult to disappear with amazing speed from our lives. No one is debating Brezhnev's "great role" in the war, economic building or the development of culture. Not even in his native Dneprodzerzhinsk and Dnepropetrovsk is anyone selling badges or calendars with Brezhnev's photograph. Nowhere in the country does one see Brezhnev's photograph on automobile windshields. For nearly 15 years our entire propaganda machine made exceptional efforts to develop a Brezhnev cult as the "great fighter for peace," "great Leninist," "great theoretician," etc. However, this entire expensive propaganda machine worked in neutral gear. As it were, the cult of Brezhnev did not become part of the conscious or subconscious mind of the Soviet people, who behaved toward him with an indifference which, in Brezhnev's final years, turned into poorly concealed scorn.

Today our press is speaking of Stalin's times as the times of the "great terror," "great change," and "victories and tragedies." The euphemism "times of subjectivism and arbitrariness" was long chosen to describe the Khrushchev era. Historians and political journalists are looking

for ways to define Brezhnev's time: "age of toadying," "times of total permissiveness and bureaucratism," "times of obstruction and stagnation" and "gerontocracy." Any one of these would be adequate.

But was nonetheless everything all that bad in our country during Brezhnev's times? Did we not describe the 1970s as the calmest decade in the history of the USSR? Yes, but that was the calm of stagnation, when problems were not being solved but postponed, while the clouds continued to gather. Were the 70s not a time of detente? Yes, but this detente was rather brittle and its results were felt by few people even in the 1980s, i.e., while Brezhnev was still living. Did the Soviet people not live better at the start of the 1980s than the start of the 1960s? Yes, life was improving but extremely slowly, if we consider the broadest possible masses of peasants, workers and employees. Furthermore, increased salaries far exceeded the growth rates of consumer goods production, housing construction and services. Had under Brezhnev the Soviet Union not attained parity with America in the area of strategic armaments? Yes, the objective was attained but at an excessively high cost to our economy and on a rather high level, which far exceeded the limits of sensible sufficiency. Furthermore, the arms race went on, exhausting the country.

The Soviet Union recovered from the horrors of the Stalinist terror. However, although on a lesser extent, illegal repressions were practiced under Brezhnev as well. The atmosphere of "moderate" fear, furthermore supported by the constant attempts to rehabilitate Stalin, remained. Not only did legality not triumph but there was not even basic order in the country. Negligence and irresponsibility in an atmosphere of total permissiveness were increasing everywhere. A socially corrupting atmosphere was becoming increasingly more blatant and impudent; abuses of power and theft on a large or small scale were becoming standard practice. An atmosphere of cliquishness, collective guarantees, nepotism and crime was developing in all areas of social and governmental life, from the party's leadership in the center and the local areas, to the editors of literary journals and the managements of creative associations.

Unwillingness and inability to work well, political passiveness and apathy, indifference toward the moral and political values of socialism, the moral degradation of tens of millions of people, the comprehensive rule of mediocrity, the disparity between words and deeds and the encouragement of ubiquitous lying maimed the consciousness of an entire generation which today, not without reason, we describe as the "lost generation." From that viewpoint the overall consequences of Brezhnevism proved to be no less severe than those of Stalinism. The country and society found themselves in an impasse. This must no longer be tolerated.

Throughout its entire history, the Soviet Union has developed in jumps from one sociopolitical crisis to another. Each regime moves the country ahead but

exhausts its possibilities long before its representatives and leaders leave the political stage. From this viewpoint, the Brezhnev regime had exhausted itself by the mid-1970s.

"History repeats itself twice," Hegel said. "Once as a tragedy and once as a farce." Marx loved to quote these words. Stalinism was tragedy. Brezhnevism was, naturally, a farce but with a mixture of tragedy. It would have been strange had such a distorted farce not created an opposition. While the open opposition was being weakened as a result of repressions, the concealed opposition, headed by greatly differing people, such as Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and M.S. Gorbachev, was becoming increasingly strong.

The history of this difficult struggle, which has not ended to this day, has still not been written and, possibly, will not be written soon. However, nor has even a small percentage of the truth of the abuses committed not only by Brezhnev but also by Rashidov, Grishin, Romanov, Kunayev and Chernenko, has also been revealed. This criticism may sound quite harsh but it covers the entire period of stagnation rather than individual and most noted of its representatives and makers. D. Granin, the popular writer, notes the characteristic features of latter "Brezhnevism." "The assiduous work of specialists and toadies on all levels separated them from the life of the people and provided benefits above all to themselves. Subservience insisted that a great power must have a great leader and they undertook to make one. Inflated merits matched inflated reports and figures. This method was mastered gradually, step by step. The good intentions with which everything had begun in 1965-1966 were gradually replaced by endless speeches. It is the work of historians to analyze the mechanisms of this sad process in greater detail."⁸

It takes a long time for the historians to work and it is my view that the politicians will outstrip them. The Brezhnev regime frightened everyone with its irrationality: It is difficult to trust a political group leading a great country on the basis of the principle of "after us the deluge." Brezhnev's physical death was long and painful, occurring in full view of the entire world. The time has now come for his political death. These, however, are not grounds for remaining silent about Brezhnev. In order to put a definitive end to his legacy it takes more than merely removing his name from street signs, squares and rayons. For that reason, I can only join in the appeal of N.K. Kozyrev, a simple worker: "We must open the window pane not only of the terrible 1930s but of the stifling 1970s as well."⁹

Footnotes

1. NEW YORK REVIEW, 4 March 1982.
2. NOVYY MIR, No 1, 1983.

3. Willy Brandt. "Begegnungen und Einsichten" [Encounters and Insights]. Hamburg, 1976, pp 334, 338.

4. Borzenko, S. "Zhizn na Voyne. Zapiski Voyennogo Korrespondenta" [Life at War. Notes of a War Correspondent]. Moscow, 1958, p 167.

5. Sokolov, G. "Malaya Zemlya." 1971, p 203.

6. Brezhnev, L.I. "Leninskim Kursom" [The Leninist Course], vol 7, Moscow, 1979, p 23.

7. DER SPIEGEL, 1982.

8. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 45, 1987, p 12.

9. OGONEK, No 10, 1988, p 4.

COPYRIGHT: "Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir", 1988

Fabrication of Evidence in Tukhachevskiy Affair Alleged

18300503 Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 7, 13-19 Feb 89 pp 10-11

[Article by F. Sergeyev: "The Tukhachevskiy Affair"]

[Text] On 31 January 1957, the Military Judicial Board of the USSR Supreme Court, in accordance with the findings of the Procurator General, revoked the sentence of 11 June 1937 imposed on persons implicated in the so-called "anti-Soviet, Trotskiyite military organization," headed by Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskiy, for lack of evidence of a crime, and they were all were fully rehabilitated.

The reader's attention is called to the following article by F. Sergeyev. It is of interest primarily because, on the basis of an analysis of the memoirs of statesmen, political spokesmen, and military leaders in the West, as well as of archive documents, it provides a complete picture of how the "evidence" of a purportedly secret connection between M. N. Tukhachevskiy, as well as other Soviet military commanders, and the German General Staff was, in fact, fabricated. The clandestine system for carrying out this nefarious political forgery is shown in full detail; and the actions of Nazi intelligence officers are examined step by step as they artfully devise an alleged "plot" in the Red Army, gambling on exploiting negative traits of Stalin—his distrust, suspiciousness, and cruelty. In other words, in palming the false documents off on Stalin, they correctly calculated in advance what his reaction would be.

The complete text of this article will soon be published in the journal NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA.

Hitler's Parting Words

One day in December 1936, Heidrich, the head of the Security Service (SS), reported to Hitler with a routine intelligence report on the USSR. In response to an irritable reproach by the Fuhrer that German intelligence was continuing to operate in a listless manner, without influencing political events in the world to the advantage of the Third Reich, Heidrich turned Hitler's attention to the possibility of trying to "decapitate" the Red Army by compromising a group of its highest-ranking officers, among them Marshal Tukhachevskiy. Hitler immediately seized upon the idea of Heidrich. The latter had more than once in the past earned the confidence of the Fuhrer and become "practically irreplaceable in situations that called for some sort of dirty work." Standing, as it were, at the threshold of his attack upon Russia, Hitler concluded the conversation by saying that nothing could be more appropriate than striking a blow at the leadership of the Red Army. Information of conditions allegedly ripe for treason in the Red Army was received by the SS in December 1936 from N. Skoblin, a former general of the Whites living in France and a sworn enemy of Soviet power. A former acquaintance of M. N. Tukhachevskiy from joint service in the army of the Tsar, he could not forgive him, as a member of a noble family, for his switching to the side of the revolution. The information received from Skoblin in two messages was as follows: The first reported that the Red Army Command was preparing a plot headed by Tukhachevskiy; the second said that Tukhachevsky and his closest supporters were in secret communication with the German General Staff. Reactions to these communications varied. Military intelligence experts flatly rejected them as absurd. Heidrich, however, it is now apparent, was determined not to let his chance slip by, and if proof of treason in the Red Army did not exist, to fabricate it.

Motives for Provocation

The rulers of Fascist Germany were mindful of the fact that M. N. Tukhachevskiy, as one of the most outstanding Soviet military commanders with a mastery of strategy and tactics, had like no one else a depth of insight into the vulnerable aspects of the organization and weapons systems of the German Army. There was one other factor to which Hitler attached no less vital significance. Tukhachevskiy, whose opinions were closely followed in Europe, had soon discerned the target of the carefully concealed preparations being carried out by Hitler's war machine. In an article published in PRAVDA on 31 March 1935, M. N. Tukhachevskiy indicated the criminal intentions of the fascist leaders by pointing to the fact that they were speeding the creation of massive armed forces, and primarily units that could be used to make up a powerful invading army. "The imperialist designs of Hitler are aimed not only at the Soviets," he warned. "These intentions simply serve as a screen to disguise revanchist plans directed at the West

(Belgium, France) and the South (Poznan, Czechoslovakia, Anschluss)." Moreover, for several years prior to the outbreak of the war he had been trying to impress upon the British and French, before it was too late, the necessity of taking collective security measures against Hitler's developing plans for unleashing a war of aggression. It was known that in 1936 at the initiative of M. N. Tukhachevskiy war games were conducted on a major scale by the People's Defense Command in the course of which means of active resistance were worked out in the event of a possible attack by Fascist Germany. In summing up the results, Tukhachevskiy expressed his sharp opposition to reduced estimates of Hitler's army, asserting that the Germans were capable of dispatching 200 divisions (a prediction, as we know, that turned out to be correct). He was convinced of another thing: In order to exploit the advantages of a sudden attack, the enemy was bound to strike first. In a speech before a session of the Central Executive Committee in 1936, he uttered a prophetic warning that the USSR must be prepared for a sudden attack by the German Army. Finally, as an attentive observer of military affairs in Germany, he staunchly insisted on modernizing the equipment of the Red Army. Notwithstanding the opinion of a number of "military authorities" of the time, he advocated the speedy development and deployment of tank forces at the cost of reducing the size and amount spent on the cavalry, and he stubbornly upheld the idea of rocket [raketnyy] fire support.

In short, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskiy, by his perspicacity in preparing our army for its future ordeal, represented all by himself a serious threat to fascism.

Search for the Best Engraver

After returning from his meeting with Hitler to Gestapo Headquarters at 8 Prints-Albrecht-Strasse, Heidrich summoned A. Nauyoks [transliterated], chief of a subdivision engaged in the preparation of false documents. As is usual on particularly momentous occasions, the conversation took place in the presence of a close associate of Heidrich, Shandartenfuhrer G. Berens, a man with a reputation within the SS as an expert in Russian affairs. "This is an extremely important assignment," Heidrich told Nauyoks. "It must be carried out without delay and in the utmost secrecy. The artistry in the forging of the documents to be discussed must be faultless as never before. For this purpose we need to recruit the finest engraver in Germany."

Then he revealed in general outline the substance of the plot. A letter, Heidrich declared, the text of which would be drawn up by Berens, and the signature of Tukhachevsky below added by the engraver, should clearly indicate that the Marshal himself and certain of his colleagues in the Red Army were in secret communication with a certain group of German generals—opponents of the Nazi regime—and that these two groups were conspiring to seize power in their respective countries. A dossier containing photographic documents, allegedly stolen

from the archives of the SS, would be turned over to the Russians, who would certainly have the impression that an investigation had been held with respect to the German generals implicated in the affair.

It was presumed that the fabricated dossier would include certain letters and reports, together with work notes of a colleague engaged in investigating communications between representatives of the German High Command and Red Army and reports of secretly monitored telephone conversations. A key factor in the collection of false documents would be provided by "a personal letter from Tukhachevskiy alluding to earlier correspondence." In the documents, covering various periods of time, mention would be made of the names of the Soviet military commanders supporting Tukhachevskiy, and likewise the German generals allegedly in league with them, whose opposition to the Nazi Party could no longer be tolerated. These, as the head of the SS put it, would form "the core of the entire plan," lending it an element of high credibility.

The folder cover, said Heidrich, should bear the stamp of the department of Admiral Kanaris, and within the folder there should be a hand-written note from the Admiral addressed to Hitler, stating that the Admiral intended to get in touch with some of the suspected German officers personally to try to extract from them details of the conspiracy. The note from Admiral Kanaris (of course, in fact, he never wrote it) would mention by name only the German "traitors," but it would contain a hint that renegades would show up in the Red Army. The dossier would also contain authentic instructions from Hitler, indicating that he approved the action proposed by Kanaris and placed matters under the general authority of Borman. There would also be a memorandum from Borman to Heidrich expressing his interest in having the German officers named by Kanaris placed under surveillance.

Heidrich concluded the discussion by saying that everything should indicate that the dossier had been kept in the SS records section, access to which was authorized for many of his working associates. One of them, in financial straits (such a motive seemed most plausible), presumably decided to take advantage of the situation, stole the dossier, made photocopies of the documents, and proposed to sell them to the Russians.

Thus preparations began for an ambitious political forgery designed to "prove" that a group of prominent Soviet military commanders headed by Marshal Tukhachevskiy were plotting a military coup and to this end conspiring with generals of the Reich and counting on their support.

Everything was carried out in the strictest secrecy. Hitler feared that the venture might fail owing to an accidental leak of information. A special operational group was formed within the SS.

Heidrich named Berens to head this group. (Subsequently, in 1946, Berens was to be executed for monstrous acts committed during the war in Belgrade, where he would serve as chief of the SS and the police. While on duty in Belgrade, he informed an SS associate, Khetlyu, that he took care of the technical side of the operation and played a major role in it at the instructions of Heidrich.)

To locate the engraver with the "highest craftsmanship" turned out to be not so easy. They settled on an expert by the name of F. Putsig. The latter, having learned of the affair, before acquiescing, laid down a condition. He was prepared, he said, to comply with the order upon receipt of a written statement confirming that he was acting without remuneration of any kind. If this was met, he was ready to place his "modest talents at the disposal of the party." The condition was accepted. Since a major share of the documents were to be typewritten, Nauyoks arranged for the delivery of different kinds of typewriters, two of them with keyboards similar in design to those used by the German High Command. He managed to get hold of a Russian typewriter "of a kind that might be used currently in the Kremlin" with the assistance of a White immigrant, Prince Avalov.

It was necessary further to obtain some authentic documents, possibly stored in the Berlin archives of the Wehrmacht, pertaining to the stay of Tukhachevskiy and some other Soviet military commanders in Germany during the 1920's and early 1930's. It was also important to find materials related to contacts, official and non-official, with representatives of the German Command, particularly hand-written by the Marshal and bearing his signature.

Soon after his meeting with Hitler, Heidrich invited Admiral Kanaris on a minor pretext to luncheon. Towards the end of the meal he led the discussion to the USSR and, while emphasizing his utter ignorance with regard to the Soviet military structure, stated that he would like to familiarize himself with any materials that might be available on this subject in the classified file. Information about the composition of the Red Army high command was of particular interest to him. Inasmuch as the Admiral had free access to the secret archives of the Wehrmacht, Heidrich asked him to make available to him for a few days the dossiers of Soviet military commanders who had visited Germany before 1933 or who had attended German military academies. The youngest of them, Marshal Tukhachevskiy, who had come to Berlin on more than one occasion between 1925 and 1932, especially attracted his attention, he said.

The Admiral, however, was put on his guard by Heidrich's request and his pronounced interest in the secret archives of the Wehrmacht. Detecting the intention of the SS to compromise one of the German generals who did not share the views of the Nazis, Kanaris replied rather evasively. Heidrich persisted in pressing him,

saying that his request was of the utmost importance. But the Admiral, who was not about to give in, clearly had no intention of accommodating him.

"I realize, Admiral," said Heidrich, "that military intelligence and counter-intelligence is a matter exclusively in your bailiwick. But this is not a military matter. To carry out his foreign policy successfully, the Fuhrer needs precise information regarding Soviet military commanders, and he has given me instructions to give him this information immediately."

"I am extremely sorry," responded the Admiral. "But without proper written authorization from the Fuhrer, no one has access in the secret archives of the General Staff."

"Well, then"—said Heidrich, cutting him off—"I will so inform the Fuhrer."

Since Hitler had ordered Heidrich to bypass the military, no further requests were made of Kanaris.

Search for Documents

After exhausting all possibilities for gaining possession of the originals, the conclusion was reached that the best thing to do was to steal them. Hitler himself had approved this action at an earlier, special meeting with Heidrich at which they had discussed the operation. It must be carried out, Hitler said, without delay: That very night They must carry out a raid on the War Ministry, open the safes, and remove as many documents as they could. The detachment assembled for this purpose was divided into three "seizure groups." It included experienced experts at breaking and entering from the Criminal Investigation Department. With the help of the SS seizure team raids were carried out on the Wehrmacht archives and classified files, and the documents needed, stamped "Top Secret" and "Highly Sensitive," were pulled out. Thus without the knowledge of the military Heidrich managed to get hold of recordings of conversations between German officers and representatives of the Soviet military leadership, together with original letters written by Tukhachevskiy and samples of his signature. The story of the hunt for documents had a curious ending. Right after the documents were discovered and removed, a fire broke out in the Wehrmacht building. In this way the organizers of the operation tried to cover their tracks.

It was now necessary to doctor the documents obtained in the way that was required. For this purpose it simply remained to assemble and tie the documents kept in the archives together, inserting supplementary phrases into the correspondence and recordings, scattering marginal notes necessary for the sake of credibility, and faking the signatures. After Berens had finished his work on the "genuine" texts and Puttsig had forged the documentation, there could no longer be any doubt of their authenticity. The forged documents included letters exchanged

between Tukhachevskiy and his supporters in the USSR, on one side, and with certain German generals on the other side. From the contents of these letters an inference could be drawn regarding the complicity of a number of "ambitiously inclined" Soviet military leaders in a process of political ferment, encompassing the highest echelons of the Red Army and threatening to spill over into a conspiracy supported by high-ranking representatives of the Wehrmacht.

The work turned out by Puttsig on a trial basis surpassed all expectations. Heidrich was entranced. "Here are the names and signatures of the officers to be implicated in the documents," said the SS chief, turning over a list. Late one night a few days later, Nauyoks delivered the texts of documents prepared by Berens to Puttsig's workshop. In four hours the work was done. As he compared the fake copies with the originals, Nauyoks could not believe his own eyes. The forgery was above suspicion.

After fastidiously studying the text of "Tukhachevskiy's letters" brought to him by Nauyoks, Heidrich pronounced: "Marvelous! Outstanding. Now place all the stamps necessary on the dossier records and make photocopies. Be sure that the light is poor, so that it is obvious that the thief was in a hurry." Just as planned, all necessary signatures, stamps, and marginal notes had been added to the documents, as if in the keeping of leaders in the Reichswehr supposedly familiar with these reports at various periods prior to 1933.

Then Heidrich once again took up a letter, noticing that this one, judged by comparison with the preceding correspondence, was composed in a style very characteristic of the Marshal and written on the appropriate paper, containing Russian water marks. In its left margin there was a penciled notation, saying: "Even clearer proof of the guilt of Tukhachevskiy than the text of the letter itself." The documents contained references to earlier correspondence and conversations that had taken place, along with "clear hints that the Red Army and Wehrmacht would be incomparably stronger if they could manage to rid themselves of the heavy-handed party bureaucracy over them. The note from Kanaris to Hitler turned out to be rather verbose, while Hitler's answer was terse and peremptory. It was the sole unsigned document. (Even the all-powerful SS did not have the temerity to simulate Hitler's signature.) The memorandum from Borman instructing Heidrich to place the suspected German officers under surveillance was written by hand.

The voluminous dossier of "authentic" documents, stamps, and seals, which was "completely credible" in Heidrich's view, was presented to Hitler. Leafing through the collection of false documents, among which, in addition to the letters mentioned above, there were receipts signed by a number of Soviet generals for vast sums of money allegedly given in exchange for providing German intelligence with secret information, Hitler

found the plan of operation "logical, generally, although absolutely fantastic." He reacted to the manufacturing of the documents with great praise and told them at the earliest opportunity to launch the operation, which, he emphasized, was intended "to rock the foundations of the vanguard of the Red Army, and not only for the present but for many years ahead."

The Forgery Reaches the Addressee

After the false documents have been subjected to careful investigation and had withstood every test, Heidrich attempted to carry out an even more difficult task, which was to find a means for the necessary information to fall into the hands of the Soviet authorities. The one that was settled upon was called "the Prague option."

At the end of January or beginning of February 1937 (as subsequently confirmed by Eduard Benesh, then president of Czechoslovakia), the Czech ambassador in Berlin, Mastny, informed his government of a routine conversation with a German diplomat who had made an insistent effort to obtain an answer to the question of how Prague would conduct itself in the event of a war between Germany and France. Evidently desiring to intimidate the Czech Government, the German diplomat hinted "on reliable authority" that a group of German generals were developing contacts with an influential group in the Red Army, and there were grounds to believe that in the very near future there would be a shift of leadership in the USSR, which would undoubtedly result in a change in the deployment of troops in Europe to the advantage of Nazi Germany.

The skillful Heidrich, for the sake of insurance, decided to duplicate this maneuver. This time, however, he chose France as an arena. The incident occurred evidently a few days after Benesh received his information from his ambassador in Berlin. Using intelligence sources with access to government circles in France, which were available to the SS among the Russian emigrants, Heidrich so arranged it that similar information "reached the ears" of Minister of War Edouard Daladier. The latter, seriously disturbed at the possibility of an abrupt shift in the political course of Moscow, asked the Russian ambassador in Paris to explain to what extent rumors reaching him of suspicious contacts between the Wehrmacht and Russian military leaders could be believed. Evidence that misinformation about the relations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army was being disseminated is attested to by a telegram sent at the time by V. P. Potemkin, then USSR ambassador in Paris, to the NKVD, which turned up in 1989 among archive documents related to the "Tukhachevskiy affair."

"Daladier obtained an appointment with your representative, and in the course of their discussion stated that he had learned through a reliable source of plans in German circles to overthrow the government in the USSR with

the support of persons of the Red Army Command hostile to the leaders of the country. Germany intends to form a military alliance with the new regime directed against France."

Referring to the fact that the report had been received from Russian emigrants, Daladier warned that more substantial information was not available.

At precisely the time that the Nazis had planned for it, a prearranged "leak" occurred in the highest military circles of the USSR, which was, incidentally, unsupported by any documentary evidence, that a plot was brewing in the Red Army, the ringleaders of which were counting on the support of the German General Staff. The hope was that the rumors generated would strengthen the suspiciousness of Stalin, subvert his faith in the military leadership, and perhaps provide a pretext for a purge of the Soviet officer corps.

Believing that the maneuver had succeeded in its aim, Heidrich addressed the final stage of the operation. He sent an especially trustworthy SS associate to Prague. (Right behind him, according to Khettl, Berens himself went to Prague under an assumed name to carry out the necessary preparations.) The SS associate's mission was to establish contact with a person close to Benesh and inform him of the existence of documents proving Tukhachevskiy's complicity in the plot.

According to Western sources, Benesh, aware of the unremitting threat from Hitler and alarmed at the prospect of Czechoslovakia's losing the support of the USSR in its opposition to Germany, considered it necessary to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government the information that had reached him, and on 8 May disclosed it in a personal and secret message to Stalin. (Footnote 1)

Winston Churchill himself indicated that this was the case. Recalling a meeting he had with Benesh in 1944 in Marrakech, he summarized the information obtained from him as follows: "In the summer of 1936 Benesh received a warning from a highly placed military source in Germany that if he wished to take advantage of Hitler's proposal (a reference to the fact that the Fuhrer was ready to respect the integrity of Czechoslovakia in exchange for assurances that it would remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and France), then he had better hurry, because in a very short time events would take place in Russia that would preclude the possibility of assistance from Germany.... This was part of the so-called conspiracy of the military... with the aim of overthrowing Stalin and forming a new government that would institute a pro-German policy. Benesh communicated everything that had been divulged to him forthwith to Stalin."

Soon a Benesh intermediary proposed to a representative of Heidrich that he get in touch with an associate of the Russian ambassador in Berlin. "So we did," writes

Shellenberg. "The associate of the Russian Embassy (he was presented with two authentic letters from the false dossier—F. S.) then flew to the USSR, and he returned with a special courier authorized to negotiate for the purchase of photocopies of the materials in the dossier. The sum stipulated in the amount of 500,000 marks was promptly paid. Thus photo-copies of the documents alleged to be held in the safe of Hitler's SS made their way to Moscow.

Another version has been broadly circulated in the West alleging the participation of Soviet experts in falsifying the Tukhachevskiy documents and asserting that the entire affair was inspired by the NKVD. Heidrich and his staff, according to this version, played only an auxiliary role as middlemen. The West German historian Pfaff, expressing his opposition to the thesis of the "Soviet origin" of the forged documents, states: "The evidence is reliable that in about the middle of December 1936 Heidrich told Hitler of his plan to undertake the preparation of false documents to 'substantiate' the existence of alleged secret ties between Tukhachevsky and the German General Staff."

The Tragic Denouement

Undoubtedly, it was not the Nazi forgery that provoked the purge and outbreak of repression in the treatment of the officer corps of the Red Army. On the contrary, after the decision was made in the Kremlin to carry out the purge, the documents forged by the Nazis served as a convenient "justification" for the accusations of conspiracy and treason made against the command unit of the Red Army. The dirty venture of Hitler's intelligence service simply speeded the onset of the fateful outcome of the tragic fate of Tukhachevskiy and other prominent Soviet military commanders. By that time the arrests among the military were occurring on a broad scale. But the seed of Hitler's nefarious deception had fallen on fertile soil. The Nazis understood this, and acting on the basis of it were to launch a treacherous scheme of their own.

On 11 May 1937 the transfer of M. N. Tukhachevskiy to the Volga Military District was officially reported. A few days later he was arrested with four "confederates": Army Commander 1st Rank I. P. Uborevich, in charge of the Belorussian Military District; Army Commander 1st Rank I. E. Yakir, in charge of the Kiev Military District; Army Commander 2d Rank A. I. Kork, director of the Military Academy imeni M. B. Frunze; and Corps Commander R. P. Eydemian, chairman of the Central Council of the Aerial Ground Defense [Osoaviakhim].

The arrests were followed by Order No. 96 by K. Ye. Voroshilov, which contained the following report: "During the period 1-4 June, in the presence of members of the Government, a meeting was held by the Military Council under the USSR People's Commissar for Defense. The Council heard and discussed a report that I gave about activities, unmasked by the NKVD, of a

treacherous, counter-revolutionary, fascist military organization, which in strict secrecy for a long time carried out acts of spying and sabotage in the Red Army."

On 11 June 1937 the USSR Supreme Soviet held a special judicial hearing to consider the affair. (Footnote 2) All those arrested were accused of specially dangerous crimes against the state: "Acting in the service of military intelligence service of a foreign government hostile in its relations to the USSR, they systematically delivered to military circles of this government secret information on the Red Army, committed acts of sabotage for the purpose of subverting the defensive capability of our country, and made preparations for the defeat of the Red Army in the event of a military attack on the USSR."

The special judicial hearing found all the accused "guilty of violating their military duty (oath), betraying the Army of Workers and Peasants, and high treason." Categorically denying these grievous charges, M. N. Tukhachevskiy declared: "I have fiercely loved the Red Army, as I have loved the Fatherland, which I have defended since the civil war.... With respect to meetings or conversations I have had with representatives of the German General Staff and the staff of the military attache in the USSR, these contacts were official in nature and they occurred at receptions or on maneuvers. The Germans were shown our military technology, and they were given an opportunity to observe changes taking place in the organization and equipment of troops. But all these contacts took place before Hitler came to power and our relations with Germany suddenly changed."

All those convicted were given the maximum punishment—execution before a firing squad. The sentence was carried out that very night.

Thus at the very height of his creative powers the life of talented military commander M. N. Tukhachevskiy, age 44, came to an abrupt end. Marshal G. K. Zhukov spoke of him as follows: "He was a giant of military thought and a star of the first magnitude in the cluster of outstanding military commanders of the Red Army." As Soviet military commanders of the time of the Great War of the Fatherland subsequently confirmed unanimously, the principles of conducting major combat operations under conditions of "mechanized warfare" as worked out by N. Tukhachevskiy and his military associates on military maneuvers in the 1930's were highly praised and successfully used in practice. It is perfectly clear that the process of strengthening the military capability of the Red Army was delayed unforgivably by the condemnation of M. N. Tukhachevskiy.

On 31 January 1957, the Military Judicial Board of the USSR Supreme Soviet revoked the sentence of 11 June 1937 which had been imposed on the so-called "anti-Soviet, Troskiyite military organization" headed by M. N. Tukhachevskiy for a lack of evidence of a crime, and

all persons charged were fully rehabilitated. The Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee restored them to party membership. The victims of repression, as noted in the proceedings of the 22nd CPSU Congress, had become prominent military authorities. Not one of them had been an enemy of the people or the party, and not one of them had been in the service of German intelligence as alleged in the indictment.

Among those surrounding Hitler, the forgery operation directed against Tukhachevskiy was regarded as one of the most outstanding in the annals of German intelligence. The SS leaders in charge of the operation were satisfied that they had managed to strike an enormous blow at the combat readiness of the Red Army by removing its most talented group of commanders and thus rendering the army powerless. In retrospect, the Hitlerites were to see in this affair one of the reasons for the tactical and strategic failures of our army in the initial period of the war, and to view the actions taken

with regard to this entire group of top-ranking and outstanding military commanders as "the first major successful battle against the Soviet Union."

Footnotes

1. As disclosed in documents recently made available by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nazis did indeed covertly provide President Benesh with information about the so-called "secret" ties alleged to exist between the Reichswehr command and the leaders of the Red Army. It is still not clear, however, from the documents available how Benesh brought this information to the knowledge of the top leadership of the USSR. In any case, it did not come through the Soviet Embassy in Prague.

2. Heidrich was informed of the judicial process at the time through direct radio-telegraph communications between Berlin and Moscow.

Ancient Islamic Spring Holiday Revived in Tajikistan

Official Approval

18300559 Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA*
in Russian 14 Mar 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "In the Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR have examined the question of holding the Navruz Holiday in the republic.

As is well known, Navruz spread among the peoples of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus 3000 years ago. But the Arab invaders who brought Islam with them to the lands of the Middle East banned the holiday. Nevertheless, the people celebrated it, and then the rulers of the caliphate were forced to allow Navruz, imparting to it a religious coloration.

Only now has the ancient holiday become a genuine people's celebration. It has been widely celebrated during the past three years, generally on the Sunday preceding Navruz. And not just in rural areas but also in the cities of Tajikistan.

During preparations for Navruz, a number of proposals came in concerning the possibility of declaring the day of celebration a non-working day. The republic's Council of Ministers studied these proposals in detail and came to the conclusion that it was not feasible at this time, because it entailed considerable administrative and economic complications which could not be resolved within the republic, linked as it is with the whole country. For example, there are multiple-destination shipments and transport-loading operations, communications functioning within a unified system (telephone and telegraph), and other vital services. And any change in the calendar work schedules of even the smallest link in the chain of interconnections could lead to disruptions throughout the system.

Thus, an unplanned reduction in the level of electricity consumption in one of the union republics would immediately disrupt the rhythmic operations of the Unified Energy System. Similarly in the case of unplanned changes in supplies of gas, transport schedules, and so on.

This is why the government of the USSR always decides for the country as a whole in cases of necessitated or desirable changes in non-working days.

Accordingly, this year the Navruz celebration, as in previous years, will be held on Sunday, 19 March. On that day, mass promenades will be held, concerts by professional performers and amateur arts collectives will be held on open squares, ethnic sports contests will be held in the stadiums and parks, wit competitions, and so

on. Funny shows will be put on for spectators. Poets and writers will address the working people. Book fairs will be organized, also culinary product sales. Long before these spring holidays, representatives from neighboring fraternal republics were invited to take part in Navruz and Tajikistan. They will include professional performers and amateur arts collectives.

Historical Significance

18300559 Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA*
in Russian 18 Mar 89 p 4

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A. Kurbanmamadov: "Ever-Young Navruz. What Do We Know About This Holiday With its Centuries of History?"]

[Text] The celebration of Navruz is among those popular traditions which have served since ancient times as a source of joy, optimism, merriment, and hope. It is rightly included among the treasures of traditional Tajik popular culture, which the tiller of the soil drew upon to renew the earth and the poet, songster, and musician drew upon for creative inspiration.

This historical celebration dates back to ancient times. About 3000 years ago, "growing" directly out of the peasant's toil, Navruz was transformed into something by which people expressed their gratitude for the beauties and bounty of nature. Its astonishing endurance is due to shared human moral and esthetic ideas, the ideal of free labor. All of this has enabled it to survive down to our own time—not as a remnant of ancient culture but as a living, ever-renewing creative activity of the working people.

Unfortunately, during the era of Stalinism, overall stagnation, and indulgence [zastolye] Navruz became anathema, and its profound esthetic content was deemed to be something which was antihuman and alien in the body of people's culture. Obviously, the ideological profundity, nurturing significance, and democratic nature of Navruz were beyond the understanding of bureaucratically thinking people and did not offer them anything they wanted.

In ancient times, people sincerely believed that if they met Navruz—the New Year—in a merry, generous, and abundant manner, that would determine their luck for the whole year, and through songs, dancing, and laughter they could drive out not only evil spirits but also all earthly evils.

The repertory of the people's holiday was quite diverse. People expressed good wishes to one another in various ways, joking and satirical. Moreover, no one was offended by criticism.

By tradition, no one thought of sleeping on New Year's Eve. People were supposed to make merry until dawn, and under no circumstances was the fire in the lamp to

be extinguished, lest happiness bypass that house. The mission of making others merry fell to young people. Young people wearing new clothes played doyras, rubabs, and other musical instruments, going from house to house, from street to street, kishlak to kishlak [village], singing songs and dancing. During the celebration, the people would forget about the vicissitudes of life, domestic squabbles, and social differences between people. And the working man became the boss of society. The padishah became the fool, the fool became the padishah.

Navruz is a celebration of springtime. And in the people's consciousness, springtime is equated with beauty. The people believed that with the advent of spring, all obstacles preventing them from leading a normal life of labor would disappear. Zealous observance of the traditional customs of Navruz, established by the working people, actually boiled down to one thing—that of providing for man and his needs. The joyousness of Navruz meant good harvests, the health of the whole household, and peace and harmony among the people.

The structure of the Navruz celebrations has come to incorporate various "unwritten laws of the land," which have come down to us in the form of customs and traditions. Consider, for example, the custom of sprinkling one another with flour. It is not just for fun, nor is it done for the sake of decorative effect. Rather, it has profound symbolic meaning: May there always be bread in your home, and may your path be always bright!

There is another custom as well. During the Navruz celebrations, the women prepare in advance large quantities of cakes and pastries and offer them to each other. This also constitutes an expression of good wishes for friendship and harmony in work and merriment and joy in life. On that day, even the poorest person was well fed and happy. Under the difficult conditions of feudalism, people in the highland districts of Tajikistan used to say that they were well fed only once a year—during Navruz. And there is a Tajik proverb that goes "Id ne ki tu har ruz kulcha khuri." ("Not every day is a holiday on which one may eat rich pastries.")

During the celebrations, every woman was especially desirous of and inspired to demonstrate her culinary skills. She would bake various forms and types of cakes and boil sprouted wheat, and submit it all to public inspection. And the men and boys, under the guidance of a wise old elder, would plow the first furrow on that day, singing and laughing. Navruz included contests between singers and musicians, fun games, comic songs, skits, games of horsemanship (buzkashi), wrestling (gushtingiri), giving of gifts and flowers, and planting of trees. Homes and streets were decorated.

Navruz is remarkably democratic. It is essential to avoid its ideologization and politicization, and it is also essential to avoid those vapid slogans which were characteristic of the era of stagnation in holding traditional holidays and which did irreparable harm to their real content and educational significance.

It must be kept in mind that this remarkable springtime celebration, a celebration of labor and friendship, is hardly known at all in the fraternal republics of our country. People of other nationalities living in our republic are rather indifferent to this holiday and do not always take active part in celebrating it, considering it as something which does not concern them. It would be pleasant, of course, to receive good wishes in honor of the holiday and to see its symbolic depiction on postcards, envelopes, postage stamps, and so on.

As is well known, a people's true spirit is revealed in its holidays, which are easy for other peoples to grasp and, consequently, understand. I believe it is essential to broadly propagandize the shared human ideas of the celebration of Navruz in other fraternal republics. When another people "gets involved" in a celebration, this provides an effective channel through which different cultures can truly come closer together and strengthen brotherhood, friendship, and mutual understanding among peoples. In our time, when perestroika and glasnost have exposed the neglect of the best popular traditions, the celebration of Navruz ought to be revived along with all its esthetic, moral, and educational functions and take its rightful place in the cause of the esthetic and labor upbringing of the rising generation.

Report on Activities

18300559 Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA
in Russian 21 Mar 89 pp 3, 4

[Reportage by S. Ozun and V. Ivashchenko: "Navruz All Around Town.... Our Correspondents Report"]

[Text] As we know, for nature there is no such thing as bad weather. Nevertheless, the organizers of the celebration were not happy about the gloomy skies over Dushanbe. Merry-making, swaggering, and creativity, after all (and these are the qualities that distinguish Navruz) require some space; you cannot restrict them, for example, to the high ceilings of the Kinokontsert Hall. For that reason, the clown players were the first to breathe easier on Sunday morning when they saw that the clouds were clearing out of the sky.

I spotted their huge masks from far away as I was approaching the republic House of Political Education. The last preparations were underway for the carnival procession. Performers of the merriment genre were selecting costumes representing personages from well-known spectacles and also... stilts.

"That's to make it funnier," one of the guys explained. "Quite a few of us are athletes attending the Physical Culture Institute, so that we have quickly learned the art of walking on stilts. Do you want to try?"

Nearby, some kids were laughing at a camel, who had assumed an air of dignity.

"Today Sher Khan (that's his nickname) is on pass," said zoo worker Takhir Khodzhayev, smiling. "He arrived in Dushanbe recently from Yerevan and has already become acclimated. Look how dignified he is. But that's just an act. He's very kind and understanding. Isn't that right, Sher Khan?"

All around there is a cacophony of sounds. Many amateur performers are tuning their instruments. One virtuoso from the Dushanbe Music School runs his fingers up the keyboard of the accordion, and immediately five *doyras* respond. Girls from the choreography department can't help dancing. And, like ripples in a pond, the ranks of dancers expand outward. Such is the exciting power of Navruz.

The clopping of horses' hooves on the asphalt is heard; what kind of parade would it be without stately riders? One of them is distinguished by his special agility. It is Makhmad Kasyim Gafronov of Dushanbe. He dreamed of riding racehorses ever since childhood, and at the age of eight he performed at the hippodrome for the first time. He never abandoned that path. He used to help the stablemen take care of the horses. After he got out of school, he went there to work. This is not the first year he has taken part in the triumphant ceremonies of Navruz along with his four-footed friend named Gal.

Now, the astonishingly variegated cavalcade is forming on the main street of Dushanbe. It is headed by a tiny donkey which is, of course, carrying everybody's favorite hero Khodzha Nasreddin. And taking his own place in the procession is the now even more dignified camel.

A dozen trumpets were raised. The children of the republic's Pioneer Palace began to step lively—boys in brand-new national costumes belted with scarves, girls wearing bright ribbons.... The music played, and the parade began.

Hundreds of people lining both sides of Lenin Prospekt smiled as the participants in the carnival passed by, waved their hands from balconies at the young man and woman seated on the carriage. I was able to find out that these two young people, who personified Peasant and Spring, were Fatkhullo Azizov, the Komsomol organizer of the republic book trade association, and Adiba Shari-pova, an architect.

High above the throng came masks, doll heads on poles, their funny faces laughing at the people in the streets of the city.

"Formerly Navruz was, you know, more ideologized," says medic L. G. Naumchenko. "Today, it seems to me, the celebration has become freer of excessive organization. And that's a good thing."

Meanwhile, the brilliant cavalcade proceeded to the city's Central Park, where it was joined by hundreds of other people. The merriment reached a new pitch. Most

of the performers took their places on stage, while the rest danced and sang down promenades lined on both sides with all kinds of viands. To tell the truth, I had not expected to see such a variety of culinary and confectionary delights. And among the delicious little cakes rolled out in enormous, thin pancakes, pots full of steaming pilaf and peas, sticks of shashlyk, sparkling wine glasses with refreshing beverages, pot-bellied tea-kettles simmering away, and apples and pears displayed in shop windows, looking like pyramids of billiard balls—among all these products of the artistry of the masters of Tajik cooking and the gifts of an abundant earth, the place of honor was always held by the platters of sprouted wheat. These circles of emerald green, spotted here and there, served as a kind of distinctive symbol of Navruz.

In the middle of the park I found a promenade where the workers of the republic's Arts Fund had set up a small exhibit. In addition to paintings there were articles made of ceramics, for example water pitchers, funny figurines of musicians, charming little animals, dragon whistles, and much else. Skilled artists displayed the art of wood carving to those who so desired. Simple tools—a hammer and chisel—can work wonders in clever hands. Proof of this could be seen in a carved telephone stand. Young artists offered their services to strollers. Would you like to get a souvenir portrait in record time? Well then, just sit and pose for a while.

At first the charcoal seems to be making nothing but chaotic lines on the white paper, but soon the familiar features begin to "peek out." I watch the efforts of artist Viktor Vays. He is concentrating, drawing the portrait of a young woman—Irina Muzyka, who is a painter and plasterer by profession. She and her husband came here for the celebration from Tursunzade, to relax and be entertained.

"Well then, what are your first impressions? Has it met your expectations?"

"Yes it has," Irina answers. "We're having a good time here. There are so many interesting things to see! And there are things to buy at the fair, too."

Parents who brought their children to the park found a fabulous little city with various attractions freshly renovated. You could climb up the steps to a wooden hut and then slide down the chute. Or take a ride on the merry-go-round, holding your breath and looking around at everything. So many fun things for kids to do—it made your head swim!

What kind of Navruz would it be without sports events and contests? Fans crowded around the sports area to watch champion Dushanbe wrestlers match their strength and skills. In fenced-off arenas, teenagers played mini-soccer and basketball.

There were touching scenes as several young couples were married in the park. Try to picture it: a clear spring sky serving as the backdrop for trees not yet fully leafed out, pensive brides and grooms standing on elevated stages, hundreds of smiling faces and waving hands. Suddenly all of this is invaded by the bright red costumes of dancing girls. Good luck, young people! You will remember this dazzling day all the rest of your life, Damir and Marina Saifullin, Asadullo and Lola Aliyev, and you other young people whose union in marriage has sealed this celebration of springtime.

Navruz has long since overflowed the boundaries of the park and rolled along the streets of Dushanbe. At half past one, Square imeni 800-letiy Moskvy resembles a theater stage. The speech of people who have come here is polyglot, and they dress in different styles. But a spirit of good-hearted merriment prevails here as well. It is not true that Navruz divides the representatives of various nationalities! It is as unselfish and pure as the gaze of a child!

Final preparations are underway on the platform in front of the S. Ayni Opera and Ballet Theater. In a few minutes, clowns will walk along the cable stretched above the stage as spectators gaze on, and the fascinating show, "The Pranks of Maysara" will be put on by the Yesh Gvardiya Theater from Tashkent. And while the varicolored ribbons are fluttering above the platform, the heads of mischievous dolls mounted on poles can be seen from the other side of the square. And over all of this resounds the lyrical singing of Tashkent State University's Navruz Ensemble.

It is impossible, of course, to tell about all the events this Sunday in one article. All about the friendly meetings, concerts, and contests, all taking place at once in the

streets and squares of the republic's capital city. All about the songs and poetry performed on improvised stages. Nevertheless, I'd like to tell you about one more Navruz encounter. It was organized by the makhalla [neighborhood] Sari Osiye Council.

Our newspaper has already reported on the youth club that was created under the aegis of this council. Teenagers were hanging out around the makhalla, doing nothing, sometimes engaging in hooliganism. Khamrullo Nurov decided to do something about it. He asked the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee for help, and he got it. As a result, young people from the neighborhood have rallied around this go-getting young man. Together they prepare draftees for the army and organize Komsomol weddings. And now just two days ago they took part in Navruz together. During the celebrations, the makhalla was visited by K. M. Makhkamov and P. K. Luchinskiy, the first and second secretaries of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee.

The boys themselves collected funds to celebrate the holiday and acquire prizes. They selected an excellent place for the youth ensemble to perform and wrestling matches to be held. There is a mixed grove of poplars and fir trees, and apple trees march up a gentle slope practically to the top of the hill.

Up above all this, the noisy celebration—the wrestling stadium, the kids romping at the foot of the hill, riders on their horses, and musicians under the tall plane trees—takes on special meaning. Suddenly the light dawns: Nature has so much to give to man! Not so much in the material sense (we have already taken so much from nature) as in the spiritual sense. For us, Navruz is a day of inner purification before the face of nature.

Impact of Rule-of-Law State Examined
18000770 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in
Russian 24 Mar 89

[Interview with Prof V. M. Savitskiy, doctor of legal sciences and head of the Department of Socialist Legality at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law, conducted by staff correspondent Yu. Nekrasov: "The Difficult Path to a State Based on the Rule of Law"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Prof V. M. Savitskiy, doctor of legal sciences and head of the Department of Socialist Legality at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law, who is a candidate for USSR people's deputy from the Leninskiy Territorial Election Okrug, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Nekrasov] The building of a socialist state based on the rule of law—in one form or another this thesis is present in the election platforms of practically all the Moscow candidates for people's deputy. You are the only legal scholar among them, Valeriy Mikhaylovich. And therefore we would particularly like to ask you a number of questions that concern our readers.

And so, the 19th All-Union Party Conference proclaimed a policy of building a socialist state based on the rule of law. That means a state based on the rule of law is something we can look forward to in the future. Then what sort of state are we living in now? This is the 11th year now that the country has been under a Constitution that protects citizens' rights and legitimate interests without qualification. Recently changes in and additions to the Basic Law were made that are aimed at expanding democratic liberties. Our entire life is regulated by numerous and diverse normative acts. Why, then, is a state based on the rule of law something that we can speak of only in the future tense?

[Savitskiy] Because that accords with the actual situation. Yes, we are only beginning to build a state based on the rule of law. Moreover, we are at the very first stage of building it. And the recognition of that is a step forward, in and of itself. After all, on the eve of the 19th Party Conference it was being said that we had to finish creating a state based on the rule of law. This thesis, which thoroughly embellished the actual state of affairs, found no support among the public. And the conference resolution proclaimed a policy not of completing, but of creating a socialist state based on the rule of law. The events that followed the conference, and the stormy shakeup of public attitudes that has already taken place in just the initial stage of implementing the conference decisions (in particular, in the course of discussing changes in and additions to the USSR Constitution) have shown that we still have a very great deal to do in order to accomplish the creation of a state based on the rule of law and of its chief component—the real legal protection of the individual.

[Nekrasov] In other words, it's a question not just of proclaiming laws, but of ensuring protection of the individual in actual fact?

[Savitskiy] Absolutely. And that requires, first, electing genuine defenders of perestroika to parliament and, with their help, creating a system of laws protecting perestroika itself and guaranteeing society's political and economic development against recurrences of stagnation; second, creating a detailed, well thought-out mechanism for monitoring the execution of laws, without which the rule of law in the country will remain merely a good intention; and finally, establishing a genuinely independent court as a guarantee of individual rights and a reliable protector against the diktat of the bureaucracy.

[Nekrasov] I would add a fourth requirement to those: We must teach people not to tolerate the arbitrary actions of bureaucrats who have overstepped their bounds; we must instill in them the habits of making an informed legal defense of their rights. After all, many people do not even know how to take advantage of the possibilities that currently exist for such a defense. Today I received 14 visitors. Nine of them, bypassing the law-enforcement services, had rushed directly to the paper's editorial offices.

[Savitskiy] We mustn't confuse cause and effect. People go to the newspaper's offices because they do not believe that they can use the courts for real protection against arbitrary actions. And that mistrust is the result of many years of practice, many years of the absence of an effective mechanism for protection of the individual, many years of discrepancy between what the law proclaims and real-life situations. And what it will take to dispel that distrust is not a volley of upbringing or enlightenment actions (which, of all things, we always have in abundance), but painstaking work to radically change the nature of practice itself. And such work requires a foundation. Personally, I see that foundation in the measures I've been talking about. And as a candidate for people's deputy, I consider it necessary to tell voters about them in an effort to demonstrate the advantage of the rule-of-law-based state. I am trying to persuade them of the feasibility of actually building such a state. I recently received a characteristic note: "Your platform is good. We support it entirely, but isn't it fantastic?" I replied: "Yes, it's fantastic if we are merely going to talk, and not do anything. But what I am calling for—improvement of the political system and ensuring protection of the individual—must be done right now. Without putting it off even for a day, the new parliament should take up the drafting of appropriate laws. And then people will believe it. And then people will support it. And then the fantastic will become reality."

There is only one means to strengthen the public's faith in the law—improving the quality of the law itself. Unfortunately, many of our laws suffer from problems, contradictions and discrepancies.

[Nekrasov] And that provides room for interpretations on the part of the people who execute them—interpretations that frequently distort the very essence of the law.

[Savitskiy] That's just it. And such a "practice of application," if one can call it that, represents the most devastating blow to the prestige of the law. I believe that the newly elected parliament will only strengthen confidence in itself if it revises, say, the Law on the Election of People's Deputies, the imperfections of which have been clearly indicated during the current election campaign.

[Nekrasov] Incidentally, about the elections. The clash of views has mainly concerned the okrug election meetings. In particular, one hears protests against the fact that a considerable number of candidates have been winnowed out at the meetings. Do you, who have successfully surmounted that "barrier," share that view?

[Savitskiy] I do not see anything antidemocratic in the idea itself of okrug election meetings. But under two conditions: if democratic representation of the population is provided, and if democratic procedures for running the meeting are guaranteed. Unfortunately, the Law on Elections provides considerable room for various interpretations both of the mechanism for forming okrug meetings, and of the procedures for holding them. And the law, I repeat, is required to operate evenly and consistently. I don't just mean the Law on Elections, of course.

We have no real oversight over the execution of laws, and no clear-cut division of powers between legislative and executive agencies. But what is worst of all is that the legislative branch has no priority over the executive. The executive branch frequently interprets the lawmaker's will at its own discretion and does so calmly, with no fear of being held accountable. We need permanent oversight on the part of deputies. A procedure must be worked out for the confirmation of executive agencies—from the USSR Council of Ministers, to the local soviet executive committees.

[Nekrasov] Yet such a procedure exists.

[Savitskiy] What I am talking about is not just approving a list, but discussing the candidacy of each member of an executive agency personally. Incidentally, I see this as a guarantee against the appearance of people like Shchelokov and his ilk in the top echelon of executive power. Let's leave aside such an undebatable question as the damage that people with such moral qualities do to the prestige of government. It is no less dangerous that their daily practice serves to undermine the people's faith in the law.

[Nekrasov] I will admit that the talk that has come up lately about the need for constitutional oversight is a little surprising. Aren't we laboring to break down an open door in this case? After all, such oversight has long since been proclaimed in our country.

[Savitskiy] Constitutional oversight is one of the leading functions in a state based on the rule of law. Yes, it has been proclaimed in our Constitution and entrusted to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But take a look at the text of Art. 121 of the Basic Law. Constitutional oversight is mentioned among the Presidium's 18 duties, but in practice it is virtually nonexistent.

We need a law on a Constitutional Oversight Committee; we need, and the sooner the better, a law regulating the legal status of its members, the procedures for its acceptance of appeals and complaints, and finally, the procedures for its consideration of disputes. Procedures that would guarantee the rights of the parties to a dispute, and guarantee objectivity in the examination of their arguments and the issuing of just decisions. I believe that the contention that the committee should include specialists in the area of politics and law is flawed. Issuing verdicts on constitutional disputes is, in any event, the prerogative of a legal specialist. And the very concept of "specialist in the area of politics" is extremely vague. Personally I have a hard time answering the question of just who is a "specialist in politics."

[Nekrasov] Since the committee would have to concern itself with the problems of the implementation of constitutional requirements, wouldn't its attention obviously be focused mainly on the executive branch?

[Savitskiy] Of course. But I do not think that the Constitutional Oversight Committee will be overburdened if oversight over the executive agencies on the part of deputies becomes what it should be in a state based on the rule of law. And here it is by no means always necessary to invent new things. For example, such a form of oversight as deputies' inquiries to the government and its individual members has been proclaimed in our country, but it hardly functions at all. Granted, there have been inquiries at past sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but the deputies were content merely to get the officials' answers. Yet in addition to this, an answer should be thoroughly discussed. And if the answer is unsatisfactory, that should not go without consequences for the member of the government—up to and including the possibility of a vote of no-confidence in him.

[Nekrasov] We have firmly asserted since school days that the court is independent and subordinate only to the law. The 1936 Constitution declared the independence of the judiciary. However, judicial practice both in those dark years and in the period closer to us that is called the stagnation does not give us the slightest right to say that the judiciary is truly independent. And why speak of the

past! Even today we are concerned, and with good reason, about having a genuinely independent court. In your opinion, how can we ensure that independence?

[Savitskiy] A fully empowered judicial branch is also an inseparable element of a state based on the rule of law. The fact that the state of our legal justice is completely out of line with the very concept of "judicial authority" was admitted by the 19th Party Conference. The task has been set of enhancing the prestige of judicial activity. And that is of fundamental importance. After all, until recently the thesis that the courts in our country are independent was considered axiomatic.

But there are a good many obstacles for us to remove along the path to an independent judiciary. The first and, in my view, fairly timid steps in this direction immediately drew a sharp reaction from the bureaucracy, which saw a real threat in the fact that alongside it there would be an agency monitoring the bureaucrat's power. That is the only explanation for the fact that the initial text of the draft Law on Changes in and Additions to the USSR Constitution included a provision according to which the rayon people's court would be elected by the rayon soviet. The judicial community's (and not just the judicial community's) wave of indignation reached the USSR Supreme Soviet, which returned to the position of the 19th Party Conference, i.e., that rayon and oblast courts are elected by higher-level soviets.

Nonetheless, in my view the genuine independence of the courts will not be ensured until we move to the practice of the lifetime appointment of judges by a higher body of authority. In saying "lifetime," I naturally mean until retirement age.

[Nekrasov] But what is to be done in cases in which a judge, say, commits a crime? After all, that sort of thing, unfortunately, happens.

[Savitskiy] Forgive me, I did not explain my idea fully. Judges could not be removed except, of course, in circumstances in which a judge broke the law, was severely ill, or expressed a desire to change occupations.

[Nekrasov] And suppose a judge displayed incompetence that was evident, so to speak, to the naked eye?

[Savitskiy] In the first place, if we ensure the genuine independence of judges from local authorities (and their irremovability is a guarantee of that), the damage caused by isolated "shoddy workmen" will be more than offset by the uncompromising work of hundreds and thousands of their colleagues. Moreover, no one intends to do away with oversight by higher courts over the legality of decisions and verdicts. But the main thing is that the whole system for training and selecting judges must be radically revised and made much, much stricter. Future judges must start to be trained (and trained, specifically, to be judges) from the time they are higher-school students. In this connection we must absolutely rule out

the practice whereby a person who has received his legal education through correspondence courses is recommended for a judgeship. But even that is not enough. What I propose is that only a person who has worked for at least three years as a lawyer after graduating from higher school could be recommended for a judgeship. Furthermore, a special state examination needs to be instituted for candidates for judgeships. And the examination commissions (of which, I think, there should be no more than one or two per republic) should include top-class specialists. But even after a person has successfully passed the examination, we should not rush to make a lifetime appointment: at first a judge should be given an appointment with a three-year trial period. And here is what is important: the age qualifications should be raised. People appointed as people's court judges should be no younger than 30, and those appointed as judges of higher courts should be no younger than 40.

[Nekrasov] Nonetheless, the very principle of irremovability bothers me.

[Savitskiy] Well, in the first place, I am convinced that the proposed selection procedures would practically rule out the access of incompetents to the judge's bench. Besides, I do not think that you will find many people with such an atrophied sense of self-regard that the daily reminder of their incompetence would not prompt them to resign.

Of course, expanding the court's powers will also help enhance judicial authority. The court must have the right to consider any citizen's complaint against the actions of any official or body of officials.

[Nekrasov] Today, unfortunately, many people lack the right to appeal to a court for the resolution of a labor dispute. These people, who have the misfortune to hold a so-called listed job, are forced to try to clamber up the bureaucratic ladder in search of justice. The courts simply do not take their complaints.

[Savitskiy] I agree that the lists are an anachronism that has no place in a state based on the rule of law. But the very position of our courts today is no less anachronistic. In general, let me share a cherished dream with you: I would some day like to be present at a ceremony in which the head of our state, after being elected to that high office, would take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution, and the text of the Constitution would be held by the chairman of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.

[Nekrasov] I think that dream is not so unrealizable. But no matter how significant it might be, a ceremony will remain a ceremony if it does not reflect the essence of matters.

[Savitskiy] Of course. And it would not do to rush to institute the ritual I have described. As we have already said, the path to a state based on the rule of law is not

simple. And along that path we have not only a lot to overcome, but also a lot to rethink (which is not the least bit easier). From childhood, citizens are brought up (and not without the help of us legal specialists) in the spirit that they have an unpaid debt to the state. They are taught that they should do this and not do that. From the attitude to this "do—don't do" comes the concept of the "law-abiding citizen."

I do not see anything disgraceful about the concept itself. What's wrong with the idea that a member of society religiously watches out for its interests and irreproachably performs his duty to the state? Yet there is another side of the coin. Why don't we ever speak about the "law-abiding state"? Isn't the state, in the person of its representatives, obliged to square any action it takes with the interests of the members of society?

I believe that in time that will be the case. And only then will we be able to say with full justification that we are citizens of a socialist state based on the rule of law.

Riga Demonstrations Prompt Meeting of Law Enforcement Officials

18000706 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
11 Mar 89 p 3

[Latvian SSR Procuracy Press Group report: "In the Republic's Law Enforcement Organs"]

[Text] On 9 March 1989, an extraordinary coordination meeting of the leadership of the law enforcement organs of the Latvian SSR took place under the chairmanship of the republic's procurator, Ya. E. Dzenitis. Taking part in the meeting were first deputy chairman of the Supreme Court Ya. A. Vilders, minister of internal affairs B. Ya. Shteynbrik, minister of justice V. Ya. Skudra, KGB chairman S. V. Zukul, deputy head of the juridical department of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR V. I. Khoroshkin, and other responsible workers of the law enforcement organs.

The coordination meeting noted that in the period February-March 1989, there were various assemblies, rallies, street processions and demonstrations systematically conducted on the streets of Riga, organized in violation of the order and active legislation. They are frequently accompanied by violations of public order and highway traffic regulations, and violations of the rights and legal interests of citizens. A number of persons appear with anti-socialist and anti-Soviet slogans, and they stir up inter-national dissension. Clashes of various groups of the population using physical force go on. Insults and insubordination to the militia workers became widespread, and a series of crimes was committed.

In several instances only the timely intervention of the militia employees allowed the prevention of group hooligan acts and mass disorder. The law enforcement organs of the city of Riga took definite measures for

securing public order on the streets. Seventy five offenders were warned by the organs of internal affairs, 12 administrative charge-sheets were sent to the peoples court with respect to persons who had violated the order on organizing and conducting assemblies, rallies, street processions and demonstrations, committing petty hooliganism. Six criminal cases were instituted over acts of malicious hooliganism and stirring up of national hostility, and a criminal case on the arbitrary seizure of a residential house on V. Tereshkovas, No. 25, is being investigated.

Serious deficiencies are observed in safeguarding the public order on the streets of Riga, however: the organs of internal affairs do not always anticipate or stop offenses during the conducting of group and mass activities in a timely fashion; the organizers and the most active violators of state and public order are not identified in all cases; and the peoples courts often examine administrative materials in an untimely fashion. There are also shortcomings in the the procurator's work in overseeing the execution of legislation on rallies and demonstrations; proper coordination of the law enforcement organs has not been organized.

The meeting outlined measures for the improvement of coordination of the work of the republic's law enforcement organs in preserving public order. A decision was taken to establish standing law and order enforcement groups constantly in force for the timely forestalling and interruption of violations of state and public order when organizing and conducting assemblies, rallies, street processions and demonstrations.

The necessity of ensuring the preservation of public order, and timely prevention and interruption of infringement of the law in the organizing and conducting of group and mass measures was pointed out to the head of the Directorate of Internal Affairs of the city of Riga Z. Ya. Skushka. It was noted that it is necessary to strictly observe legality, and the rights and freedoms of citizens and public organizations in doing this. It was recorded in the minutes that the procurator of the city of Riga E. V. Ziyedinsh was given a commission by the procurator of the republic to verify statements of citizens about violations on the part of the militia workers in arresting persons participating in a demonstration conducted in violation of established law of order in Kronvald park on 6 March.

The peoples courts are obliged to review the cases of administrative offenses in the organization and conducting of group and mass measures in the established period.

There will be a strengthening of procurator supervision for the observance of legislation on rallies and demonstrations, for instituting legal proceedings against persons who violate these laws and the public order.

The necessity of analyzing existing conditions and planning joint measures for ensuring public order in the organizing and conducting the stated measures was shown to all the leaders of the law enforcement organs of the republic.

MVD Spokesman Responds to Readers

18000746 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 13, 1-7 Apr 89 pp 4-5

["The Total of Thefts Each Year Amounts To No More Than 200 Million Rubles. Are The Statistics Objective?"]

[Text] The statistical data published in February on the state of crime in 1988 have stirred alarm among some, questions among others. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent A. Uglanov asked B. Mikhaylov, director of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' press bureau, to answer some of them.

[Uglanov] Some of the figures from the published statistics are clearly at odds with reality. For example, 45,235 crimes entailing speculation. Yet one only need approach any large store to become convinced that that is just a drop in the bucket, that selling goods from hand to hand is all but commonplace.

[Mikhaylov] The scope of speculation is of course significantly broader. Only the total number of recorded criminally punishable instances was published. But how many undetected, so-called "latent," instances were there? To augment the picture somewhat, I can say that another 62,500 people were punished for petty speculation, and that several thousand, mostly young people, were detained for currency speculation, selling goods from hand to hand, and so on.

The causes and conditions of speculation are diverse. They include the existing shortage of goods and shortcomings in law-enforcement activity, above all on the part of the police.

[Uglanov] Many people have interpreted the published data in wide variety of ways. But comparison puts everything in perspective. Last year, 16,710 murders were committed and 37,191 grave bodily injuries inflicted. How do these figures compare with similar figures in other countries?

[Mikhaylov] In this instance, we could draw a comparison with the United States. According to the data for 1986, more than 20,000 murders were committed and 837,000 grave bodily injuries inflicted there.

Furthermore, the proportion of murders solved in our country is 97%, while the figure for the United States is about 70%.

[Uglanov] When we talk about thousands of murders, many people get the impression that murderers are literally walking the streets of our cities, demanding "your money or your life."

[Mikhaylov] First, in thousands of cities and settlements, crimes against the person are not dominant in the structure of crime, and in some not a single murder is committed at all. Second, selective studies show that more than 70% of all murders are committed in a domestic setting. Of these, 17% to 20% are committed out of revenge and 12% to 14% out of jealousy, and roughly an equal number stem from domestic disputes. Murders committed out of mercenary motives and in assaults with intent to rob amount to roughly 8% to 9%, and murders committed in order to conceal rape amount to about 1.5% to 2%.

Up to 40% to 50% of all murders are committed on nonworkdays and holidays. This is largely attributable to drunkenness. In almost every third instance, the criminals used "random" murder weapons—bricks, rocks, necklaces, bottles. Piercing and cutting tools such as kitchen knives, chisels, screwdrivers, and so forth were used in more than 40% of all instances, something that eloquently attests to the domestic situations in which these crimes are committed.

[Uglanov] The growing number of apartment burglaries is causing particular anxiety. What accounts for this? Is the number of thieves growing, or do the causes lie elsewhere?

[Mikhaylov] A rudimentary criminogenic analysis of apartment burglaries (nearly 175,000 of them were committed in 1988—a 28.9% increase over 1987) shows the following. Up to 20% of them stem from instances in which the occupant of the apartment trusts some random person, has a few drinks with him, and leaves the key in the traditional places—for example, under a mat, a location criminals are well aware of—and so forth. More than 30% of all burglaries are committed by breaking the door or the door locks.

Nearly 50% of all burglaries are committed by professionals using lockpicks and special tools.

The burglar's profile is as follows. More than 82% of them are local residents, not traveling thieves. Every third one has committed crimes previously. More than half commit the burglary in a state of intoxication.

Unfortunately, to date only every second apartment burglary is solved.

[Uglanov] In a number of cities, especially large ones, the problem of pickpocketing is rather acute.

[Mikhaylov] An average of 10,000 to 14,000 such crimes are registered each year. In reality, however, there are far more of them, since by no means all victims immediately

report the crime to the police. This is attributable to a whole number of circumstances. First, the highly developed "vocational skills" of pickpockets prevent the victim from immediately discovering his loss, thereby enabling the criminal to "cover his tracks." Second, many victims deem it useless to contact the police or simply don't do so because their loss was not significant.

At the same time, selective studies show that the pick-pocket, in order not to lose his "skill," has to commit up to 25 thefts a month, and between three to five thefts and 10 to 15 thefts on days of intensive criminal activity. And so in assessing such crimes as theft of citizens' personal property, fraud, extortion (racketeering), and certain others, we have to make an adjustment for latency.

[Uglov] Can it be said, then, that state statistics and their numerical data fail to objectively reflect the essence of the crime problem?

[Mikhaylov] They reflect it, but only as a body of data on the processes that are occurring. As for interpreting the statistical data, in order to ensure that they are understood correctly and do not cause panic, it will be necessary in the future to make each index more specific. This could be done by the immediate supervisors of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' various administrations.

Glasnost Era Work of Visa Administration Examined

18000717 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Mar 89
Second Edition p 6

[Article by A. Lukyanov and A. Lyutyy: "Going Abroad on Personal Business: Working Days at the Visa and Registration Departments"]

[Text] An elegant dark blue Mercedes with a yellow license plate drives slowly down hill on a narrow Moscow street. The car brakes in front of a completely nondescript building. In the car's side window, a camera lens appears. After a few clicks of the shutter, the car continues on its way, disappearing around a bend in the street.

This episode, which is almost like something one would find in a detective story, happens frequently in front of building No. 10, Kolpachnyy Pereulok. Probably the only things that change are the brands of the cars and the cameras. The passengers in the Mercedes, Volvos, and Toyotas are Western journalists. And the building that they are photographing is by no means a secret objective, but, rather, the Administration of Visas and Registrations (UVIR), of Moscow GUVI [Main Administration of Internal Affairs]. During the years of stagnation that building acquired the not especially flattering name of "house of refusals," since the persons who visited that building to ask permission to leave the USSR received a refusal so often.

Currently UVIR is photographed basically as a confirmation of the changes occurring in our country in the area of human rights.

In 1988, 1.8 million Soviet citizens made trips abroad on private business. This is 3 times the number of persons who made such trips in 1987. Last year 108,000 persons left our country to take up permanent residency abroad—that number is 2.7 times larger than the number of 1987, and 18.3 times larger than in 1986.

We do not set as our task the analyzing of the motivations either of those who make trips abroad temporarily, or those who have decided to live abroad forever. That is the subject for separate discussion. We will note only that the statistics that have been cited conceal a process that is building up strength—the process of the democratization of our political and social life and the humanizing of Soviet laws. We are becoming a more open society.

In January the Soviet minister of foreign affairs put his signature on the final document of the Vienna meeting of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A rather large number of politicians in the West predicted that we would not decide to do this, inasmuch as the Viennese understandings with regard to questions of leaving a country go too far. But the USSR not only signed the final document, but is also putting its own legislation into conformity with the principles stated in that document.

As R. Kuznetsov, chief of the Department of Visas and Registrations, USSR MVD, stated, the work on the legislative acts governing the procedure for departure from the Soviet Union, entry into our country, and the movement of foreign citizens within our country, is in the stage of practical completion. The adoption of the documents still lies ahead, but from what we have heard one can conclude that the changes that are expected are the most radical ones.

Meanwhile, we have already seen the removal of many of the obstacles on the path of the more active development of contacts between our citizens and people abroad, the expansion of exchanges, and the observance of the principle of reuniting families. Since 1 January 1987, for example, new rules have been in effect for preparing documents for persons who are going abroad either on private business or to take up permanent residency. Without going into details, we shall say that the questionnaires for the persons who are leaving have been considerably shortened, and there is no longer a requirement for personal appraisals that have been certified by party, Komsomol, or trade-union agencies.

Soon our citizens who are traveling on private business to the CEMA countries will no longer need a passport. All that they will be required to have in their possession is an internal passport identifying them as a USSR citizen, with a special insert. At MVD OVIR we were

shown samples of such inserts, both for adults and for adolescents younger than 18 years. Now it is up to Goznak [State Bank Notes, Coins, and Medals Administration], the insufficient technical capacities of which have been delaying the production of the inserts. We might note that this simplified passport procedure will be used, for the time being, only when persons are departing for those countries with which the USSR has an agreement dealing with exchange without visas.

Incidentally, members of tourist groups are already making trips to the socialist countries while having in their possession only an internal passport identifying them as a USSR citizen, and a foreign passport for foreign travel, together with a list of the persons in the group, is issued only to the leader. This is being done as a result of good living. The sharp increase in the number of persons leaving the country has led to a situation in which the supply of foreign passports for ordinary citizens has become catastrophically low.

In our opinion, we can hear knocking on the door in an increasingly persistent manner the need to issue to the entire adult population a single passport—both for internal use, and for making trips abroad. We realize that this problem is very complicated, if one takes into consideration, for example, the fact that the most recent campaign for the exchanging of passports in our country took approximately 10 years. Nevertheless, even with a consideration of the expenses, this action will prove its worth in the future. At MVD OVIR the idea, in principle, is encountering understanding.

But all of this is something for the future. Let us return, however, to today. Judging from certain items published in the press, many people continue to be upset by the problem of refusals. Well, the question actually remains, but it has become less acute. And even the people in the West recognize this. For example, last year the number of refusals for trips abroad on private business constituted only 0.3 percent. Authorization to leave the country with the purpose of establishing permanent residency was refused to only 1.1 percent of the persons requesting that authorization. The main reason was that most of them possess information that constitutes a state secret.

The periods of time during which the citizens possessing such information cannot leave the country are currently being reconsidered with a view of their possible reduction, proceeding from considerations of common sense and the real degree of secrecy. In any event, on the basis of the legislative acts that are being prepared, the ministries and departments are given the responsibility of informing any persons whom they accept as employees that that employment imposes limitations on their right to leave the country. One would only hope that this practice does not sin in imposing too broad a ban in accordance with the principle "no good will come of this."

The currently existing procedure by which persons make trips abroad for reasons other than official necessity presupposes the mandatory existence of an invitation—from relatives or friends, if one is talking about a trip for personal reasons, or from close relatives, if one has in mind a departure to set up permanent residency. Sometimes the question is asked: are these invitations really needed at all? Aren't they an infringement on our rights? Agreeing in principle with the view that the invitations can be considered to be a formality, R. Kuznetsov, chief of OVIR, USSR MVD, in a conversation with us, remarked that they do provide some kind of material and psychological guarantees that the person who is leaving the USSR will not be left abroad to the will of fate. You will agree that the situations can be the most unpredictable. For example, a person might lose his money, or might be mugged or robbed. Who will help him? If a person has invited him, that person will bear the responsibility for the person who was invited.

Of course, this does not alter the fact that the USSR consular representations are responsible for the fate of our citizens. But what we have heard at the Moscow OVIR and from certain citizens who have traveled abroad allows us to say that the restructuring of our foreign representations has been proceeding very slowly. The stereotypes of the period of stagnation are still very much alive. A person who has left the country, even if he has in his possession an internal passport identifying him as a citizen of the USSR, is frequently viewed unfavorably. In this regard, certain of our consular workers have some things to learn from their foreign colleagues.

And, of course, OVIR itself is not without sin. All one has to do is to chat with people who have stood in lines there, and one will hear a rather large number of complaints and reprimands—the amounts of time required to fill out documents are not being observed, and some of the employees are impolite and slow-moving. But, in our opinion, piling absolutely all the blame on the workers of just the OVIR is also unjust. There has been a chronic personnel shortage. As the flow of persons requesting departure increases with every passing day, the OVIR employees have suddenly found themselves in the category of "administrative personnel." And, naturally, they are supposed to be reduced in number.

As of today, the OVIR subdivisions in our country would need an additional several thousand workers in order to carry out properly and promptly all the duties entrusted to them.

"Last year," S. Alpatov, chief of UVIR, Moscow GUVI, states, "we prepared departure documents for more than 100,000 persons. The city has 32 rayons. Each rayon has its own Department of Visas and Registrations. But the total number of workers is only 148. For the most part, they are women."

S. Alpatov goes on to state, "At the present time the Interkvadro computer system is being developed for our needs. That system is housed in the new UVIR building on Ulitsa Chernyshevskogo. But we have had some bad luck—the remodeling of the building that we plan to move into has been dragging out at the fault of Mosremont."

We learned that much is being expected from computerization in this sphere. But for the time being the rayon workers are upset by much more prosaic concerns. In order to become acquainted with their everyday working situation, we went to OVIR, Sverdlovskiy Rayon. To our surprise, we did not see any waiting lines in building No. 11, Sretenka.

"Unfortunately, you're out of luck," OVIR chief V. Noskov said. "Today is Wednesday, which is the day when the smallest number of people visit us. In addition, it is only the beginning of springtime."

As we chatted with V. Noskov, we were convinced that the conditions and the atmosphere for receiving the visitors and for performing the elementary work with the documents leave much to be desired. Two tiny, cramped rooms, in one of which there are two old desks and a prewar file cabinet, and a portrait of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy on the wall. And one wonders what the visitors think as they read the notice, "Attention! It is strictly forbidden to conduct secret conversations over the telephone!"

At OVIR, Sovetskiy Rayon, we observe the same crowded situation, the same decrepitude, the same narrow corridors. It is not inviting. Moreover, it is also awkward for the workers themselves. They say that recently a chair broke while a visitor was sitting on it. In this instance the unlucky individual was a French citizen.

Incidentally, the people here are not even dreaming of any special comfort.

"We would be happy just to have a typewriter with Latin characters," senior inspector V. Smirnov says. "Starting on 1 April we will have the responsibility for processing trips on private business to the capitalist and developing countries. The passports will have to be prepared in French. It is not only inconvenient to write them out by hand, but also awkward. Documents that have been prepared in this way might not be accepted in other countries..."

Much in the work of the OVIR's depends upon their interrelationships with the local agencies of authority, primarily the ispolkoms. It is well known, for example, that in 1988, through the OVIR's as state customs, the local budgets received 80 million rubles (the preparation of foreign passports for travel to the socialist countries costs 30 rubles, and to capitalist and developing countries, 200 rubles). The annual deduction even of one

percent of those amount of money would be sufficient to carry out the complete re-equipping of the facilities of the rayon departments and to maintain them in good condition.

Pretty soon the summer will be here. People are already planning their trips abroad—both as tourists and as people engaged in personal business. Of course one hopes that none of the persons who are preparing for a foreign trip will not have their mood spoiled ahead of time by the nervous frustration, red tape, or other squabbles that are so often linked with the preparation of documents. In such an important matter as this, it is truly necessary to turn one's face to the person as quickly as possible!

Growing Gang Problem in Schools Outlined

18120076 Alma-Ata LENINSHIL ZHAS in Kazakh
18 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Kommunar Tabayev, "Bullet Shot in a School"]

[Text] Various socio-economic and ideological changes taking place in our society to give rise to perestroika, democracy and socialist pluralism in the Soviet Union have been promulgated. Looking at the past, to mend one's errors—this is a guarantee of progress. No matter how difficult, the party has taken an irreconcilable position towards past deficiencies, and has moved ahead in efforts to make the Soviet Union a society of law. Considerable work has been done in this area in our republic too. However, we cannot help but be worried by the appearance of various disorderly unofficial groups among young people.

Period five finished at 20 minutes of 11:00. None of the boys and girls who came noisily out of the classroom as usual devoted any attention to the five who were hanging around undecided in front of the geography department on the first floor. Who would make anything special out of how groups like this formed and broke up at the school, so much fun. The students who were hurrying home, began running, they raced to get to the door out of the school. The mixed-bag of five which came after them also rushed right out, with little delay.

Suddenly, one of the five—a rather thin, handsome, pale boy—Valeriy Smetannikov quickly took out a pistol from his bag. He then fired, aiming at a tall young person about two-three paces in front of him. Starting at the sudden sound of a gun, three students at his side, not knowing what to do, stood in a disturbed state with their eyes bulging. The young person struck by the bullet fell to the ground...

This sad occurrence, which took place 30 April last year, at the city's No 13 Middle School, shocked the people of the city. They were unable to forget it for a long time. In particular, frightened parents, seeing the sparks of fighting breaking out everywhere, and all the shooting going

on among rural youth groups, cannot sit idly aside in the face of this cruelty. "Who is going to put a stop to this?" Thus the letters mixing complaint and cries of pain arrive one after the other at social organizations and justice organs.

But we must tell the truth. There is no one close at hand able to tell the white from black of this situation, endeavoring to provide a real answer. Instead, certain responsible officials mercilessly accuse school collectives for the breakdown of educational work. Others excuse the whole thing as the results of a disagreement between two young people. Now some, as has been mentioned, namely Vadim Dmitriyevich Ryabtsev, chief of the Alatau rayon education division, and Galina Yakovlevna Belonosova, second secretary of the rayon party committee, expressing the clear desire to "get the matter over with," convened a sudden school assembly on the afternoon of the incident, and ended by putting the whole blame upon the student who had been murdered. (Alma-Ata City Internal Affairs Administration working paper 2/4-2-686). The most unfortunate thing is that the parents of the murdered student were participating in the meeting.

Whatever you say, it is true that this incident has had an effect upon everyone, like lightening striking on a sunny day. The quiet life of a school, like the completely calm surface of a lake, is now in a commotion. The deputy director of education has been removed from his post. A number of teachers have been reminded once again, by this highly unusual event, which was a severe lesson for them, of what a complex world it is in life of their quiet nest.

Indeed, the school house is not just, as we would think, a pleasant, unsophisticated home full of silver laughter. It is—a small but living cell of our society, a pure mirror of our lives. This is something we have perhaps forgotten. Little things, like big things, have their own ennuis, their own secrets. When did we ever forget this.

If you had listened to the heartfelt grief and the thin, high, and husky voices of boys and girls of No 8 "A" (now No 9 "A"), who spent part of their summer vacations visiting police investigators, part at a procurator's office, during the trial, you will feel unable to express the unpardonable error of elders in conflict with the world of the young, the complete inadequacy of it all. We realize that Rustem, who died at the age of 12 before his life could develop, was a sacrifice of this apathy and indifference.

What do we mean when we say we were rocked by the waves at this trial, and shaken with it. Something which caught our attention—during the 26 June regular session of the trial, the accused Valeriy Smetannikov suddenly confessed about the "black list." He had made it a practice for some time to enter the names of his enemies into his small notebook—onto his "black list." He had gone over his list several times with his senior

Bogodukhov. However, Bogodukhov, known among the rowdies by the alias "Dukh," brought to trial conditionally on 15 December, 1987, for a petty crime, not only did not stop his cruel assaults on children younger than himself, but lied about his connection with a certain suspicious group. As came out later, this group was called—"Krepost." However, the presiding judge, S.K. Kishkinov did not see the need to go into this matter any further, and was unable to decide if the testimony was true or not. The witness, student Baqtiyar Orazaliyev, testified that "Dukh" had seized the dead Rustem Azilkanov, himself, and likewise other students, on several occasions, had threatened them with a knife, physically forced them, and demanded money. Although he so testified, the evidence was not accepted. Why? The reason is that if criminal actions cease to be individual acts, but the acts of many, or if they acquire a collective character, it makes justice much more difficult. Secondly, this would have greatly effected the defendant who accepted his own guilt in the crime completely. V. Smetannikov, who quickly understood the facts of the matter, said that he had no connection with "Krepost." The question was not raised again after that. In addition, an unknown, secret force unseen in areas outside the courtroom seemed to have an interest in quickly quieting the howling about the bullet that had been fired in a school, and to be finished with the matter quickly. Who were the bearers of this force? In fact they are certainly to be sought among the ranks of responsible persons at the rayon level, very worried about their reputations. Thus, criminal Valeriy Smetannikov, taking into consideration that fact that he had not yet reached the age of maturity, was sentenced to three years in jail. The noise quieted down, the business was finished.

However, the outcry will not die down. How did this kind of dangerous crime which has appeared in recent years, leaving aside the question of whether or not it is being overcome within the schools, ever develop in the first place? What are the facts about a phenomenon which moved from one school to the other, gliding like a mirage. It seems that only recently the flames have been put out in No 13 School. Now the sound of a gun has crashed in No 131 School of Frunze Rayon. This is unusual, it is amazing that a shot has been fired in a school which has just been opened this academic year. Fortunately, the 8th grade student wounded by the bullet came through a serious operation extremely well with the help of doctors "X." However, will occasional bullets be heard in outlying regions of our broad republic where medicine is not so well developed? For example, who thought about or even noticed what was required for our doctors to offer first aid to those wounded after an armed collision on 20 April, 1988, at the Kenghir Water Reservoir of Dzhezkazghan, in which more than 50 young people participated? According to a report of the KaSSR State Procurator's Office, one of the young people taken to the hospital was severely wounded. A fourth had received light wounds...

Thanks for a happy ending you say?

However, do you believe that encounters between armed young people will all end so happily? How...? The author of these lines participated on 15 November of last year in an expanded session of the republic Discussion Council. I wrote down the following information from the mouth of E.O. Basapov, KaSSR First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs: "...Every tenth crime now being committed in the republic each day is committed by young people. Of these, every fourth is associated with unofficial groups." That is what he said!

Thus, the law-breaking activities of unofficial groups, so often the subject of discussion recently, stand in front of us. Why have such dangerous phenomena foreign to a socialist society developed so wrongly among the young, why has the poisonous growth shot up so rapidly? Leaving aside the young men, delicate young women, forgetting their soft natural dispositions, have made a "perestroyka" in the direction of deciding disputes among themselves with fists.—This is something that should worry us all.

Recently an alarming letter came to the editorial office of LENINSHIL ZHAS from Dzhanaozen City, from old man Baydolla Sarymbetov, veteran of the Great Patriotic War. On 18 September, 1988, a young girl Baliyan, studying in the 9th grade, was beaten and knocked down by someone. As a result Baliyan was severely injured, and had to go to the hospital. So writes the old man, reporting that local police organizations did not take the matter seriously. At our request, R. Alaminov, deputy chief of the city police who looked into the complaint of the veteran, said that this—beating was the work of the "Fasmoniya" girls group. The "Fasmoniya" group formed by Elmira Bermukhabetova, student of 10 "G" Class of the Dzhanaozen No 1 Middle School, beat Baliyan solely for the reason that she was not part of the group! According to the investigations of doctors of the city hospital, it cannot be said for sure whether or not Baliyan has suffered brain damage or not. It is, to be sure, very unfortunate that the Dzhanaozen upholders of public order did not devote attention to the case in good time.

Let us return to the question we posed above. Why have such phenomenon spread widely among young people.

First of all, there are objective and subjective factors forming their various attitudes towards the world around them, what we are doing, the problems in what we are doing, and also towards the valuable achievements, and likewise failures of communist ideology. You will perhaps remember how our young posterity leaving the schools eight or nine years ago felt...?

...Indeed, Leonid Ilich said himself that it was a lovely time for Kazakhs.

Were not people saying this? Were the people not rejoicing? Ah, it is all true. But did you not notice how, even in that time of rejoicing, the ranks of innocent adolescents

in the real Kazakh schools, who had struck up a haughty song, became sparse like singly-standing trees, standing so worn and threadbare amidst the elegant words and trimming? I saw. I was caught up in the flowery joy of those able to live double lives of truth and deception, compassion and perfidy. Thus, were there are not enough intellectual contradictions preventing understanding why things are the way they are, due to rejoicing and haughtiness. [Sentence as received] But they could not dare ask for advice from elders. To tell the truth, the elders hurrying too hard among them, rejoicing at plans, reputation, a "100 percent" example, had no time to understand what was happening, or concern themselves with little things. Thus members of the younger generation, who have felt themselves at a fork in the road during these times "tossed to the winds," find nothing left for themselves but to choose among various groups.

Secondly, there are socio-psychological peculiarities which have taken shape little by little among young people: inability to function except in groups, inability to bear being on one's own, inability to bear individual difficulties. Such characteristics involuntarily bring about the formation of elemental groupings. This is because young people think that this is the only way to defend themselves from the "attacks" of other groups.

Thirdly, the fact that young people have gradually severed their ties with socially useful work, and qualities of loving work, have nurtured feelings of egotistical consumerism in their minds. This has had a direct influence upon the emergence of individual, established groups, as numerous as the stars in the sky, accustomed to taking, and sticking off the hand to beg. Likewise, there is a shallowness, in economic, political-legal, humanistic and ethical terms of grand cultural scope, in common for many unofficial groups. They can communicate with one another easily. In short, "the fishermen—recognizes the fish from a long way off..."

As glasnost and democratic principles have taken root in our life, they have opened a broad path for the emergence of unofficial groups. There are more than 60 in Alma-Ata a present. There are nearly 20 in Pavlodar (including Ekibastuz). It is known that something like 15 unofficial groups have accumulated in Chimkent. Likewise, some 340 youth groups have been identified with varied memberships and interests in other large cities and major settlements of the republic. With the help of KaSSR Procurator's Office division procurator M. Narikbayev, and major V. Stepuskin, worker of the KaSSR Military Commissariat, let me now discuss the social qualities of these groups.

"Metallister [Hard Metalists]:" this is a youth group wide-spread in Alma-Ata, in Alma-Ata Oblast and in rayon centers. It unifies mindless admirers of rhythmic music of the "heavy metal rock" style. Idolizing well-known rock stars of the west, members of the group clothe themselves in black leather jackets. They wear chain necklaces, iron knuckles and shiny badges, which

they put to good use when there is trouble. Members tend to be more pugnacious than other groups. They look down on and scorn others of the same age, especially schoolmates.

"Pankter [Punks]," young people of this group aim at laborless gain and a life of pleasure. Taking a carrion-crow attitude in a socialist society, they are deeply opposed to doing any work at all, or serving in the military. (According to the information of the republic Military Commisariat, there have been cases where Pankter have avoided doing their civic duty—K.T.). The Pankter think it their duty to experience everything about life. Their opinions about themselves are high. In addition, they are always eager to find fault with others. There are many alcoholics, narcotics addicts and persons with easy sexual morals among them. The external characteristics—They wear Mohawk haircuts, formless, bulbous clothing.

"Mazhorlar [Majors]," are a group of seekers of uniformity in pursuit of the deceptive idea of "living a life just like in the west," and "making a lot of money." Generally members of this group, which are involved in blackmarketeering with name-brand products, are also known as "Fartsovshchikter." Wearing styles of clothing from one country only (e.g. Italy, FRG) from head to foot, it is difficult to tell one of the Marzholar from the other. They frequently break the law and wind up in the hands of the police.

"Popperler," are the "well fed, blue-blood" sons and daughters of families of wealth and position, where the parents have provided well for the living standards of their children, and have guaranteed their futures. They are the "cream" of the crop, the elite. They are distinguished for their optimistic slogan "live for oneself, play and have a good time, look out for fun."

"Rokerler" [Rockers] are small groups which have appeared out of the unity of young people in the entire technological world. However, most have a low spiritual culture, are semi-literate, have attitudes totally out of touch with life, and are morally directionless. They get together mostly at night, and treat workers of the state motor vehicle inspectorate and citizens extremely badly. (Most of the 2500 road incidents in the republic in the first half of 1988 were due to the evil influence of poorly trained motorcyclists, or motorcyclists who should not have been carrying passengers.—KAZAKHSTANSKYA PRAVDA, 20 September, 1988). Sometimes motorcycles are vehicles are involved in robberies.

"Koshe Bilewshileri [Street Dancers]" are found in large numbers in the city and in rural areas, and are real street fighters. Drawn under their influence, in addition to upper class students, are, by the way, boys and girls of

middle school. There are even found among them violent children sick with mental illnesses, narcotics addicts, alcoholics, and nymphomaniac young girls...

We are not discussing here groups of the present day showing initiative in progressive areas (ecology, military-patriotic education, labor, medicine, becoming involved with creative research work). The reader must not forget that the discussion here is about groups which are headed in wrong directions, worrying most people. In this connection, let us mention a few groups with very dangerous policies for the attention of the Alma-Ata City Rayon Komsomol Committees.

Lenin Rayon:

The "Deribas" Group of No 41 Middle School. Its intention is to commit crimes.

The "Islam" Group of No 15 Middle School. Its intention is to commit crimes. The group extorts money from small children.

The "Altyn Orda [Golden Horde]" of No 54 Middle School. Its intention is to commit crimes.

Sovet Rayon:

The "CC (Stareyshinder Soveti)" Group of No 25 Middle School. Its intention is indulge in narcotics.

The "Filadelfiya" Group of No 124 Middle School. Its intention is to commit crimes.

The "OOH" Group of No 36 Middle School. Its intention is drunkenness and narcotics use.

Alatau Rayon:

Unnamed group in No 94 Middle School. Its intention—to control its territory.

Unnamed group in No 45 Middle School. Its intention—to take power among the students.

Moskva Rayon:

The "Tomengi Qamal [Lower Fortress]" of No 4 Middle school. Its intention—to get stoned.

The "Zaghiptar Aylasy [Village of Cripples] of No 17 Middle School. Its intention—robbery, getting high.

Frunze Rayon:

The "Krepost" group of No 19 Middle School. Its intention—to control its own territory.

The Groups "Namaz [Prayer], "Quran," and "Dos [Friend]" of No 12 Middle School. Their intentions—competition, bringing the other groups under their power.

Kalinin Rayon:

The "Torghay" Group of No. 69 Middle School. Its intention—fight for the power of the girls of the rayon.

A list of the leaders of the above mentioned group is being kept by the editors of LENINSHIL ZHAS. They are not listed for obvious reasons.

Now the basis purpose of Komsomol committees and of the schools in making available facts about specific groups to the youth inspectorate, is to hold out the hand to such groups, to help them. Through dialogue with them, an opportunity is given for beginning a new life. Regarding this, comrade G.V. Kolbin, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP said quite correctly at the V Plenum of the Kazakhstan Komsomol Central Committee: "Because," he said, "this is mostly the case: young people sense their power, and they have the strong desire for the power to change things, to improve the world, but since their experience is quite naturally deficient, they do not know in which direction to change things, or how to change things..."

Ideological saboteurs, in addition to taking advantage of this power among young people, carefully exploit the limited esthetic needs and intellectual impoverishment of young people for their own goals. Eagerness to employ bourgeois fashions (in the broadest sense: certain styles, music, clothing, haircuts, or ways of spending free time, etc., to establish associations and communicate) broadly, fashions deeply steeped in anti-humanistic, petty bourgeois, egomaniac customs, is because of this. At the present time, there stands before Komsomol committees, and before all social organizations involved with the question of unofficial groups, the duty, while carrying out an heroic perestroika of their own work, to direct their energies to productive efforts, confronting the leaders and individual members of unofficial groups through organizing exchanges of views and open discussions.

No one should have any doubt whatever that there are demagogues and instigators among groups inclined to combine anti-social tendencies with an ideology which is opposed to us. For example, it was determined in the process of investigation that it was Kh. Amanon, a student of the Karaganda Polytechnical Institute, and hardened criminal Kh. Aqzholov who stirred up rival groups in Dzhezkazghan to armed conflict. Aqzholov, who had previously gone out on a nomadic "guest tour" to Alma-Ata and Dzhambul several times, assembling young people of unstable moral qualities and organizing them for a big fight, was prosecuted for these crimes. However, although he was prosecuted, punishment was deferred and he went free. It should be mentioned in passing that those given deferred sentences (otstrochka) are not supervised. Since they do not understand the educational significance of the period given to them for reform, some have been observed to continued to commit crimes.

Last year, juveniles R. Karpov and K. Slabodchikov planned to get rid of the division inspector who was keeping them in line. However, the two were prosecuted in March for involvement in robbery and theft, but freed from jail on a suspended sentence. While they were serving their suspended sentence, in June, one of them stole a motorcycle and was caught in the act. However, since legal measures were not applied in good time, he was not captured. This laxness of police officers subsequently led to unpardonable misfortune. After another month had passed, the "two musketeers" killed a taxi driver and stole the tape recorder in his car. V. Peshkov and I. Kotlyar, students of Alma-Ata No. 13 School, "rubbing their hands," as it were, at suspended sentences, followed up their initial robberies by breaking into 10 stores...

Among shiftless of persons of easy virtue, dreaming of "living a bright life just as in the west, and of making a lot of money," and imitating in their life styles and jargons criminal elements, the great honor of coming face to face with the representatives of the law, and of escaping from the iron net, is an obligatory one. These are the things impelling young people, eager for cheap thrills, to law breaking. Plans of several hardened criminals returning from prison after the November, 1987 amnesty to form a group in Alma-Ata No. 1 Middle School have been exposed. These were the ones preparing devices with the fascist sign. It was discovered that a neofascist group led by unknown persons at No. 122 Middle School had been putting up anti-soviet slogans and wearing brown uniforms. Last of all, they were the ones who set up young boys and girls as "chetchikke (tellers)." You will remember that the famous "Dukh" (Bogodukhov) mentioned above demanded from Rustem and his friends that "each of you bring in 10 rubles." The setting up "of tellers"—this began when students were unable to pay their "taxes," set in this way, on time. In truth, where did the young men get the money, from whom? They could either ask their parents, or steal it. One of the two.

Cases of this sort occur everywhere. In parks, on the streets, village lanes, in school restrooms. There are many cases of extortion of what is in the hands of small, isolated children, with public use of force. Since this occurs so often, why are we silent? Measures should be taken against these extorters? Not so? The clear need to prevent such phenomena was expressed at the V Plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Komsomol: "Fertile conditions have come into being for the rapid growth of groups with wrong views which are conducive to law breaking, of groups with anti-Soviet tendencies. If Komsomol committees do not work among young people, and if we do not turn our attention to investigations of problems of alcoholism and narcotics addiction, it is possible that the Komsomol will lose all influence in these areas in the future." Thus it was stated in the report.

It is a trial for all of us to peer literally at all sides of this living movement within the world of the young, to rid

ourselves of our time-honored complacency. According to the research of sociologists, it is calculated that 10 percent, more or less, of school students at present are members of some kind of unofficial group. Some 25 percent have close contact with members of such groups (weekly MOLODEZHNYE EKSPRESS, No 40, 1988). It is clearly felt at present in organizations working directly with such associations that we are unable to carry on the work of providing a communist education at a level commensurate with the needs of the times, and that we lack a specific *modus operandi* analyzed on a scientific basis.

But be that as it may, what is the view of the family towards the problem. Needless to say, control of unofficial groups by social organizations and the Komsomol, and the strengthening of connections among them based upon strong confidence, has lowered the educational role of the family. Education in the family—it is always the beginning of all education, is source.

Unfortunately, there are large numbers of parents among us who do not sufficiently appreciate the social role of great importance played by the Soviet family in educating the individual of today. In their book "Family, Social Production and Law," investigating sociologists K. Yemelyanov and T. Faddeyev complain that 30 percent of parents devote no attention whatever to their children, and 29 percent avoid their children with the excuse that they "have no time." This is reality. Some 61.5 percent of students in Chimkent City returned the answer that "I first tasted spirits at the family dinner table" in a questionnaire circulated among young people by the KaSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. What a finding! Is it a total surprise to parents that some 266 young people between the ages of 12 and 17 in this oblast are studying nothing (some have a third grade-level education!), do not work and have joined the ranks of "useless people." It seems unnecessary to bring to the attention of parents that the fate of unwatched and unsupervised children often ends in tragedy. The mother of Valeriy Smetannikov, who murdered a class mate in cold blood, when she turned her child over to another and went off to celebrate May day in the mountains for a week, did she realize that he would commit such a crime? But be that as it may, should not parents and other adults be concerned and cautious about the reality of life around them? Did not the murder rate increase 7 percent in 1988?

Indeed it did...

To conclude, it seems as if we have before our eyes the great difficulties of this kind which lie in front of us on account of inability to find the way to guarantee the carrying out of several important measures set by the party and the government in recent years in the area of educating the minds of the younger generation, and the inability of the Komsomol, the schools and other social organizations to apply these measures practically, in a mass manner.

The bullet shot at a school—this is a sign of our failure.

Family Planning, Infant Mortality in Uzbekistan
18300513a Tashkent SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
2 Feb 89 p 4

[Interview with deputy minister of the UkSSR Ministry of Public Health, D. N. Kabulova, conducted by Ye. Travas concerning problems of the health protection of mothers and children: Area of Special Attention]

[Text] "Our people's health is our nation's resource." We often say these words, at times not fully understanding their meaning. In the final analysis, the health factor actually defines our ability to participate in social and economic development and increase the productivity of labor, and it determines the country's economic and defensive power. The health of the people depends on a multitude of factors, but its base, its foundation, so to speak, is laid in early childhood, even earlier, before the newborn appears in the world. It is for this very reason, when we are talking about the health of the nation as a whole, that we primarily focus on the health of mothers and children. It is for this very reason that the Main Directions of Development of the Health Protection of the Population and Perestroika of the Public Health System during the 12th Five-Year Plan and the Period up to the Year 2000 emphasize the necessity for priority development and improvement of the maternity and childhood system. Nevertheless, a great deal has been written recently about the extreme trouble in this area of medicine in our country and, in particular, in Uzbekistan. We asked the deputy minister of the Uzbekistan SSR Ministry of Public Health, Dilovar Nasimovna Kabulova, to tell us about the current situation and what is being done to improve the organization of health protection for mothers and children.

Before we begin our interview, it might be worth repeating a few statistics which will literally amaze the public. When the ban was lifted from several secrets, it was revealed that the level of infant mortality in the USSR was much higher than in such countries as Mauritius and Barbados. And Uzbekistan is one of the most unfortunate republics in our country in this regard.

In 1987, the infant death rate in Uzbekistan was 45.9 per thousand births. Admittedly, in 1988, this depressing figure was reduced a little and is now 43.3. But it is still too early to rejoice.

[Ye. Travas] What, in your opinion, is the root of the present trouble? And more simply, how did we get to this point?

[D. Kabulova] There are many reasons. But one of the most basic ones is that the slogans that are uttered by the nation such as "Everything better for the children", "Concern for women-mothers - a priority" have only been fulfilled in words during the past decades. What results can we expect if only 16 percent of children's

institutions and 30 percent of maternity institutions in the republic are located in standard buildings which meet all the modern requirements?

We are also experiencing a shortage of pediatricians. There are barely six thousand of them. Two years in a row we have asked the USSR Ministry of Public Health to assign us obstetrician-gynecologists according to the number of births rather than the number of people. For example, with equal amounts of personnel in the obstetrical service, the load on obstetrician-gynecologists is higher in our republic than in others due to the high birth rate. And since women mainly work in the childhood and maternity service, more than 11 thousand physicians and over 43 thousand secondary medical employees do not work every year due to maternity leave and leave of absence to care for young children.

All of this cannot help but put this branch of medicine in turmoil. But, of course, one of our most serious problems is incompetence and the low professional level of physicians and nurses. An evaluation which was carried out recently, for example, showed that 20 percent of gynecologists and pediatricians are not capable of performing their duties with adequate proficiency due to lack of knowledge.

[Ye. Travas] Dilovar Nasimovna, this discussion about the low professional level of physicians did not begin today or yesterday. Yet no particular improvements can be seen. How do you explain this situation and what can be done to increase the professionalism of our physicians and other medical employees?

[D. Kabulova] Well, first of all, a flow of weak, professionally disoriented graduates continues to enter the VUZes, which, in the end, reflects on the quality of the young specialists. Many physicians who work in remote regions, and not only there, do not believe it is necessary to raise their professional level and as a result are removed from life and the requirements of contemporary medicine.

Our stagnant baggage has been accumulating for years, but we are not allowed the same amount of time to correct the situation. Therefore, we are trying to manipulate every possible lever in order to increase the knowledge and experience of physicians and are attempting to raise the qualifications of health professionals taking into account the most serious problems of the region. In accordance with the initiative of the Uzbekistan SSR Ministry of Public Health, more than 25 seminars for pediatricians and obstetrician-gynecologists were held in the republic with the aid of the central institutes for the advanced training of physicians and a series of guest lectures of the Tashkent Institute for the Advanced Training of Physicians was organized. In the oblasts, the qualifications of physicians and nurses is being raised in the workplace, at the scientific research institutes and in the leading departments of medical VUZes. Our physicians are working together with specialists from Moscow,

Leningrad and other fraternal republics who work here during the summer months to establish a good school which will provide the opportunity of gaining additional knowledge.

[Ye. Travas] Is all of this having a tangible effect?

[D. Kabulova] I think so. At present, at least, physicians are being made more active. Many have understood that to be semi-professional today is not only shameful but simply impossible. And therefore, passivity at lectures and seminars has given way to the desire to obtain, find out and understand as much as possible. This is also evidenced by the professors and assistant professors from the center who present the lectures and lead the seminars. "There is no end to the questions," they say. "And before everyone always understood everything." But what is closer to the truth is that nobody understood anything, so it was boring and uninteresting. And they sat stiffly, to obtain a "pass" and avoid a reprimand.

[Ye. Travas] You have already mentioned the indices of infant mortality for the republic as a whole. But what is the situation in the rural areas?

[D. Kabulova] If we consider the reasons for infant mortality, more than 60 percent of infants who do not reach their first birthday in the kishlaks and rayons of the republic die of diseases of the respiratory and digestive organs against a background of avitaminosis, metabolism disturbances and anemia. The high infant death rate here is caused to a significant extent by the insufficient amount of necessary vitamins and balanced components in breast milk. And this is natural. For in the rural areas of the republic, the consumption of meat is 5-6 times lower, dairy products 2-3 times lower, eggs 3.5 times lower and potatoes 4.7 times lower than the average for the nation.

And if we add to this the unsanitary conditions in which breast-fed babies frequently find themselves, the lack of running water in many kishlaks, the pesticides used on the cotton plantations, the pollution of the soil and air and the lack of qualified aid, then you can understand that the health problems of mothers and children in rural areas are much more serious and cause much greater and much deeper pain.

[Ye. Travas] Dilovar Nasimovna, according to the physicians, the increase in infant mortality in the rural areas is also caused by frequent births in women.

[D. Kabulova] Of course. For, as I have already mentioned, a healthy child can only be born to a healthy woman. And the health of the villagers, in addition to all the above-mentioned factors, is also jeopardized by the fact that they do not observe the prescribed interval between births necessary for restoring the health and strength of the woman and for giving birth to a healthy child. For example, imagine that out of one thousand

first-borns, 21 infants die during the first year of life, however, of the fourth, fifth and subsequent children this number is already 43, i.e. more than twice as much.

It seems we have arrived at yet another very important question, the resolving of which may to a great extent help solve the problem of health protection for mothers and children. Family planning . . . It has been discussed a great deal recently, different opinions have been given and, unfortunately, not always competent and objective.

Our republic is one of the regions with a high percentage of multiparas - 34.5 percent, while in the central band of Russia it does not exceed 4-5 percent. Every year the families of Uzbekistan give birth to more than half a million children. This fact can be evaluated from different directions - economic, social, moral, ethnographic, etc. But since we are discussing the health of women and children, we will consider the situation from this point of view. So, I will present the opinion of scientists who believe that for multiparas (and in our region, I will mention again, they constitute 34.5 percent of the total population) pregnancy and birth is more difficult. These patients often suffer from such diseases as hypertonia, diabetes mellitus, diseases of the liver, kidneys, heart and lungs, which are aggravated during pregnancy, and sometimes result in a tragic outcome. It is not coincidental that maternal mortality has not decreased in the republic recently, and its index is 1.5-2-fold higher than the average for the Union. Among the women who die, every third one is a multipara, the death of whom leaves behind a large number of orphans forever deprived of their mother's love.

We, the health professionals, believe that each family has the right to plan how many children they want. But the children should be healthy, and in order to achieve this, as I have already mentioned, it is necessary to observe a three-year interval between births in multiparas, which will ensure a reduction in the number of complications during pregnancy and have a favorable effect on the state of health of the newborn.

The problem of children born to women after thirty is currently very serious, for those who have their first child during their fourth decade run the risk of giving birth to a child with various defects. We have ignored these issues for a long time, not wishing to interfere in the intimate world of the family and justifying the situation by the children's cult which is traditional for the republic. However, since we are talking about a healthy posterity, health professionals should present their case in its defense.

[Ye. Travas] How can women observe a three-year interval between births? Abortion is not popular among Uzbek villagers, and they rarely decide to take this extreme step.

[D. Kabulova] In principle, we are against abortions and believe that they should only be resorted to in extreme cases and that, in the final analysis, abortion is also dangerous to the health of the woman. But medicine has wonderful means of birth control at its disposal today. Any woman who seeks maternity consultation in this regard can receive professional help. She is examined and the most suitable contraceptive is suggested.

[Ye. Travas] I know that at the moment gynecologists in the oblasts are doing a great deal of work associated with preventing unwanted pregnancies. And the village women are willingly going along with this.

[D. Kabulova] At present, many people in the kishlaks are aware of the need to regulate the birth rate. By the way, I have statistics from a sociological survey conducted among the population of the republic. For example, in the cities, the average ideal number of children in a family, in the men's opinion, was 4.9, and in the women's - 4.6. In the rural areas, it was 5.2 and 4.9, respectively. A pronounced change in the reproductive situation has occurred in young people, who are oriented toward fewer children than the older age groups.

[Ye. Travas] Dilorar Nasimovna, you said that one of the causes of infant mortality is the insufficient amount of vitamins and other balanced nutritional components in the mother's milk. Is anything being done at the moment to correct this situation and improve the nutrition of pregnant women?

[D. Kabulova] This is a very serious issue. But we know that women, especially multiparas, have the tendency to deprive themselves for the sake of their children. It is practically impossible to follow the eating habits of a pregnant woman. Therefore, medical propaganda should play an important role here. Each pregnant woman should know that by economizing on food she is risking not only her own health but also the health of her future child. Apparently, the time has come to think about introducing free food for pregnant women if their families have a low standard of living.

By the way, the government is already allotting more funds to the organization of free children's food for families with a low standard of living. Whereas in 1987, free food was guaranteed for children up to the age of one, in 1988 it was guaranteed up to the age of two. However, even with these generous grants, we are not always able to ensure that babies receive the necessary products. The problem is that the allotted money cannot be used to supply goods anywhere. There is nothing to buy in the rayons. Not only are there no mixtures obtained from the Ukraine, but also there are no small packages of juice from our own republic. In 1988, the State Agricultural Industry produced 55 thousand cans of fruit and vegetables, 22 thousand of which were sent to other republics.

In order to lower infant and maternal mortality and in order for healthy mothers to give birth to healthy children, a whole complex of urgent problems - both medical and social - must be solved immediately. For example, we talk a great deal about how we have few opportunities for disease prevention and improving the health of women and children. Only 15 percent of the "Mother and Child" dispensaries, which are under the authority of the agricultural industry, are in operation. Two trade unions - those of medical employees and the agricultural industry - should join efforts in this direction and make efficient use of the available and empty dispensaries to the benefit of the situation. This should be the government approach to the question of improving the health of the population.

Yes, we still have a great many unsolved problems. Nevertheless, the most important thing is the fact that the slogan "Everything better for the children" is finally being translated into reality. For example, 30-40 percent of capital investments in the public health system are to be directed towards pediatric and obstetrical units (in the 11th Five-Year Plan, this figure was 9.2 percent).

During the 12th Five-Year Plan, the number of children's beds increased by 3,611 and maternity beds by 1,600, the majority of which were installed due to the new construction. Specialized aid has also achieved further development, at present, pediatric centers have been created in six specialties at two republic and 10 oblast hospitals. The network of beds for premature and sick newborns, pregnant women with various pathologies and therapeutic beds for treating mothers is expanding. Every year, the health of more than 43 thousand women is improved this way. Twelve inter-regional departments with 1,100 beds for pregnant women suffering from viral hepatitis have been organized.

Outpatient medical aid is being developed at an accelerated pace: centers for restorative treatment, day hospitals, care at home and mobile services for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of diseases in children and women in rural areas.

In the large cities, diagnostic centers are being created, in which the most complex diagnostic equipment will be concentrated. An increase in funds for free food for children from six million rubles in 1988 to 12 million rubles in 1990 is being planned.

Republic medical and genetic consultation at the Scientific Research Institute of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the Uzbekistan SSR Ministry of Public Health and five offices in remote oblasts is being organized for the purpose of exposing and preventing inherited diseases.

A comprehensive program for reducing infant mortality is being developed by the Ministry of Public Health and interested ministries and departments.

Demographers, economists, health professionals and sociologists are participating in the implementation of this program. They are helping to solve not only medical but also many social and economic problems. This program is partially financed by the republic departments of the Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin, for which we are deeply grateful.

The republic houses of sanitary education are producing brochures, signs and monuments to the young mother and are conducting lectures and discussions concerning questions of sanitary education of the population and preparation of young people for family life.

However, as the USSR Minister of Public Health, Ye. I. Chazov, rightly said at the All-Union Physician's Congress: "The number of lectures is in direct contradiction to the level of medical, hygienic and sanitary knowledge of the population", therefore it is necessary to work together with the trade union organizations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and other public organizations to build health centers instead of houses of sanitary education to spearhead the work of adopting a healthy way of life. One such center has already been built in the republic.

From the editors

So the service for the health protection of mothers and children has a great many problems. Everyone understands the importance and urgency of these problems - from rank and file health professionals to the heads of the ministries and departments. It is time to create a streamlined system for combating infant and maternal mortality, it is time for action, for the success of the entire matter of preserving the health of the current and future generations will depend on the contribution of everyone, on our skill and interest.

Serious Health Problems in East Kazakhstan Oblast

*18300513b Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 8 Mar 89 p 2*

[Article by V. Kislyakova, head of the resuscitation department of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Emergency Aid Hospital, deputy of the Kazakhstan SSR Supreme Soviet: "The Concern of Each of Us"]

[Text] As has been reported, the forthcoming session of the Kazakhstan SSR Supreme Soviet on 10 March will review the problems of developing the health protection of the republic's population. An important and crucial discussion is in store. During this time, we will continue to publish material reflecting the various aspects of the problem.

In East Kazakhstan, three medical employees have been registered as USSR People's Deputies. In addition to this, questions of the population's health protection are

occupying a noticeable place in the pre-election programs of other candidates running for representation in the country's highest government body. This is very natural. People no longer want to tolerate backward medical services. Especially since, despite the measures being taken, the ecological situation in the oblast is deteriorating with every year and this is having a negative effect on the health of both children and adults.

At a meeting of the active membership of the oblast party and economic organizations, which took place last year with the participation of the USSR Minister of Public Health, Ye. Chazov, it was noted that, in connection with the increase in environmental pollution from toxic substances in East Kazakhstan, a high level of morbidity has been observed, with people suffering from malignant tumors, diseases of the blood and kidneys and cardiovascular diseases.

However, the enterprises which are polluting the atmosphere will not take any responsibility for the health of the population and are taking almost no active part in strengthening the foundation of the public health system, getting away with paltry contributions. Radical changes are needed here. For example, a serious situation has developed in the oblast concerning oncological morbidity, and the appropriate service does not have modern means at its disposal for treating these patients.

Infant mortality is still high. The main reason for this is a lack of proper conditions in the obstetrical service. For example, in Ust-Kamenogorsk, where, according to the regulations, there should be three maternity hospitals, there are two. One of them is periodically closed by the medical inspection agencies. The construction of a new maternity hospital is moving at a slow pace. There is a high level of contagious disease among children. But the only department specializing in this is overloaded.

The level of organization of health protection for the adult population is no less alarming. There is not enough medical equipment. For example, at the Emergency Aid Hospital, many instruments have become worn out, but we are unable to make copies of them. If we do not face this problem, we will always be without equipment. There is a shortage of space. Patients who have suffered an infarction lie in the corridors, not to mention the fact that there is a shortage of both ordinary and single-use syringes. We have long been in need of the construction of annexes for surgical units, a burn department, cardiologic center and diagnostic center.

A particular issue is the creation of appropriate working conditions at enterprises which produce toxic substances to ensure that workers' health is not in as much jeopardy. There are a great many problems here. One physician cannot deal with them all. He should, simply must, speak to the trade unions - the protector of the workers' interests. Unfortunately, the trade unions of the oblast are still not carrying out their protective functions toward the workers to the fullest extent.

The active members, who I mentioned earlier, asked the USSR Minister of Public Health, Ye. Chazov, to look for the opportunity and organize scientific research work in East Kazakhstan with the aid of the Academy of Medical Sciences for the purpose of analyzing the reasons for disease, obtaining a prognosis of the health of the population and defining methods for its protection and treatment.

Talking before those gathered, the minister promised to solve some of the problems. He reported that the question concerning wage funds for physicians had been solved and that the USSR State Planning Committee had fully allotted funds to the public health system in accordance with the number of employees and the function of the institution. But March 1989 has already arrived and words have remained only words.

The gap between promises and deeds is as wide as before. The USSR Council of Ministers gave the order that, as of 1 January, the expenditure norms per day for food and the procurement of medications for each patient would increase in the hospitals for veterans of the Great Patriotic War and special departments (wards) within hospitals. But this important document is not supported by rubles and is not in operation.

Concrete actions are necessary and not empty words.

Returning to the reasons for the increased morbidity of the population, the proper position of local party and soviet agencies in restricting the industrial potential of Rudnyy Altay should be recognized.

At present, the party and soviet agencies of East Kazakhstan have submitted several proposals to the country's government concerning the improvement of the ecological situation in the oblast. It appears that the Supreme Soviet of the republic and the Kazakhstan SSR Council of Ministers will support the efforts of the local administration and promote the solving of health issues, which have currently acquired political significance.

Activities of Ecological, Social Group Defended
18300406 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by V. Stupak, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent, under the rubric "Studying Democracy": "Understanding Is Needed"]

[Text] At times initiative groups with an important social program are treated with mistrust and apprehension. The longstanding intolerance of dissent is at work...

Today, almost anyone, who is a participant in movements of every sort and kind, is added to the category of "informals"—lovers of poetry, the cinema, and song, philatelists, numismatists, admirers of Vysotskiy, fate worshippers, etc. If more than three people gather

together, it means that they are "informals". In Pavlodar, the priests of spontaneous creativity in the workplace, who have failed to opportunely vanish into the past, numbered approximately five hundred "associations" of every sort and kind. Even the Pavel Vasilyev literary society, which during its whole existence has been involved with only one thing—critiquing the literary merit of its own opuses, has been included in the pursuit of an index for independent policies. If the matter goes much further, you will see that even soccer fans, who from time to time gather near the stadium gates to discuss the play of their idols, will find themselves with some sort of label.

Valeriy Galenko, the ideological inspirer of the Pavlodar Ecology and Public Opinion initiative group, is against his group being called "informals".

He stated—It is equally humiliating for us when our group is ranked among leisure-time organizations, where people gather together out of boredom and for the sake of entertainment, and, even worse, when they look in advance for extremist aspirations in our activities without the slightest justification beforehand for doing this.

What in the world brought these twenty people together, who have been getting together every Monday evening for more than six months now to sum up the information concerning the ecological situation in Pavlodar, which has accumulated during the week, to make provisions for regular meetings with the collectives and the city and oblast leaders, to distribute assignments, to plan trips, and to make inquiries to other oblasts about their experience in the struggle to protect the environment and people's health?

There is a multitude of concerns. Only unconverted people imagine that ecologists only get together to jabber about the disgraceful things that are going on and then go home.

How and by whom will the meetings be set up with the specialists, who are monitoring the purity of the air in the earth's atmosphere and the condition of the Irtysh and the reservoirs. Who will be involved with the reproduction of questionnaires and their subsequent dissemination? Where can one procure paper and resources? And even recording the minutes of the meetings demands work and skill. One must also be good at formulating resolutions.

And furthermore, they have begun publishing a typewritten ecological bulletin (a wall newspaper with a circulation of 30 copies). Everything is done by hand, since an attempt is made to keep duplicating equipment farther away from the people with the label "informals" than matches from children... Who knows what they will think of next!... From time to time veiled misgivings and undisguised suspicions rain down in abundance on the heads of the voluntary enthusiasts of sociological research and environmental protection. They see in their

familiarity with the information from the laboratories and the oversight inspection agencies an undermining of their own status and in the question concerning the leader's treatment of environmental protection, there appears to be an encroachment upon his authority.

Here is an original case. When the official public opinion section attached to the oblast's political education building asked in its questionnaire the pointed question: "Do you have faith in perestroika?", no one found fault with perestroika, even after 67 percent of the answers which were received were negative. This is what it means to have official status. But on the other hand, the public champions of the environment always rebuff: "Your questions are too disturbing" or "You are meddling in other people's affairs!". And at times one will hear and quite from the old repertoire: "Communists are not obliged to account to you!".

—Well, who are you?—an obkom worker passionately hurled at the "ecologists" at their recent meeting with the collective at the Assembly Machinery Scientific Industrial Association (NPO).—You make conclusions concerning ecology on behalf of public-spirited people, but there is not a single expert among yourselves!

Indeed, who are these people "with unpredictable behavior". Some ideological and soviet workers, who are unable to get used to the fact that it is necessary to coexist with organizations, which are not provided for by the official structure and which from their point of view are uncontrollable, have deprecatively certified them a new troublesome category of the population which sprang up unexpectedly.

I should specify that we are not expressing our own personal opinion, but the opinion of people who have been polled—stated Aleksandr Zadorin, another theorist from the group and an engineer, who is a master of the scientific principles concerning public administration.—We have thereby assumed the crucial function of an upward channel of communication. And it is well-known that not a single democratic system can function normally without this channel of communication. Our group relies upon the opinion of experts in its conclusions. Though, it can be said to us that we have voiced a lack of confidence in some of the experts. Indeed, we repudiate those defenders of bureaucratic interests, who, having forgotten about morals, uphold their "filthy" factories' right to exist. But we rely on principled and honest "experts" with independent opinions.

As a number of publications have already reported, the Pavlodar biologist-enthusiasts came into existence on a wave of protest by the townspeople against the construction of a BVK (protein vitamin concentrate) plant in the city in the Irtysh. Flagrant violations were revealed in the realm of environmental protection. The prestige of the initiative group, which is led by the worker Pavel Likhachev, delegate to the XX Komsomol Congress,

increased significantly after it successfully defended Pavlodar from having the BVK plant sited in its northern industrial zone. Even the oblast Ispolkom has begun to take the group's position into account. After meetings with the top leaders of the city and oblast and the elucidation of mutual policies, contacts with other agencies were normalized.

It is true that initiative groups currently have not attained the desired level of development. Apprehension, mistrust, a preconceived attitude, and in many people, a deep-seated intolerance of dissent still hinder both sides.

Zhanna Yagodina, a pedagogical institute instructor, gives vent to longstanding resentments.—Judge for yourself, what level of mutual trust can there be if the majority of the ideological workers forms its opinion of us from the words of others and avoids visiting our meetings, if only out of curiosity? This militant propagandist joined the groups ranks in order to find out firsthand the opinion of the people and to answer questions frankly and openly, in the manner which she has become accustomed to talking not just to her students, but also to her two sons who are becoming adults.

We probably should rejoice in the awakened civic activism and derive practical benefit from the enthusiasm of the voluntary ecologists and sociologists, who are offering their unselfish assistance in monitoring the protection of the environment and in sociological research. The group has good connections with a number of scholars and scientific centers, which are prepared to assist in the study of the problems in Pavlodar.

V. Galenko stated,—We are trying to do everything possible so that our group does not become a kind of exclusive circle, where the same people get together all the time. Our doors are always open to anyone. We are pursuing no sacred objectives, which following somebody's example have come to be assigned to any association.

It is true, after the Ecology and Public Opinion independent action group was officially made a section of the governing body of the oblast's Soviet World Fund and V. Galenko was made a member of its presidium, these impudent and usually unsubstantiated attacks began to be heard less frequently. Apparently, a kind of getting used to coexisting with nontraditional organizations is taking place in official circles. But if one really tells the truth about the weaknesses of the associations, in the case of the Pavlodar "ecologists", in the first instance, there is the undisguised distrust, with which they typically treat any specialist, who represents the bureaucracy and oblast institutions and at times they almost show off through this distrust: they say, see how independent we are. It must be honestly admitted, there have been grounds for this distrust, which have manifested themselves in the leaders' unscrupulous position and readiness to sign under pressure any document, which is fraught with a threat to the local ecology. One encounters such cases even today, when a tense situation in the matter of protecting the environment, like the one in Priirtish, forces everyone to be especially circumspect during the siting of new factories and the making of other decisions. The "ecologists" are on the look-out and their strong support of public opinion, even if only on certain occasions, has allowed responsible comrades to take a stronger position and prevent mistakes and disasters. Of course, if the "ecologists" had broad publicity in the oblast newspaper, to which they have not yet obtained the required access, they would be able to exploit with greater benefit public opinion concerning protecting the environment and people's health.

One could most likely argue with the members of the association about the methods used in the public opinion poll. Their knowledge in both sociology and environmental protection work is still insufficient at times. But even this is not the primary problem. The main problem is in our inability to make enthusiastic public-spirited persons our allies and to apply their energy to the country's urgent troubles.

Student Defends Use of Belorussian Flag, Coat of Arms

18000653a Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 3 Feb 89 p 3

[Commentary by Yu. Usmanova, a correspondence student with the Belorussian State University: "I Appeal for Objectivity"]

[Text] An article "Occupation. Criminal Goals—Criminal Means" was published in the 19 October 1988 issue of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA. I wish to disagree with the views of the authors on the subject of the Belorussian flag and the coat of arms, "The Chase."

The white and red flag and "The Chase" are considered unacceptable because they are perceived as symbols of the atrocities of the nationalists. Comrades: I respect the memory of every fourth Belorussian and every third resident of Vitebsk, and I honor the Soviet people for their victory over the fascists. But were the flag and "The Chase" really invented by the nationalists during the war? Were there no Krutogor'ye, Grunwald, 1863, or Kastus' Kalinovsky? Is there not a single favorable page of Belorussian history which might be associated with "The Chase"?

"The Chase," in its capacity of the ancient coat of arms of my native Vitebsk, has existed since the 18th century—must we really renounce it?

I personally like the state flag and coat of arms of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and I have been brought up to respect them. I appeal not for a change in the flag and coat of arms, but for objectivity. In what way are the flag and coat of arms guilty if criminals used them for their own ends? With questions such as these let us look not 40 or 50 years back, but at the centuries-old sources. There we'll find our roots and our ancestors, there we'll find our history and our present.

Meeting in Chernigov Commemorates Stalin Purge Victims

18000653b Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by E. Kiyashko: "To Know and to Remember"]

[Text] The people of Chernigov participated in a meeting dedicated to the memory of the victims of the Stalin purges. Among those who spoke at the meeting was V.N. Rostal'nyy, an instructor at the teachers' training institute. He has studied the problems of the cult of personality for many years and is known for his publications on that theme in both the central and republic press. Vitaliy Nikolayevich stated that in 1935 Ya.L. Trushkin was sent to Chernigov to fill the post of chief of department at the UNKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs Directorate]. In 1928 Trushkin had been fired from the agencies of the OGPU [United State Political Administration]; but the time came when just such men

as Trushkin were required. This martinet immediately "uncovered" a whole group of Trotskyites in the Chernigov region and obtained the arrest of a number of leaders of the oblast, in particular Z.G. Dashevskiy, the chief of the Industrial Transportation Department of the Oblast Party Committee; A.I. Lyubimov, the chief of the Oblast Local Industry Administration; A.E. Braude, the chief of the Oblast Trade Administration; and others.

In June 1937 an article appeared in PRAVDA in which it was maintained that the unmasking of enemies in the Chernigov region was going slowly and with difficulty. The Oblast Party Committee and its first secretary P.F. Markitan were blamed. Then a similar article appeared in the republic newspaper KOMMUNIST. Mass repressions began. In July and August 1937 alone, P.F. Markitan, G.A. Bogatyrev (chairman of the Oblast Soviet Executive Committee), I.A. Datsiy (chairman of the Oblast Council of Trade Unions), M.D. Karachunskiy (chief of the Oblast Financial Department), D.I. Sibiryak (chairman of the City Soviet Executive Committee), I.I. Kozik (chief of the Oblast Municipal Services Department)—practically all of the leaders of the oblast—were purged. In April 1938 alone, a "troyka" [special commission] sentenced more than 100 people to be shot. They were accused of membership in an anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist Socialist-Revolutionary insurgent organization. Among the innocent victims were teachers P.F. Sander, I.D. Lukyanets, G.Ya. Prolisko, and S.T. Bolkharevskiy; collective farmer N.V. Upyr; pensioner K.Z. Kuk; and painter I.Ya. Cycoyev. Subsequently all of the above people were posthumously rehabilitated.

L.S. Ulyanitskaya, daughter of a purged engineer, showed participants of the meeting a photograph of her father and a note which he miraculously succeeded in transmitting. In it he bade farewell to his family, asked his wife to watch over the children, and wrote that he remained a faithful communist.

L.A. Podlesnaya, a teacher from the village of Nikolae-vka in the Menskiy Rayon, talked of her father, who also perished in Stalin's concentration camps.

Participants in the meeting discussed Stalinism and the centralized administrative system which arose from it; and they upheld the decisions of the 27th Party Congress and of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which were directed at the *perestroyka* of life in our country and at the development of democracy and *glasnost*.

Tajik Premier on Restoring Earthquake-Damaged Areas

18300530 Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 11 Mar 89 p 1

[Article under rubric "Pertinent Interview": "The Country's Reliable Shoulder"]

[Text] It has already been computed that the Gissar earthquake caused damage to the republic's national economy with a total value exceeding 140 million rubles.

The earthquake damaged more than 5000 homes, 65 schools, 20 children's preschool institutions, and 34 structures used for public-health, cultural, scientific, and personal-services use. Damage that is hard to repair was inflicted on agriculture. Many water-management and agricultural structures and electrical transmission lines suffered. More than a thousand head of livestock perished.

The disaster was tremendous in scope. It will take time and will require financial and material resources to cure the wounds, restore what was destroyed, and re-establish normal life and working conditions. Therefore the entire country has come to Tadzhikistan's aid and even foreign countries have been rendering it. Literally immediately after the underground tremors, administrators of the Central Asian republics visited the disaster zone. The ways in which our neighbors could participate in eliminating the consequences of the earthquake were quickly defined. The disaster area was also visited by G. G. Vedernikov, deputy chairman of USSR Council of Ministers.

USSR Council of Ministers recently took steps that stipulate a series of time-responsive measures to restore what was destroyed by the earthquake. At the request of a TadzhikTA correspondent, I. Khayeyev, chairman of TaSSR Council of Ministers, discusses the basic aspects of this step taken by the union republic, which is so important for our republic.

[I. Khayeyev] This reconfirms the merits of our state structure: it has been planned in 1989-1991 practically to restore everything that was destroyed by the earthquake. In order to do this, this very year the country's Council of Ministers increased the limit of state centralized capital investments for the republic by 50 million rubles. Of that amount, 30 million is intended for construction-and-installation operations. Some of that money will be used to build up the capacities of the enterprises in the construction industry so that their output can be sold to the public for individual construction. In addition, USSR Council of Ministers has instructed USSR Gosplan to locate in 1990-1991 additional capital investments for restoration work in Gissar Valley.

Drawing from state reserves, the union republic allocated scarce material resources that were not stipulated by the material and technical support plan that had already been set up in type for the year. In particular, the republic will receive 88 motor vehicles of various makes, including KamAZ's, ZIL's, motor buses, 45 hoisting cranes of various hoisting capacities, more than 40 excavators, 38 bulldozers, 22 tractors, including powerful Kirov tractors, cement trucks, concret-mixer trucks, loaders, scrapers, and other very important equipment. It is planned to have the additional shipment of strictly allocated steel, rolled pipes, cement, lumber, timber, motor-vehicle and tractor tires, gasoline, and other types of fuels and lubricants.

The republic's Council of Ministers has been authorized to involve in the construction-and-installation operations all the organizations based in Tajikistan, regardless of the department to which they belong. The country's government has approved the initiative of Uzbekistan, which has undertaken the construction in Gissarskiy Rayon of a housing settlement consisting of 100 single-apartment homes with structures intended for social, cultural, and personal use, and which also worked out the problems of delivering brick-making equipment.

USSR Ministry of Finance has been instructed to defer the payments of bank loans for farms that suffered from the disaster. It has been authorized, by way of an exception, to pay kolkhozes and sovkhoses insurance compensation at the rate of 100 percent, proceeding from the balance-sheet value. Loans issued for individual construction will be written off at the expense of the state budget.

USSR Council of Ministers has instructed:

- USSR Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] to allocate 2000 head of cattle to restore the pedigree stock on farms that suffered from the disaster; instruments and equipment for the Zemledeliye and Bogparvar scientific-production associations; and 10,000 tons of concentrated fodders;
- Tsentsosoyuz [Central Union of Consumers' Cooperatives] to provide assistance in equipping and building new trade structures;
- Gosstroy [State Construction Committee] to allocate during the current year equipment for completing the outfitting of two preassembled reinforced-concrete plants, as well as assemblies to produce keramzit [porous clay filler for concrete] gravel;
- USSR Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry to deliver, from its subordinate enterprises, production lines for manufacturing window and door assemblies, with a capacity of 250,000 square meters.

Concern has also been shown for those who, after the subterranean tremors, were left homeless; in addition to the tents and house trailers that have already arrived, the disaster area will receive prefabricated wooden homes and sets of parts for 6000 square meters. There will be an increase in the shipments of consumer goods, including food products.

A production association for erecting housing in rural localities by the monolithic house-building method is being organized. The association's annual capacity will reach 200,000 square meters. The production of lightweight aluminum structurals will also be organized.

As one can see even from this incomplete listing, the country's assistance to the areas that have suffered is tremendous. Now it is necessary in an organized manner, without any indecisiveness, to begin to implement the program that has been planned. The republic's Gosstroy and supply organizations must organize a precise construction process and the continuous delivery of equipment, technology, and construction materials, must create new capacities, and must involve additional labor resources in the operations.

A special responsibility lies on the local agencies of authority. The rayon and village soviets must radically restructure their work. They will determine, first of all, the acceleration in eliminating the consequences of the earthquake. It is necessary to overcome the dependent tendencies in the outlying areas, and to think out all the questions of intensifying the human factor. And in this matter we must rely on the initiative and spontaneous actions of the public. The inhabitants of the areas that have suffered are the chief force for restoring the destroyed villages and the structures intended for production and social purposes. They must be involved in the work at construction-and-installation subdivisions, and all the conditions must be created to enable them to carry out individual construction at locations where homes had been destroyed by the disaster. And this is possible only if the supply and trade organizations perform their work excellently.

Nor can one forget that the earthquake occurred in a major agrarian region. The restoration of the normal working rhythm in agricultural production is an urgent task. It is necessary on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes to organize the precise fulfillment of the entire series of springtime field operations and to complete successfully the wintering-over of the livestock.

The Gissar earthquake is not only our pain. It is the test of our endurance, of our ability to combat emergency situations. And Tajikistan is being helped to pass this test successfully by having available the reliable shoulder of the Soviet country.

Anticipated Kirghiz SSR Economic, Social Development in 1989

18300487 Frunze *KOMMUNIST KIRGIZSTANA* in Russian No 2, Feb 89 pp 32-37

[Article: "Kirghizia: New Goals"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The 4th year of the current five-year plan occupied an important place in our country's history and revolutionary transformation. It became the year of a large-scale implementation of the aims of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. It is characterized by the fact that the introduction of new economic methods of

management, which will encompass all national economic sectors, will occur with a simultaneous realization of the reform in the political system on the basis of society's democratization.

Purposeful work on concentrating efforts on the solution of problems of production intensification and on improving structural and investment policy made it possible to attain certain positive shifts in the republic's economic development. In 2.5 years the **volume of the national income** increased by 9.4 percent. Planned indicators for the growth of industrial production were exceeded. Positive shifts appeared in the technical level and renewal of output. The scale of technical retooling and reconstruction of existing enterprises increased significantly.

The **agro-industrial complex** began to develop more stably. The average annual rates of increase in gross agricultural output exceeded 2.6-fold the corresponding indicators of the 11th Five-Year Plan. The volumes of sale of livestock, poultry, milk, eggs, and wool to the state increased. A tendency appeared toward a rise in the productivity of animal husbandry and in the yield of fields. All this made it possible to slightly raise the per-capita consumption of meat, dairy, and some other food products.

Social orientation in economic development intensified considerably. During the current five-year plan the average annual commissioning of dwelling houses increased 1.2-fold as compared with the 11th Five-Year Plan. The volumes of construction of schools, children's preschool institutions, hospitals, polyclinics, and cultural projects increased significantly.

In 2.5 years the output of **consumer goods** in the republic increased by 26.4 percent. At the same time, the volumes of nonfoodstuffs exceeded the assignments envisaged by the overall program for the production of consumer goods and the service sphere for 1986-1990. In 1986-1987 the **population's real income** rose 6.8 percent, as compared with 5.2 percent according to the plan, and **volumes of retail commodity turnover** increased.

Work on improving the economic mechanism is intensifying. **The general scheme for managing the republic's national economy**, which envisages an increase in the efficiency of economic management and a considerable reduction and a decrease in the cost of the administrative apparatus, has been developed and is now being realized. The circle of enterprises operating on the basis of full cost-accounting and self-financing principles has expanded significantly. They account for more than one-half of the total volume of output. The positive shifts that have appeared in financial indicators are visible results of their activity under the new conditions and the average annual rates of profit increase are much higher than during the 11th Five-Year Plan.

However, the restructuring of the national economy is proceeding with considerable difficulties. Many qualitative parameters of economic growth have not yet been attained. From the beginning of the five-year plan, although a reduction in the rates of growth of national labor productivity has been overcome, the attainment of the outlined goals has not been ensured. Individual sectors, industrial enterprises, and construction, transport, and other organizations have not ensured a stable operation. It has not yet been possible to attain a 100-percent fulfillment of the main evaluating indicator—contractual deliveries.

A high loss of livestock from murrain, especially in Issyk-Kul Oblast and in Keminskiy and other rayons, has occurred in agricultural production. The stock of cows in the regions of the Talas Valley and Osh Oblast has been reduced groundlessly.

The construction complex operated unstably last year. The annual limits of capital investments and construction and installation work were not utilized in a full volume. New forms and methods of management are introduced slowly in construction organizations, there is no efficiently elaborated system in production organization, and the quality of performed construction and installation work is low.

The indicators of the State Plan for Economic and Social Development and of the budget of the Kirghiz SSR for 1989 approved by the 8th session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation take into consideration these shortcomings and the real capabilities of the republic economy and, on the whole, correspond to the economic and social policy developed by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of Kirghizia and to the aims of the 19th party conference and subsequent party plenums, and are oriented toward ensuring a qualitative, new economic growth. In the most important directions they meet the assignments of the five-year plan in a sufficiently strict manner. Special attention has been paid to an increase in the balance, improvement in the economic mechanism, and intensification of democratic principles in production management.

The fact that the new plan is formed with due regard for the introduction of the new scheme for managing the national economy and change in the republic's administrative divisions is its important distinctive feature. In accordance with the requirements of the economic reform the methodology of plan elaboration has been changed. It has been relieved of secondary indicators and assignments to a considerable extent and the procedure of forming the state order has been revised, is based on normative approaches, and is directed toward an active transition to economic methods of management. The operation of laws on the socialist enterprise and cooperation will contribute to the development of the initiative of low-level labor collectives for increasing production efficiency and fostering in every worker the sense of

being the master. In 1989 the national economy will develop for the first time under conditions when the new economic mechanism encompasses all material production sectors and management levels. At the same time, the forms and methods of work of the entire nonproduction sphere under these conditions are also being worked out.

According to estimates, the produced national income will increase by 4.1 percent and national labor productivity, by 3.6 percent. At the same time, the overwhelming part of the increase in the national income (87 percent) will be obtained owing to this factor.

Intensification of the social orientation of the new plan is its priority. The population's monetary income will increase by 6.9 percent as compared with the 1988 plan (against 6.4 percent according to the five-year plan). Such a growth is determined by the increase in expenditures on the social and cultural needs of enterprises transferred to full cost accounting and self-financing, as well as by the growth of allocations from the state budget on the development of education and public health. Per-capita real income will increase by 3 percent annually, public consumption funds, by 4.6 percent, the average wages of workers and employees, by 2.2 percent, and the remuneration of kolkhoz members, by 5 percent.

The 1989 plan is directed toward a further increase in the production of consumer goods, development of the service sphere, and increase in the volume of commodity turnover for the purpose of the biggest satisfaction of public demand. The production of consumer goods will increase by 8.8 percent, as compared with last year's plan, and will exceed the control figures envisaged by the five-year plan by 305 million rubles. The highest rates of their output are envisaged in the city of Frunze, regions of republic jurisdiction, and Osh Oblast. The volume of production of foodstuffs should exceed last year's planned assignment by 6.6 percent and of nonfoodstuffs, by 10.4 percent. This corresponds to the goals outlined in the overall program.

In 1989 the volume of paid services for the public is to be brought up to 509.9 million rubles with an annual increase of almost 11 percent. At the same time, the state order for all types of services for the public is established for enterprises of ministries and departments irrespective of their departmental jurisdiction. Special attention is paid to overcoming the differences in the levels of domestic services for the rural and urban population. Services in the construction and repair of dwelling houses, establishment of orchard plots, servicing of motor vehicles, repair of complex household equipment, restoration of health, and active organization of citizens' leisure time will develop at outstripping rates. Work on the further development of cooperatives and individual labor activity in the service sphere will continue.

The volume of retail commodity turnover of state and cooperative trade for 1989 is envisaged with a growth of 6.7 percent, as compared with the 1988 plan, which exceeds the assignments of the five-year plan. All this will make it possible to balance workers' monetary income and expenditure.

Public education, culture, and public health will be developed further. The commissioning of projects of the social and cultural sphere and housing envisaged by the plan ensures the fulfillment of assignments envisaged by the five-year plan. At the same time, the funds of enterprises operating under self-financing and self-support conditions are more than doubled. For example, with them it is planned to commission one-half of the planned volume of children's preschool institutions. For the first time these sources are used for the construction of public health and school projects.

The material base of the republic's public health will be strengthened markedly. A hospital for war and labor veterans for 120 beds and a diagnostic center in the city of Frunze, a tuberculosis hospital for 200 beds in the settlement of Archala, boarding homes for disabled persons and very old people in the city of Tokmak and in the village of Kalininskiy, and a number of other projects will be put into operation.

The rates of housing construction will rise. The outlined measures make it possible right now to increase the provision of every resident of the republic with a living space of 11.45 square meters as compared with 11 square meters envisaged by the five-year plan. From all financing sources it is planned to build and commission residential houses of a total area of 1,580,000 square meters with a growth of 26 percent, as compared with 1988, including from state capital investments, 745,000 square meters and from funds of housing cooperative investments, 122,000 square meters. Owing to all-around attention and support, the annual volume of individual construction will reach 650,000 square meters. At the same time, the maintenance of existing housing will also improve. The volumes of major repairs of available state housing will increase by 18.5 percent as compared with last year's plan.

The biggest number of new construction projects for social purposes is planned in the republic's villages. The following will be commissioned there: general educational schools for 39,800 places, which will make up 72 percent of the total number of schools put into operation in the republic during the current year, children's preschool institutions for 8,800 places, that is, 50 percent, hospitals for 850 beds, that is, 79 percent, and almost all the club institutions and houses of culture under construction. All this will make it possible to increase the provision with preschool institutions to 36.8 percent as compared with 35.2 percent according to the 1988 plan.

The needs of the population and of the national economy for **communication services** are met more fully. They will increase by 6.8 percent as compared with the planned needs last year. The number of telephone sets in cities will increase by 7.8 percent and in rural areas by 4.8 percent.

A total of 51.5 million rubles of state funds, which is 10.6 percent more than the assignments of the five-year plan, are allocated for the development of **municipal services**. From the indicated deductions plans are made to commission intake structures of a capacity of 55,000 cubic meters of water supply in 24 hours, 273 km of water supply systems, a number of cleaning structures, boiler houses, trolley bus lines, gas supply systems, and other facilities.

Nor have tasks concerning **nature protection** and a careful utilization of natural resources been forgotten. The discharge of polluted sewage has decreased considerably and the volume of recovered and decontaminated harmful substances in atmospheric refuse will reach 85.1 percent. Forest shelter plantings on 200 hectares will be added.

The republic's industrial production plan for 1989 has been developed on the basis of the new approach to state orders for the delivery of products. The level of the state order throughout the sector is planned at the rate of 38 percent. This means that a significant part of the enterprises' production program is determined by the labor collectives themselves on the basis of contractual ties. It is envisaged ensuring a fuller loading of the capacities of existing production facilities, introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, and improvement in the structure of public production. The output of group B will receive an outstripping development. In the total production volume its annual growth will make up 6.7 percent and exceed the growth of output of group A by 3.1 percent.

According to estimates, the volume of industrial output throughout the republic this year will increase by 4.5 percent and, according to the sum of 4 years, by 18.4 percent, which meets the assignments of the five-year plan. The machine building complex, including radio engineering and other subsectors, will develop at outstripping rates.

It is planned to increase the output of enterprises of the machine building complex to 1,404 million rubles with an annual growth of 7.1 percent, which meets the assignments of the five-year plan.

The fuel and power complex will increase output by 3.1 percent as compared with the assignments of the five-year plan. Throughout the complex it will ensure an annual rate of output growth of 6 percent, including in power engineering, 7.5 percent.

In **nonferrous metallurgy** the Kirghiz Mining-Metallurgical Combine, the Khaydarkan Mercury Combine, and the Makmalskiy Gold Mining Combine will ensure the basic increase in output. The construction of the Sary-Dzhazskiy Ore Dressing Combine continues.

Predicting earthquakes and prospecting tin, tungsten, mercury, antimony, coal, petroleum, and natural gas, as well as building materials and thermal-mineral waters, represent the basic direction in the development of **geology** in the current year.

The measures envisaged for the development of **light industry** correspond to the level of assignments of the five-year plan. Provision is made for the further growth of output of children's articles, goods for young people and older individuals, for which a state order is established, goods for sports purposes, cotton and wool fabrics in higher demand, carpets, footwear, and other articles.

The envisaged development of the republic's **agro-industrial complex** is directed toward a consistent solution of the food problem in accordance with the aims of the 17th party congress and the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The fulfillment of this program will bring about the transfer of kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and enterprises to full cost accounting and self-financing and an extensive introduction of the internal economic brigade and leasing contract. The task is as follows: To increase the production of livestock and poultry (in live weight) by 63,000 tons, as compared with the five-year plan, of milk, by 179,000 tons, of eggs, by 52 million, of grain crops, by 219,000 tons, of potatoes, by 18,000 tons, and of vegetables, by 42,000 tons. An increase in the production of other products is also envisaged. With due regard for the decisions of the September (1988) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia the addition should be ensured through the growth of productivity. For example, it is envisaged increasing the average milk yield per cow on the republic's kolkhozes and sovkhoses to 3,300 kg and obtaining 207 eggs per laying hen in the public sector and a wool yield of 3.46 kg per sheep. All this will make it possible to raise the annual level of per-capita consumption of meat to 49 kg, of milk to 244, of vegetables and melon crops to 123 kg, and of eggs to 143. Unfortunately, nor does this goal meet rational consumption norms.

In the current year the volume of gross (commodity) output of all sectors of the agro-industrial complex with due regard for the additional assignment for the production of agricultural products will total 5.9 billion rubles, which is 8.4 percent higher than that of last year and 4.7 percent higher than that of the five-year plan. This year from all financing sources 658.8 million rubles of capital investments are allocated for the development of the republic's agro-industrial complex, including 386.6 million, for construction and installation work.

The further development of all types of **transport**, improvement in contractual relations between transport enterprises and dispatchers, and the transfer of motor vehicles from motor fuel to gas are envisaged.

A successful realization of plans largely depends on **capital construction**. The capital investments allocated for the development of the republic's national economy from all types of financing in 1989 are 7 percent higher than the 1988 plan and in the economy within the jurisdiction of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers they exceed 3 percent. The scale of retooling and reconstruction of existing enterprises will increase significantly. The proportion of capital investments allocated for these goals makes up 46 percent as compared with 35 percent in 1985. The funds for the development of the base of construction organizations and enterprises of the building materials industry have increased 1.5-fold. The construction of a shop for the manufacture of parts for social, cultural, and domestic projects at the Frunze House Building Combine and of the second stage of the Osh House Building Combine and the expansion of the Reinforced Concrete Products Plant in Frunze and of the joinery shop in Osh will be completed at the expense of the above funds.

The formed structure of the economy, the existing **price formation** mechanism, and annual compensations from the budget for large funds for paying for the differences in prices of agricultural products, in a number of cases for an untimely mastering of capacities, and for all kinds of losses have led to the formation of a deficit in the republic's budget in recent years. The balance of its expenditure part is ensured through additional receipts from the Union budget, whose size for 1989 was determined in the amount of 510 million rubles. Only expenditures on the compensation for the difference in prices of livestock in the amount of 240 million rubles, of milk, 134 million rubles, and of sugar, 142 million rubles are envisaged in the expenditure part of the republic's budget.

The planned growth of the production of **consumer goods and paid services**, as well as the attainment of the planned capacity by a number of enterprises, will make it possible to increase turnover tax receipts and payments from the profit into the budget in the amount of more than 60 million rubles. The envisaged steps for reducing nonproductive expenditures and losses, as well as the measures for reducing expenditures and increasing profit, will make it possible to reduce subsidies within 60 million rubles.

However, the envisaged steps will not make it possible to fully compensate for the above-mentioned expenditures. In this connection, in our opinion, the question raised before Union bodies by the republic's Ministry of Finance concerning the change in the procedure of deductions into the budget by enterprises of Union jurisdiction located on the republic's territory for capital and labor resources and of payments from the profit is

completely legitimate. The examination of proposals made by the Ministry of Finance connected with the production and delivery outside the republic of scoured wool, fur and fleece sheepskin, and sugar is also promising.

On the whole, the 1989 plan is directed toward the consolidation of the attained positive shifts and reorientation of the economy toward qualitative growth parameters. However, the rates and proportions of the republic's national economic development necessary for accomplishing the fundamental tasks of renewal in all production spheres are limited by the sectors' capabilities. For example, the still low output-capital in industry is due to the weak technical equipment. The proportion of obsolete equipment here makes up 37 percent and its renewability reaches only 7.8 percent. This also affects the quality of output. The share of its export in the total production volume does not exceed 1 percent. Owing to the weak production base, unsatisfactory supply, and other reasons, the effectiveness of utilization of capital investments in construction does not increase, but even drops. Two-thirds of the allocated funds are to be "frozen" in incomplete projects.

In accordance with the decisions of the 19th party conference the full responsibility and independence of soviets of people's deputies in matters concerning the development of a jurisdictional territory, creation of favorable living conditions for the population, and its provision with food products, consumer goods, housing, the service sphere, and a comfortable natural habitat is established. However, soviets still timidly undertake the unification and coordination of the efforts of enterprises irrespective of their jurisdiction for an overall and social development of regions. The expansion of the independence of enterprises does not reduce, but expands, the possibilities of soviets and their bodies in ensuring a mutually coordinated solution of production and social problems in a rayon, city, and oblast. Ensuring full scope for all forms of manifestation of the economic independence of enterprises and organizations will become a guarantee for the success of the radical economic reform carried out in the republic's national economy.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK Kompartii Kirgizii, "Kommunist Kirgizstana", 1988

Replacement of Director Leads to Strike at Collective Farm

18300552a Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Apr 89 p 2

[Article by T.Kvyatkovskaya, from Alma-Ata: "A Rejected Order: Before and After the Strike at Sovkhoz 'Gulder'"; under the "Facing the Law" rubric; first paragraph is a boldface introduction]

[Text] A labor collective opposes an administrative decision. There is nothing new in this situation in the fourth year of perestroika. On the pages of our newspaper, a number of articles have appeared under the

"Learning Democracy" rubric. The more imbedded perestroika becomes our life, the more obvious it is that the democratization of society is intimately linked to the growth of collective and individual legal conscience.

What was the cause of this conflict? What was the collective fighting for? In addition to these questions which lie on the surface, other questions arise, as well. Today, it is important for us to see how deeply the collective can analyze the situation to avoid trivial group muscle-flexing and basic trouble-making, and how much the collective can and wants to understand the essence and the purpose of its struggle. In any conflict situation, the position taken by the communists of the grassroots party organization is especially important, since they are the vanguard of the entire labor collective and its directing force.

From this point of view I want to review the situation before and after the strike at sovkhoz "Gulder".

The order issued by the head of the city "Blagoustroystvo" association (formerly the "Dorvodzelenstroy" trust) A.Karpov removed G.Karnaukhov from the position of sovkhoz director because he failed the certification process. A new man was appointed to his place. The collective did not agree with the decision. At the general sovkhoz meeting on March 16 it unanimously decided to restore Karnaukhov to his old position. Karpov categorically warned that he would not change his order under any circumstances. The following day, as the management of the association failed to act, sovkhoz workers went on strike. However, the men accepted a reasonable request of party bureau and union committee members: most important work, without which production would suffer irreparably, was still carried out. The party and union committees and the labor collective council were compelled to write to superior party and economic organizations since the conflict situation had to be resolved.

The people had a legitimate reason to be upset. Karnaukhov was a member of the labor collective council and according to the Law on Industrial Enterprises management could not fire, demote or punish him in any other way without the consent of the council. Yet, when he issued his order, Karpov did not even think of asking the council.

Yet, if it were only the question of form, it would not have been difficult to correct the mistake. The replaced director was accused of serious wrongs. Did the collective not have the responsibility to understand the essence of the matter? It did.

At the meeting, the people listened attentively and patiently to A.Rakovskiy, the head of the certification commission; to Karpov, the head of the association; to A.Kazbayev, the secretary of the joint party committee, and to A.Ognevaya, chief agronomist of the Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services.

Later, they spoke themselves. It is worth quoting some speeches, in order to give the sense of the climate prevailing at the meeting.

L. Matrenina, a crew worker:

"I am not afraid to speak out as no boss would want my pick and shovel. Kazbayev has come here, very self-important and all stuck-up. He is the party leader, so it is his job to meet with the workers and to talk to them. Yet, he did not even bother to look at us. According to him (when he introduced Karnaukhov to us originally), Karnaukhov was a qualified specialist and a very remarkable person in all respects. How long ago was it? Now Kazbayev is his chief accuser. I obey managers, but not those who are in our administration. They lie all the time and can't even straighten things out among themselves. They never like those who speak truthfully. Karnaukhov speaks truthfully, that's why they don't like him."

Plumber A. Shishkin, member of the labor collective council and chairman of the people's control group:

"Certification in the hands of people like Karpov is a means of getting rid of people they dislike, since it is well-known that the results of certification cannot be contested even in court. Razumovskiy himself admitted that even before certification he had advised Karnaukhov to submit his resignation. He gave him a friendly advice, he says. Which means that he had known in advance that Karnaukhov would fail certification."

A. Zaporozhets, member of crew No. 9:

"We are now being told about problems at the sovkhov. Yes, we have many problems. It is also true that agronomic services are poorly organized. And what about the assistance that experts from the association and the ministry were supposed to give us? A disease hit our carnations and we could not figure out what kind it was. We asked Ognevaya to tell us what it was and to explain how to treat it. She took a plant and left; this meeting is the first time we have seen her since then.

"Karpov himself introduced Karnaukhov to us and personally praised him. Now he turns out to be no good. This is the fourth director to be replaced in my time. We should be removed from the "Blagoustroystvo" system as they do not let us do our job."

Driver A. Podsolnukhin:

"A day before yesterday we had an agitator here from management. I myself heard him trying to poison workers against Karnaukhov. You all know that Karpov sent such agitators to other crews and nurseries. This is dishonest. What kind of communists are they if they act behind people's backs and would not even come to talk to the collective openly before issuing orders?"

This is not all, and these speeches are incomplete. The minutes of the meeting softened many rude statements. But it is difficult to forget, for instance, how one speaker called Karpov a liar to his face after Karpov's assertion that the sovkhov unprofitably and without official authorization had transferred two hothouses to a cooperative were refuted by documents.

Officials did not come off well during the meeting at which they tried to explain to workers the difficulties faced by their sovkhov.

The situation is difficult indeed. The agronomic and economic services are poor and many shortcomings exist in bookkeeping and control. Accounts for last year's performance, which showed a R300,000 profit for the first time in recent years, were accepted conditionally by Karpov (even though that figure was quoted by a commission which he himself appointed); the sovkhov has no funds in the bank and had to ask for a R150,000 loan to pay salaries.

The workers' mood is understandable: for the first time in a long while they had gotten bonuses for annual performance. Karpov is convinced that this is the only reason why they are so solidly behind Karnaukhov. But labor council members were aware of the general situation and should have understood that the sovkhov was not yet out of the woods and that it was too early to speak of Karnaukhov's economic achievements. Yet, it was the labor collective council that together with the union committee was the first to rebel against the management order and to appeal to the meeting of the collective. The party bureau, too, threw its total and unwavering support behind those two organizations.

What is this position based on?

G. Abdrashitova, union committee chairman:

"At the meeting, you have heard how people who did not have anything against Sh. Bayduanov, the new director, and who did not even know him yet, warned him that in a couple of years management would fire him too for being incompetent and inadequate and would criticize him no matter how hard he tried.

"They had the right to say it. Directors are replaced very quickly at our sovkhov. The association gives no help to newly appointed directors. At the meeting, Karpov pounded himself on the chest for emphasis claiming that all the losses accumulated under his predecessor had been written off for Karnaukhov and what invaluable help it was. But workers see a different situation: most of our hothouses are falling apart and need repairs; the heating system is not just old but faulty to begin with and does not create necessary conditions; labor conditions are very tough and people lack elementary amenities. Instead of forgiving debts, the association, with its massive construction plant, should have helped us by boosting the material and technical base of the sovkhov. But

we have received no such help—even if not for free, even if it would burden the sovkhov with payments and increase our costs—no matter how often we have asked for it. Yet, without it, it is impossible to achieve rapid economic progress. The only solution is lease contract, economic self-management, accumulation of our own funds and gradual replacement of our productive plant. Karnaukhov had been preparing to shift to the lease contract system for more than 6 months. We actively helped him and hoped that it would be a turning point. But instead of signing the contract we suddenly got yet another change of directors."

L.Kalugina, party buro secretary:

"Every change of directors entails a change of experts. Our head bookkeepers are also replaced practically every year on the association's orders. It takes a long time for them to get used to the collective and for the collective to get used to them. This is inevitable because, as the saying goes, every broom sweeps in a new way. Is it natural when this happens every couple of years? And the problem is not only the constant blow to morale. Every time a director is replaced there is a tremendous mix-up in documents, something is misplaced or is incomprehensible. In other words, every time it becomes the proverbial turbulent water where all sorts of fish is caught. Who needs it? For what reason? Who benefits from it?

"Another reason why the party buro decided to support the labor council was that we saw an opportunity to focus the attention of the party and the ministry on our inveterate ills. We were not afraid to escalate the conflict. Our party organization is small but all communists are well-respected in the collective. We could easily control the situation and there was no mention whatsoever of any strike. I think that the mood changed after the meeting due to Karpov and Kazbayev's irresponsible and unyielding statements. We remember that everything started when the Leninskiy Rayon party committee's second secretary A.I.Shelepanov told the workers: "No matter what you say or who you vote for, we'll do as we please and not as you want." After that the situation started to get out of control. We worked hard to get the people back to thinking soberly and calmly and to restore the normal work rhythm.

On March 22, a week after the spontaneous sovkhov meeting, the Leninskiy Rayon party committee called an extraordinary party meeting for sovkhov communists. New rayon committee secretary S.K.Nukenov and Deputy Minister of Housing and Municipal Services V.P.Ionov came to "Gulder". An argument about the assessment of the situation at the farm flared up anew.

However, the communists' position remained firm: no one is allowed to break the law, the collective's opinion must not be treated so cavalierly, musical chairs with directors must be stopped and serious thought must be given to the fate of the long-suffering sovkhov.

First secretary of the rayon party committee Nukenov proposed a general solution: Karpov would formally ask the labor collective council to agree to Karnaukhov's removal, as he was supposed to do in the first place; a commission would be set up to analyze the sovkhov's economic and financial activity, comprised of specialists from third-party organizations and members of the collective; the collective would be informed about the commission's conclusions and then a new director would be chosen in an open competition.

"Tomorrow the labor collective council meets," rayon party committee secretary Shelepanov told me over the telephone. "We have reasons to believe that it will give its consent for Karnaukhov's removal."

The council met for more than 3 hours and did not give its consent.

Almost every day, party members and non-party members call the newspaper from "Gulder":

"Do you still remember us? Do you understand that the essence of the conflict is not our group muscle-flexing? We want you to tell this story on the pages of your newspaper and to analyze it thoroughly."

The story, in my opinion, deserves it. We will also report on the outcome of this conflict, no matter how it ends.

Strike Issues Resolved in Favor of Bus Drivers

*18300552b Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 9 Apr 89 p 4*

[Article by V.Lebedev, from Dzhambul: "Planned Emergency"; under the "Following Up Old Publications" rubric]

[Text] In an article titled "Planned Emergency", KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in its March 27 issue reported extraordinary events that took place at the municipal bus garage No.2 in Dzhambul. On March 14, having become completely frustrated with management's endless promises to restructure at long last industrial relations, the drivers of the garage called a strike. That morning, thousands of city residents were late for work. Losses suffered by enterprises exceeded R100,000.

A commission headed by G.Yefremov, the director of the "Avtotransport" industrial association, thoroughly analyzed the situation at the garage and studied numerous proposals submitted by drivers. Nearly all of their demands were met. The drivers were reimbursed for docked pay for schedule breakdowns. The pay system was reorganized. The revenue plan was no longer the main indicator of driver productivity and was replaced with on-schedule route service performance and passenger service. The transportation control department was

cut by 15 employees. The KaSSR Ministry of Transport's order dated March 20, 1989, abolished cash payments for rides on the "Avtotransport" association's vehicles and replaced them with a system of previously purchased tickets, which will begin in July of this year.

Thus, reason and justice won. It would have been surprising if it had been otherwise. There are no situations without a solution, only indifference, callousness and inaction which can poison the situation in any business and at any industrial site.

Alternate Proposals for KaSSR State Language
18300549 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Mar 89 p 2

[Article by KaSSR Academician S.Z. Zimanov: "Perestroika and Equality of Languages"; under the "Toward the CPSU Central Committee Plenum: Improving Interethnic Relations" rubric; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] During the election campaign in Kazakhstan, as in other union republics, the debate on improving interethnic relations, which will be the focus of the CPSU Central Committee's plenum in the middle of this year, attracted growing interest. The Central Committee has recently discussed preparations for the plenum. Its recommendations included keeping the public informed about progress in developing the concept of the party's nationalities policy; striving to make workers understand the need for thought-out, systematic and consistent approaches to these problems and continuing the broad public discussion of such approaches. Today, KaSSR Academician S.Z. Zimanov shares his views on the issue of state language in a union republic.

The status of languages, and the need to raise their role in strengthening the unity and friendship of the peoples, has become one of the main issues in our society; it is currently undergoing a long-overdue reassessment. The impetus for the reassessment is the new thinking that has come together with perestroika.

There is no need to argue about the importance of the language in the life of a nationality. It is tied by countless threads to its material and spiritual culture. At the same time, the language is a timeless treasure and the very essence of a nationality; it is its code and distinctive feature.

V.I. Lenin wanted the languages of all nationalities to have "maximum equality" under soviet power. During the years of personality cult and stagnation this principle was distorted. Today it is becoming increasingly clear that problems and failures accumulated in the language area are serious enough to have a negative impact on interethnic relations.

In our republic, the Kazakh language has lost a measure of its prestige, persuading some groups of the population that it has no future. The extent of the problem is such that some data now suggest that around 40 percent of Kazakhs either do not know their tongue or know it poorly. In Alma-Ata, 90 percent of adolescents of the indigenous nationality do not speak their language. The situation is similar in other cities of the republic.

This is not so much the result of objective ethnic processes, which did of course have an impact, as of artificial encouragement of those processes with subjective slogans about the decline of the ethnic, the emergence of a single common tongue and the disappearance of ethnic distinctions.

Could the decline of the Kazakh language's prestige not only be stemmed but reversed? Definitely, if optimal and totally indispensable organizational, legislative and ideological measures were developed and implemented. One such measure would be to accord it the state language status and to enshrine this in the republic's Constitution. No state can exist without an official language, and the KaSSR is a sovereign state, as per Article 76 of the USSR Constitution.

In some cases the language is raised, for one reason or another, to the constitutional rank thereby acquiring the power of a law and becoming obligatory. In others, especially when there is no need to do so, the language is not defined legally, in which case its function as a state language is self-evident. For instance, in the constitutions of the United States and Great Britain, there is no direct mention of a state language, but in practice this function is performed by English.

In countries where two or more large ethnic groups live side by side, and especially if they have autonomous political structures, there can be several state languages. For instance, the Irish Republic, which lies next to England and has close ties with it, has the basic law that states: "The Irish language, by virtue of being a national tongue, is the first official language. English is recognized as the second official language." A similar situation exists in Belgium, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

As a revolutionary and a dialectician, Lenin viewed this situation in its actual historical context. He opposed a state language that would be forced onto society, suppressing and subjugating other tongues. In czarist Russia that would have inevitably led to greater inequality of nations and national oppression. In his words, "czarism would not mind totally banning" the languages of non-Russian peoples.

In his "Theses on the Nationalities Issue" written in 1913, Lenin demanded "unconditional equality of nationalities", since under the reactionary monarchical regime, when "government policy is totally permeated

by nationalism", investing the Russian language with legal powers would "create a million new tensions, efforts, irritations and misunderstandings" in interethnic relations.

At the same time, Lenin was fully aware of the significance and the role of Russian in the life of nationalities in an enormous country not only as a means of communication among them but of introducing them to the spiritual riches of Russian and world civilizations. Replying to the liberals, who supported the monarchists on the issue of state language, he wrote: "We have an interest that is even greater than yours in establishing closer ties and fraternal unity among oppressed classes of every nationality inhabiting Russia. And of course we support giving an opportunity to every resident of Russia to learn the great Russian tongue. What we oppose is the element of compulsion."

Lenin's approach to the issue of state language was logical and clear. He linked its solution to the lofty ideals of freedom and equality for all individuals, classes and nationalities. He was not opposed to a state language on principle. As a positive example, he cited Switzerland where state languages were not enforced by "repulsive police measures", so that the population "benefitted from their existence instead of being hurt by it."

In the post-October revolution period, in a number of union and autonomous republics freely choosing their destiny, national tongues were given the status of state languages. For instance, the Bashkir ASSR declared such status for its language, "on an equal footing with Russian", in 1922. In 1923, the Kazakh and Russian languages were declared state languages on the territory of the Kazakh ASSR. At the time, this played a positive role. However, starting in the mid-1930s, previous legislative acts were unfortunately relegated to oblivion, which had a negative impact on the language situation in the republics, including Kazakhstan.

Perestroika has introduced radically new elements in the area of nationalities and interethnic relations, including the language issue. The right of the nationality whose name the republic bears to ensure that its language is a state language on its territory not only formally but in practice is gradually becoming generally recognized both at the center and locally.

Now, the main issue is whether we should recognize both Russian and the national tongue as state languages, or the national tongue alone, with Russian being recognized as a language of interethnic communications. It seems to me that this question should be resolved based on the historical experience and the actual situation in each republic.

In our republic, supporters of both views are ultimately concerned with raising the fallen prestige of the Kazakh language which is rightly considered one of the richest

languages, removing artificial barriers to its development and turning it into a valid means of state and economic communication. I think that this goal would be best served by recognizing both Kazakh and Russian as state languages.

What are the arguments of those who advocate making Kazakh the state language and recognizing Russian as the language of interethnic communications? There are two of them. First, they say that Russian and Kazakh are not equal languages: one is regional and local while the other is union-wide in scope and is also one of the principal languages of world culture. As a result, if both languages were declared official, Russian would overshadow the national tongue.

What can be said about this? Indeed, those differences do exist objectively, but they will not be overcome by passing normative legislation. The essence of the problem is to make sure that the natural dominance of one language does not turn into suppression of the other. Russian-speaking people should extend a helping hand to lead the Kazakh tongue onto the broad highway of independent development. This goal, as mentioned earlier, would be best achieved in our republic by closely linking those two languages.

The second reason is that declaring both Kazakh and Russian official tongues, which has been done many times, has not helped to strengthen or develop the national language. But in reality this was not the fault of bilingualism. The main reason was, first of all, that those decisions, not being passed by highest authorities, lacked the force of constitutional actions. Secondly, they were not supported by serious organizational and political measures and long-term plans. In other words, they were declarations, not effective actions. Even now, regardless of the form the state language status of Kazakh is declared, it would not be especially useful if it is done as a formality.

The essence of the problem is to make Kazakh not only a state language equal to Russian but to ensure that it is a functioning language. This will greatly depend on how thoroughly and thoughtfully its status is defined once it becomes the state language, and what its real authority is.

Bilingualism in national republics is closely linked to the state language and is both its foundation and practical structure. It would be more effective if Kazakh, along with Russian, were made a state language. As a consequence, the responsibility for strengthening both bilingualism and the Kazakh language would shift from individual officials to the state, becoming its duty and the object of its constant attention and creative regulation. Bilingualism would become a significant effective factor in the development of nationalities and interethnic relations.

The heightened prestige and importance of the language of the indigenous nationality will have a positive impact on the overall linguistic situation in the republic and on the development of languages of smaller ethnic minorities inhabiting the republic.

Environmental Protection Plan Draws Critical Comments

18300496a Moscow *SOVETSKAYA KULTURA* in Russian 25 Mar 89 p 2

[Article by I. Savinskaya: "Threat to the Biosphere"]

[Text] Over the past 10 or so years our state has spent 92 billion rubles to protect the environment. This is a gigantic sum. What has been the result.

Every year more than 100 million tons of pollutants are ejected into the atmosphere. In 100 large cities their concentration exceeds the maximum allowable norms by factors of 10 or more.

Because of pollution and waste, the water resources of the Volga, Dnepr, Don, Kuban and Dnestr are practically exhausted.

About 40 percent of all agricultural land is endangered by erosion.

As F. Morgun, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature, said, a gigantic machine for damaging nature has been created in the country. A special meeting of the State Committee was dedicated to this problem. It examined a draft of the long term state program for environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources during the 13th Five-Year Plan and up until 2005.

The purpose of the new program is to radically improve the use of nature, to restructure the activities of ministries and departments in this area and to eliminate the harmful effects of economic activities on humans and nature.

Many points are covered in this monumental work's 400 pages. Its perspectives are so bright that it is hard to believe they are realistic. As I. Popovich, chairman of the Moldavian State Committee for the Protection of Nature, said during the discussions: There has already been too much thought about all sorts of happy programs, which, remaining on paper, have become sort of a consolation for us.

There were stormy discussions of the draft. Various opinions were stated.

Academician I. Petryanov-Sokolov:

I cannot completely agree with the draft's concepts. Some tendencies are not reflected. For example, production is continually increasing. Can all the intended

measures be implemented? Won't new problems arise? In my opinion the only way is to convert all industrial technologies to waste free production. Today finished products only account for 1 percent of the raw materials used. There are huge losses! It is necessary to restructure the psychology of producers so that they clearly know they cannot pollute at all.

G. Yagodin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Education:

Can this program solve the problem? It is not very probable. However, it must be approved—there is no other. The main thing now is to improve society's cultural level. It is necessary to widely propagandize ecological knowledge at all levels. How can one talk about rank and file workers when even enterprise managers display enormous ecological illiteracy.

V. Kozlov, chairman of the Belorussian Committee for the Protection of Nature, laconically noted:

We are tired of endless calls to improve, support, intensify, increase. It is time for concrete deeds.

Morgun on Goskompriroda Balance Between Ecology, Industry

18300496b Moscow *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian 26 Mar 89 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Fedor Trofimovich Morgun, Chairman, USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of Nature]: "Land For a Lifetime"]

[Text] [V. Ivanitskiy] Fedor Trofimovich, we decided to publish our interview on 26 March, election day for USSR People's Deputies. Perhaps not a single candidate has a program without an ecological section. A powerful social movement is being born today. This is given impetus by the condition of water, land and air... How would you characterize the ecological situation?

[F. T. Morgun] To say that our fields, forests, water and sky are in unsatisfactory condition is not to say very much, this is already a feeble commonplace. Calls of alarm are needed. Nature is now tired of waiting for heartfelt attention, she asks for help. Every year more than 100 million tons of pollutants fly into the sky, rivers have been weakened by pollution and waste. Every year 300,000 hectares of productive farm land are covered by buildings, mines, waste dumps or reservoirs. This is equal to the destruction of 50 large farms. The humus content of soil in the Chernozem in the European part of the country has been reduced by one-fourth. One cannot but be concerned that this damage to nature is destroying the very face of the Motherland—the Mother Volga, the grey Dnepr, the quiet Don and the mighty Yenisey. Our history and our roots are beneath them. What about the Russian forest? How much this means to the Soviet

people and to citizens of the world. It seemed that there would be no end to the forest. Now it requires care from Karelia to the Trans-Baykal and the Far East.

Erosion is impoverishing the chernozems of our steppes and forest steppes. The tundra suffers under tractor wheels and tracks. In places the crystal clear rivers of many regions are being darkened. This can become worse. For many years the "subjugation of nature" allowed, through its shortsightedness, the creation of a gigantic mechanism for destroying nature for the sake of the current moment. Not sparing nature, this mechanism also attacked the human spirit so closely attached to nature.

[V. Ivanitskiy] What, in your view, is the reason for the creation of this wasteful mechanism, what gave it impetus?

[F. T. Morgun] It is difficult to analyze the entire complex of historical, economic and social factors leading to the present state of the environment. However, I will mention some things. Previously we rarely turned to world experience in industrial development. Through unplanned industrialization many Western countries found themselves in an ecological blind alley 20-30 years ago. However, then they took stock of the situation, began to set up state institutions to protect the environment and started making instruments and equipment to monitor and control the environment. This experience also includes errors which we have to avoid and discoveries it would be a sin not to utilize.

I will not pile up examples, but will take only one—motor vehicles. They account for almost one-third of pollutants, in large cities often two-thirds. Last November I was in America. I visited many cities, meeting and talking with scientists, ecologists, journalists and several senators and congressmen. Americans are an affable, kind people, who, in my opinion, genuinely wish us success in our perestroika. They are a very hard working people. In America, the successes of which are much greater, and in construction and some other areas, immeasurably greater, much is being done to save nature. However, even they have not avoided problems. The main one is motor vehicles. For example, from downtown Chicago or New York it is about 30 kilometers to their airport. It takes three and a half hours to get there. Yes, the seats are comfortable, but you have to sit in them like in a trap, deafened by noise as the car almost stands still. You move ahead 3 meters, then put on the brakes, 10 meters, then stop. Americans admit that it is a suffocating, crossing trap. However, if he has the money for a suburban house, not a single inhabitant of Chicago, New York or Pittsburg will remain there. Such houses are usually 30-50 and sometimes 100 kilometers from work, in the so-called rest zone. They say one needs money and a lot of it to get along. I understand, but it is necessary to sell not only vehicles, but also in high quality consumer goods, producing more goods to fit out peasants houses and plots and houses and dachas for city

dwellers. The capital invested in motor vehicles is capital, devouring metal, energy, petroleum, requiring additional costs in plant construction. And all faster, faster. Who will pay? Nature and we ourselves.

One can dispute my statements, but let us soberly and thoroughly discuss them.

I think that Tolyatti, Zaporozhe and other such places should continue to produce what they are producing now, but turn the capacity at Elabugi to rural needs, producing automobiles, buses, family vans, truck cranes, portable sawmills, cement mixers and everything else needed by kolkhozes, sovkhoses lessees and cooperative members. Let some shops make pipe, batteries, heating boilers, equipment for wells, bathrooms, toilets. Fill the store shelves with everything needed for a comfortable 3-4 room peasant house and homestead. Of course, it is difficult to argue with what has already been planned, but perestroika gives us the possibility to repeatedly think over and weigh what we plan to do. Take, for example, plants for VVK (protein-vitamin concentrates). Agencies convince us that we cannot get along without such plants. I honestly want to have a well grounded discussion of this subject in the press. We have acquired too much data. In particular, a scientific-practical conference in Tomsk this February spoke out against the large tonnage production and industrial use of single cell protein. At the end of the 1970's the West reoriented itself and began to shift scientific research in this direction.

The desire to want what is fashionable and seems useful, the inability to admit mistakes are typical features of agencies which have created the mechanism of waste.

[V. Ivanitskiy] Fedor Trofimovich, if, in your opinion, this is a wasteful economy, then it should become a conserving one. Just what is this?

[F. T. Morgun] To a great extent today's ecological situation is the result of many years of neglecting and underestimating the importance of the countryside.

I am convinced that money must be invested first of all in peasant houses, for it is only through the countryside that we can restore the purity to the air and water, restore the soil's strength and preserve for all the miracle of the land's creations. Through the countryside lies the rebirth of the feeling of being master, a patriot in ones village and region, a rebirth of the high morality which was always central to our people. The countryside is the best friend of nature, if true peasants live in it. An example of this is the Leninskaya Iskra Kolkhoz, in Chuvashia, led by A. Aidak. There is concern about everything: beautiful fields, gardens, 14 villages, 58 ponds, all is taken care of. The people are friendly and generally feel that they live well at the kolkhoz. Incidentally, they farm here without pesticides and herbicides. The yields are the highest in the rayon. In the forests their are wild deer and boar, in the ponds beaver and the fields are full of

partridge. Only 15 years ago this place was cut by ravines and gullies. Now, having given birth to an economy, it is active. After the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum the country turned its face to problems of the mother-village and to its sources. This is cause for joy and inspires hope for changes.

[V. Ivanitskiy] There are many ecological troubles and many resources and much effort are required to restore the damage. But we do have places where it is sufficient to stop agencies in order to protect nature and consequently the lives of the people living there. I am speaking in particular of the Far North.

[F. T. Morgun] Yes, in recent decades it has been opened to industrial development. Rich reserves of minerals, oil and gas have been found. When we began to develop it we did it in a careless and coarse manner. Two attitudes towards nature collided in the tundra's boundless spaces: One of being nature's child. This has been ingrained in far northerners' hearts and minds since time immemorial; and a thoughtless, assertive one, industrial in the worst sense of the word. Undoubtedly, the region should be developed, but it is necessary to use its riches without damaging it. Nature in the North, and the spirits of far northerners, are easily scarred. The 26 indigenous nationalities and peoples here only total 160,000. For many years their population has not been increasing. Fewer than 43 percent of the indigenous population is engaged in the traditional occupations—reindeer raising, fishing and hunting. This is less than half as many as 40 years ago. This means their roots are vanishing.

We must work slowly on the problems which have accumulated in the North. Among other things, the Arctic is a huge reserve of clean air and genuine nature. It is a very important part of the earth's biosphere, a huge area of general human culture.

[V. Ivanitskiy] Everybody around us, and we ourselves are crying out against the violations of nature. But at the Goskompriroda you are hopeful. How much of this is justified?

[F. T. Morgun] The committee is almost completely formed. Now we are working out a program for ecologically protecting the country as called for in the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers decree. Its main component is to transfer to localities the functions involving the regulation and economic management of nature's use. This means that local soviets of people's deputies, and not agencies will determine how a territory develops. The mechanism for implementing this program is to be enterprise payments for natural resources: land, water and air. These will begin in 1991.

Throughout the entire country it is intended to strictly keep within the maximum allowable concentrations of pollutants. We must stop destroying the biosphere and begin supporting the reproduction of natural resources, so they will not later be taken. I think that this approach

by local soviets will cool the fervor of those talking about the "subjugation of nature." However, one has to realistically admit that without this such a mechanism will not work. It is necessary to restructure our economy, moving enterprises outside of cities, reprofiling dangerous ones, developing and introducing low waste and waste free technologies and resource conserving production techniques. The departmental psychology, which still thinks about economizing at nature's expense must be broken. I think that it is unecological, uneconomical and amoral.

Today we have faced the need to develop a protective canopy of laws specifying responsibility for harming nature. First of all, we need a USSR Law on the protection of nature. Most importantly, we need general public support. The time has come for everyone who values the future, who consider themselves patriots and who want their children to live healthily on our Earth, to rise to its defense. I will start with myself, a clean apartment, a clean house, a neat yard and street where I live and safety where I work. It may be bitter to accept, but we are very sloppy. Nobody parachuted down our trash piles and dirt on streets, pathways and parking lots. I think that these areas should be transferred from municipal services and assigned to organizations and institutions, naturally, on a cost accounting basis. For a start, let us clean up our cities, of which we are rightly ashamed. There must, of course, be well planned methods for processing garbage and waste, based upon experience in other countries. Japan processes 50 percent of urban industrial wastes, Western Europe—30 and America—20 percent, and they criticize themselves mercilessly, considering these levels insufficient. To some extent wastes are processed in our country, in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. There is a well running operation in Murmansk. However, this is clearly insufficient.

[V. Ivanitskiy] Let's assume that we learn how to "clean up", and that the streets get cleaner. However, society is not able to clean the air, soil and water.

[F. T. Morgun] Everything is subject to correction. We can bring order to the sky, the land and the water. Sections in the program are dedicated to these problems. Erosion prevention measures, helped by non-moldboard tillage, will be introduced on 110 million hectares and millions of hectares of new forests will be planted. During this time 55 million hectares will be freed from pesticides. Biological methods of crop protection will replace them. Irrigation systems will be comprehensively rebuilt and drainage systems rearranged. We will start restoring land flooded by reclamation and hydroelectric project builders and begin cleaning lakes, reservoirs and small rivers. Our task is to force ministries and agencies to carry out party and government instructions on protecting nature. It must be noted that nature protection measures are under the strictest control by the USSR Council of Ministers.

[V. Ivanitskiy] You call upon the public, and the public calls upon you. In their turn, managers at many industrial enterprises, especially chemical plants, complain to

environmental protection organs, saying that they hinder the location of plants the country needs. Their is truth in what they say. However, if the Motherland, which is common to all of us, is in danger, it is necessary to unite.

[F. T. Morgun] Yes, I know about these processes. The country's ecological consciousness has grown a lot recently. I know about the large meeting and marches. Every day we receive hundreds of letters from people demanding that we take immediate ecological measures. Here is a letter from Salavat in the Bashkir ASSR, signed by 50,000 of its inhabitants demanding that all industrial development be subordinated to ecological interests.

Representitives from the chemical industry are completely wrong when they call this interference. Rather than engage in "counterpropaganda" they should give objective evaluations of present conditions at chemical enterprises. Many have compromised themselves by large emmissions of pollutants, accidents and poorly planned locations. Why, for example, was the "Azot" [Nitrogen] NPO [Science and Production Association] located in Yasnaya Polyana, a place sacred to every educated person?

Of course, we are not opposed to development in the chemical industry, but we are categorically for clean technology and for none other.

Now something about relations with informal ecological movements. Today they are based upon mutual trust. A public council has been set up at the committee. More than 40 large science, creative, womens', youth, public, environmental and religious organizations and movements proposed 150 people as council members. These individuals have sufficient experience in solving ecological problems and are respected by the public. We think

that the council's main direction will be thorough discussions of large problems in using nature and protecting the environment and in making recommendations for their solution to the USSR Goskompriroda. This is not playing with the public. This is an accurate evaluation of its activities, which are acquiring a practical direction. To me a good example of constructive ecological activity is the creation of the Public Committee to Save the Volga, organized at the initiative of your paper and the RSFSR Writers Union. This is the correct direction and we will thoroughly support it.

[V. Ivanitskiy] Fedor Trofimovich, turning to deputies' campaign programs, they are all for saving nature. Today you are receiving very strong parliamentary support. Can it be hoped that many problems will be easier to solve?

[F. T. Morgun] I am hoping very much for this support. Everything we intend to do should have a precise legal basis. Deputies need the wisdom of a careful farmer and the courage and tenacity of patriots. The struggle for the mandate was only the prelude to the difficult things we have to do. First of all, they must be ready to carry out the promises to people, if not they will loose their mandate. It is time to ring the alarm. The broadest public circles should know where we are going and what we must leave behind. Deputies and politicians must exert every effort to raise the public's consciousness so it can understand very complex problems. Today is time for new ecological thinking and well thought out ecological policies. It was about such policies that M. S. Gorbachev talked about with working people in Kiev. It is demanded by inhabitants of Salavat, Angarsk and Nizhniy Tagil. If some of our deputies decline to formulate and implement this policy, I will be the first to say that they are the wrong people for that job. It is time to save nature not with words, but with deeds. It is only given to us once and for all eternity.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

12 JUNE 89